The Political Career of Erskine Hamilton Childers, 1905-74 by Hynes, Michael Gerald
  
 
 
 
 
 
THE POLITICAL CAREER OF ERSKINE HAMILTON 
CHILDERS, 1905-74 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
MICHAEL GERALD MARIAN HYNES 
 
 
 
THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF PHD 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND 
MAYNOOTH 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor of Research: Dr Denise Dunne 
Head of department: Professor R.V. Comerford 
 
 
 
June 2008 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
Table of contents 
 
 
         Page 
 
Acknowledgements       iii 
 
Abbreviations        iv 
   
Introduction        1 
          
 
Chapter 1 The early political career of Erskine Hamilton Childers,   7 
  1931-51   
  
 
Chapter 2 First ministerial challenge, Department of Posts and   50 
Telegraphs, 1951-4  
      
 
Chapter 3 Minister for Lands, Forestry and Fisheries, 1957-9   80 
      
 
Chapter 4 What price solvency? Minister for Transport and Power,   114 
1959-69         
    
 
Chapter 5 Tánaiste and Minister for Health, 1963-73; forerunner of  154 
the modern  presidency, 1973-4      
   
Conclusion          198 
 
Bibliography          206 
            
            
   
 
 
 
 iii 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 I would particularly like to thank my supervisor, Dr Denise Dunne. From the 
initial guidance in choosing my research topic, Dr Dunne’s patience, encouragement 
and guidance have been fundamental to the completion of my thesis. My thanks also 
to all those in the History Department, who gave generously of their time and 
assistance. Thanks also to the staff in the libraries at NUI Maynooth for their help and 
advice. 
 My thanks also to the staff of the National Archives of Ireland, the National 
Library of Ireland, the library staff in the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food and the record management unit of the  Department of Health and Children for 
providing  documentation and answering my many queries. Thank you to the staff of 
the Aidan Heavey Library, Athlone for their courtesy and assistance during my many 
visits while researching my thesis.  
 To the staff of Trinity College Manuscripts Department and University College 
Dublin Archives Department, thank you for your efforts and assistance. 
 Thanks to all those who granted me interviews and who wrote to me with 
comments and suggestions.  
 Special thanks to my sisters, Teresa and Elizabeth for their interest and 
encouragement throughout my period of study. To my parents, now deceased, thank 
you. Finally, to my son, Daniel, whose encouragement, interest, and understanding 
provided a constant driving force during my period of study and was paramount in the 
successful completion of my thesis.  
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
Abbreviations 
  
 BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation 
 CIE  Coras Iompair Éireann    
 EEC  European Economic Community 
 LC  Land Commission  
 NAI  National Archives of Ireland  
  NE  Fianna Fáil National Executive 
 NFA  National Farmers’ Association   
NHC  National Health Council     
 NLI  National Library of Ireland  
PSC  Publicity Sub-Committee 
RE  Radio Éireann  
RTE  Radio Telefís Éireann  
TCD  Trinity College Dublin    
UCDA  University College Dublin Archives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Abstract  
 Erskine Hamilton Childers, hereafter cited as Childers, was born on the 11 
December 1905 and died during his term as President of Ireland on 17 November 1974. 
First elected to Dáil Éireann in 1938, Childers successfully contested all subsequent 
general elections until he resigned his Dáil seat to successfully contest the presidential 
election in 1973. Childers held the ministerial portfolios of Posts and Telegraphs, Lands 
Forestry and Fisheries, Transport and Power and Health. He also served as Tánaiste 
while Minister for Health. Childers represented the constituency of Athlone-Longford, 
later reconstituted as Longford-Westmeath, from 1938 until 1961 at which time he 
transferred to Monaghan where he remained until his resignation in 1973. Childers was 
educated in England but he developed a love for Ireland from a very young age. He was 
greatly influenced by both his parents, particularly his father, Robert Erskine Childers, 
who was executed by the Irish Free State in 1922.      
 Childers was totally dedicated to all his portfolios, he was named Minister of the 
Year in 1970 by Newsweek magazine. This thesis explores Childers political contribution 
and examines a number of key issues and themes throughout his political career. Such 
themes include the development and subsequent management of the Irish broadcasting 
service; the development of natural resources such as land, fisheries and tourism; the 
evolution of infrastructural services including train services and the Irish post and 
telecommunications system, and the development of the health system. Childers held 
responsibilities in all of these areas at different stages in his political career. Other more 
controversial issues which are examined include Childers decision to return to Ireland in 
1931, his place within the Fianna Fáil party, the extent to which Childers ever understood 
the Irish political system, and the influence of the Catholic Church on his political career. 
 1 
 
Introduction  
 The aim of this thesis is to examine the political and presidential career of Erskine 
Hamilton Childers, hereafter cited as Childers, and thereby contribute significantly to the 
scant body of knowledge currently available on Childers. First elected to Dáil Éireann in 
1938, Childers successfully contested all subsequent general elections until he resigned 
his Dáil seat to contest the presidential election in 1973. During his term in Dáil Éireann 
he held the ministerial portfolios of Posts and Telegraphs, Lands Forestry and Fisheries, 
Transport and Power, and Health. He also served as Tánaiste while Minister for Health. 
Childers represented the constituency of Athlone-Longford, later reconstituted as 
Longford-Westmeath, from 1938 until 1961 at which time he transferred to Monaghan 
where he remained until his resignation in 1973. He was named Minister of the Year in 
1970 by Newsweek magazine.1 
 The focus of the thesis is primarily on the political life of Childers and the 
contributions that he made to Irish political and social life in his various portfolios. It is 
not biographical in approach and the thesis does not encapsulate Childers personal life. 
This approach is justified due to a lack of primary sources coupled with John N. Young’s 
biographical work on Childers.2 The only emphasis given to his personal life is in his 
early years only to demonstrate how this impacted on his entry into political life in 
Ireland. Chiders’s development as a politician is explored by way of his attitude to the 
electorate, his understanding of the political process in Ireland and his handling of his 
various portfolios. During his career Childers emerged as an effective administrator and 
one who fully immersed himself in whatever portfolio was assigned to him. Childers had 
few friends within the political circle and remained aloof from his political colleagues. 
When presented with the opportunity Childers displayed leadership qualities and an 
ability to remain in control under pressure. Childers political background was unique. 
Arguably, he lived in the shadow of his father, Robert Erskine Childers, and he devoted 
his life trying to fulfil the aspirations of both his parents. The influence of his parents, 
particularly his father, had a profound effect on Childers political career. His decision to 
return to Ireland in 1931 is explored in some detail.  Having no connections in the 
                                                
1
 John N. Young, Erskine H. Childers: President of Ireland, a biography (Buckinghamshire, 1985), p.155. 
2
 John N. Young, Erskine H. Childers: President of Ireland, a biography (Buckinghamshire, 1985). 
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Athlone-Longford constituency, his successful entry into Irish politics via this 
constituency in 1938 is considered. When judging his political career it is important to 
keep in mind the personalities and qualities of the leadership of Fianna Fáil during this 
period. Such distinguished national personalities as de Valera, Lemass, Aiken and 
MacEntee were to the front of Irish politics during most of Childers’s political career. 
Standing before a predominately Catholic electorate, Childers, a Protestant, had to 
overcome the disadvantages that this caused him. While his success at the polling stations 
speaks of his success with the public, he did have reservations concerning the promotion 
of his political career due to his religious beliefs. This issue is considered in the light of 
the influence of the Catholic Church in Ireland during the period of his political career, 
particularly the period from 1938 to 1965. Childers was remarkably honest and principled 
which on occasions led him to be politically naïve. Throughout his political career and 
into his short term as president, Childers constantly encouraged the development of 
community associations and local responsibility. Some of the decisions he took during 
his political career raise the question of whether he ever fully understood the Irish 
political class and the Irish political system. He knew what was required to be elected and 
continually voiced Fianna Fáil policies to aid party victories. However, in relation to his 
personal career he did not adjust or amend those practices which impacted negatively on 
his own political progress. There were many contradictions in Childers’s political life and 
some of these are addressed in the thesis. He was somewhat of a visionary in forecasting 
future developments in the areas of infrastructure and services. However, this sense of 
vision was hampered by economic considerations in his management of the Irish rail 
infrastructure.  
 Existing secondary source material on Childers is sparse with only one exclusive 
contribution devoted to the life of Childers by John N. Young.3 This important 
contribution to the Childers story concentrates on the Childers family background and the 
young Childers growing up in London. Young traces Childers’s progression from his 
early school days right through to his presidential campaign in 1973. While I 
acknowledge Young’s valuable contribution to the hitherto non-existent literature on 
Childers, Young nonetheless does not make use of the considerable archive material 
                                                
3
 John N. Young, Erskine H. Childers: President of Ireland, a biography (Buckinghamshire, 1985). 
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available. Using the sources available this thesis explores in greater detail Childers’s 
entry into political life in Ireland, his political contributions and the major issues 
encountered during his career. In short, the thesis defines Childers’s thumbprint 
following his thirty-five years in Irish political life. Other secondary sources include 
references to Childers’s political life with varying levels of detail. In his autobiography 
León Ó Broin, secretary of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs during Childers’s 
first term as minister, provides us with an insight into the broadcasting service under 
Childers’s period as minister.4 A major innovation during Childers’s term was in the area 
of political broadcasting. Unscripted political discussions were allowed and the ban on 
members of Dáil Éireann removed during Childers’s term as minister.5 One of the more 
innovative actions by Childers was the appointment of Maurice Gorham as Director of 
Broadcasting in 1953.  Gorham’s book on broadcasting includes a detailed account of the 
processes and daily on goings at Radio Éireann.6 Gorham outlined Childers term as 
minister and his style of management and control. Having installed a new regime and 
advocated independence for Radio Éireann, Childers found it difficult not to intervene.   
 In his book on the land question Terence Dooley analyses Childers term as 
Minister for Lands Fisheries and Forestry.7 Childers recognised the shortcomings within 
agriculture and that output was hampered by the volume of small farms. He challenged 
the Land Commission to review its own policies but had limited success. Patrick J. 
Sammon stated that Childers was not only hindered by the Land Commission but also 
blocked by his own advisers and the political system.8 Childers’s efforts to reform the 
land allocation process is examined in this thesis. Cormac Ó Gráda painted a dreary 
image of Ireland’s tourist industry in the late 1950s but there is no mention of Childers’s 
efforts in the area of tourism from 1961 to 1969.9   
 The troubles in Northern Ireland and the internal power struggle within the Fianna 
Fáil Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s provided Childers with an opportunity to 
demonstrate that he was not merely a good administrator. His contribution to Irish 
                                                
4
 León Ó Broin, Just like yesterday: an autobiography (Dublin, 1985), pp178-83. 
5
 John Horgan, Irish media: a critical history since 1922 (London, 2001), p.72. 
6
 Maurice Gorham, Forty years of Irish broadcasting (Dublin, 1967), pp 201-22. 
7
 Terence Dooley, The land for the people: the land question in independent Ireland (Dublin, 2004), pp170-
231. 
8
 Patrick J. Sammon, In the Land Commission: a memoir 1933-1978 (Dublin, 1997), pp55-7. 
9
 Cormac Ó Gráda, A rocky road: the Irish economy since the 1920s (Manchester, 1997), pp172-3. 
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politics particularly during this period needs to be highlighted and recognised. According 
to Dermot Keogh, Childers was one of those that Jack Lynch could trust during this 
period of crisis within Fianna Fáil.10 Lynch relied heavily on Childers during this period 
and political commentaries questioned why his abilities were not used more frequently by 
the government. Arguably, J.J. Lee’s observation that it is ‘sometimes said that great 
administrators do not make good politicians’ is particularly appropriate to Childers.11 
Childers’s style of management and communication within government, and how this 
affected his relationship with the taoiseach of the day is explored in this thesis.   
 Childers succeeded de Valera as president and according to Tim Pat Coogan his 
success was attributable more to the fact that he was a Protestant rather than for his 
ministerial record.12 An increasing ecumenically minded electorate was a positive for 
Childers but factors such as his lengthy political career and the personality of the man 
were also decisive in his success. Fine Gael viewed Childers’s success as a personal 
victory for Childers himself rather than a Fianna Fáil party victory.   
 There are ample primary sources available on the political life of Childers. He 
held a variety of ministerial portfolios over a twenty-two year period and the 
departmental papers deposited in the National Archives of Ireland are of prime 
importance. These papers cover his terms as Minister for Posts and Telegraphs and 
Transport and Power. The papers of the Department of the Taoiseach in particular and 
those of the Department of Foreign Affairs were also of considerable benefit.  However, 
the ministerial records for his term as Minister for Lands, Fisheries and Forestry were not 
deposited in the National Archives of Ireland at the time of writing this thesis and efforts 
to locate them through the Department of Agriculture and the Land Commission have 
proven unsuccessful.13 A similar story holds true for his term as Tánaiste and Minister for 
Health. The ministerial records for health were not deposited in the National Archives of 
                                                
10
 Dermot Keogh, Twentieth-century Ireland: nation and state (Dublin, 1994), p.307. 
11
 J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: politics and society (Cambridge, 2001), p.367.  
12
 Tim Pat Coogan, Disillusioned decades: Ireland 1966-87 (Dublin, 1987), p.52. and De Valera: long 
fellow, long shadow (London, 1993), p.688. 
13
 Confirmation with author from the National Archives of Ireland dated 25 Sept. 2005 that records for 
Childers term as Minister for Lands, Fisheries and Forestry are not deposited there. Also letters from the 
Land Commission and Dept of Agriculture dated 24 June 2005 and 5 Sept. 2005 respectively confirming 
the unavailability of Childers records as minister.  
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Ireland at the time of writing this thesis.14 However, the Department of Health and 
Children, record management unit, have provided hitherto unseen records covering 
Childers’s term as Minister for Health. While limited use is made of these records they 
are not, in the main, relevant to this thesis. The Government Information Services files, 
deposited in the National Archives of Ireland are very useful as they provide the speeches 
and newspaper reports covering all of Childers’s ministerial portfolios.15 Files relating to 
Childers’s short term as President of Ireland are also deposited in the National Archives 
of Ireland.16 
 The Fianna Fáil papers deposited in University College, Dublin provide details of 
Childers’s early political work within the Fianna Fáil organisation.17 This depository also 
includes the papers of Sean MacEntee, Eamon de Valera, Frank Aiken and Sean 
MacEoin all key political figures during Childers political career. 
 Childers was a regular contributor during Dáil debates and this source is 
particularly useful in gathering information on issues concerning Childers.18 His 
departmental estimate speeches are of considerable assistance in assessing Childers’s 
control and development of his varied portfolios. He was always thorough in preparing 
memoranda for the Taoiseach and government departments and his speeches and answers 
to questions in the Dáil are generally similarly presented.  
 The private papers of Childers are deposited in Trinity College, Dublin.19 These 
invaluable papers range from correspondence to and from his parents while Childers was 
at boarding school, ministerial correspondence through his political career through to 
press cuttings and party literature during his presidential campaign.  
 A measurement of Childers’s achievement while responsible for the broadcasting 
service can be gauged by examining the additional programming and increased broadcast 
hours during his term as minister. The National Library of Ireland houses the Radio 
                                                
14
 Confirmation with author from the National Archives of Ireland dated 25 Sept. 2005 that records for 
Childers term as Minister for Health are not deposited there.  
15
 Speeches and newspaper reports for ministerial portfolios and presidency, 1951-73 (N.A.I., GIS-
Ministers’ Speeches, MS GIS 1/57-1/72). 
16
 Presidential records, 1973-4 (N.A.I., Uachtaráin na hÉireann, MS 2004/25/1-2004/25/66). 
17
 Fianna Fáil papers, 1913-95 (U.C.D.A., P176). 
18
 Dáil Éireann debates, 1938-74 (http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie) (27 May 2005). 
19
 Childers papers, 1905-74 (T.C.D., MS 9935-10046). 
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Review and the annual reports and radio handbooks published by Radio Éireann during 
Childers’s term as minister.20 
 Newspapers, especially local editions, are particularly useful in determining the 
local response to issues that confronted Childers. This source is of particular value when 
assessing Childers’s term as Minister for Lands. Reports from the Central Statistics 
Office and those of the Land Commission assist in dealing with his term as Minister for 
Lands.  
 Interviews with the author and written communications with selected people, such 
as Nessa Childers, T.K. Whitaker, Garret Fitzgerald, Barry Desmond and Sean Sherwin, 
also assisted in the analysis of the development of Childers’s political career.21 Personal 
contacts and recollections of the interviewees provide evidence that has not been found in 
the written sources to date. 
 Before analysing the political contribution of Childers over thirty-five years and 
his efforts to redefine the role of the presidency, it is necessary to establish his Irish 
connections and present some aspects of his family background and the circumstances 
that were to influence and guide Childers throughout his entire public life.  
                                                
20
 Radio reviews and annual reports, 1949-54 (N.L.I., MS newspaper catalogue, hard copy, Jan 1949-Dec. 
1954, MS IR621384 rl). 
21
 Interview with Nessa Childers of Clonskeagh, Dublin 14 (2 Sept. 2005), Garret Fitzgerald of Ranelagh, 
Dublin 6 (20 Dec. 2007), Barry Desmond of 2 Taney Ave., Dublin 14 (22 Nov. 2005), Seán Sherwin of 
65/66 Lower Mount Street, Dublin 2 (2 June 2005). 
Written communications with T.K. Whitaker of 148 Stillorgan Road, Dublin 4 (13 Dec. 2005), Barry 
Desmond of 2 Taney Ave., Dublin 14 (17 Oct. 2007). 
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Chapter 1  
The early political career of Erskine Hamilton Childers, 1931-51 
The Childers family can trace its ancestry back to the reign of King Edward III. 
Robert Caesar Childers, grandfather of Erskine Hamilton Childers, was born in 1838 
and married Anna Barton of Glendalough in County Wicklow thus providing the 
family with its Irish connection. Robert and Anna lived in London and their second 
son; Robert Erskine Childers was born in 1870.  Robert Erskine Childers married 
Mary Alden Osgood and on the 11 December 1905 their son, Erskine Hamilton 
Childers was born. 
Erskine Hamilton Childers, hereafter cited as Childers, childhood was typical 
of an upper class London family of that period. His nanny would take him to the 
Chelsea Embankment gardens and as he grew older he was taught to appreciate nature 
and observe the changing seasons. His formal education commenced at a small private 
kindergarten school when Childers was five years old and it was also during this 
period that his brother, Robert was born. The highlight of the young Childers’s year 
was the visit to Ireland. At Glendalough House, Annamoe in County Wicklow, 
Childers had the environment and grounds to challenge him. Fishing, hill walking and 
explorations of the woodlands gave the young Childers a view of life different to his 
own life in London. 
 Childers was mature for his years and he understood his parents desire to 
devote themselves to Irish independence. He was greatly influenced by his father, 
Robert Erskine Childers. Having moved to Glendalough House, Annamoe, County 
Wicklow at a very young age, Robert Erskine Childers developed a great love for 
Ireland. A Unionist and imperialist, Robert Erskine Childers was educated at 
Cambridge University. Despite a career in the British civil service and armed forces 
his interest in home rule for Ireland grew following the Liberal success in 1906. In 
1914 he used his yacht, the Asgard, to bring guns into Howth for the Irish Volunteers. 
He became increasingly republican and in 1919 he was appointed director of publicity 
for the Irish Republican Army. Elected to the Dáil in 1921 he was appointed its 
minister for propaganda. Robert Erskine Childers was first secretary to the Irish 
delegation in the negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Irish treaty, which he strongly 
opposed. Thoroughly disliked by the Free State government he was one of the first 
  
  
8 
republicans to be executed on 24 November 1922 during the Irish Civil War. 
Following the death of Michael Collins the IRA was forced to break up into smaller 
groups and move to more remote country districts. Robert Erskine Childers based 
himself in the hills of west Cork. He was the republican director of propaganda and 
according to Diarmaid Ferriter was erroneously believed by some to be ‘the military 
mastermind of republican opposition’.1 Days before his death Robert Erskine Childers 
reflected on the unusual circumstances of his situation: 
I have been held up to scorn and hatred as an Englishman who, betraying 
his own country, came here to lecture and destroy Ireland. Another and 
viler version is to the effect that so far from betraying England, I have 
been actually acting as the secret instrument of Englishmen for ruining 
Ireland.2 
 
Ireland was of special interest to Erskine Hamilton Childers from a young age 
and he was angry at British repression and injustice; he was proud to think of himself 
as an Irishman. He kept a photograph of Eamon de Valera on his locker at boarding 
school and next to his father; de Valera was his greatest hero.3 Childers was teased 
over this but remembering his father’s advice, he never became abusive or 
discourteous. In May 1921 Childers wrote to his brother Bobby stating: ‘isn’t it 
wonderful about father’s election aren’t you proud?’4 Even at the young age of fifteen 
years Childers was expressing an interest in the politics of Ireland. In a letter to his 
parents during the summer of 1921, he stated ‘I am so longing for peace in Ireland’.5 
On the peace talks and subsequent conference Childers was very excited and in a 
letter to his parents asked ‘Why isn’t the President going?’.6 During the negotiations 
Childers  hoped that: ‘father and uncle Bob will be able to come down to see me one 
day, they must have one or two breaks I am sure in the continuity of the conference’.7 
In letters to his parents Childers demonstrated the enormity of his love for them and 
the influence that his father, in particular, had on him. On his sixteenth birthday, 11 
December 1921, he wrote of his increasing love for his parents and his desire to ‘live 
                                                          
1
 Diarmaid Ferriter, The transformation of Ireland 1900-2000 (London, 2005), p.262. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 John N. Young. Erskine H. Childers President of Ireland a biography (Buckinghamshire, 1985), p.26.   
4
 Letter from Childers to brother Bobby, 24 May 1921 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/190). 
5
 Letter from Childers to his parents, 1921 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/194). 
6
 Ibid., Sept./Oct. 1921(T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/196). 
7
 Ibid., Oct. 1921(T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/197). 
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up to father’s greatness’.8 Childers kept up with happenings in Ireland through 
newspaper cuttings sent from home. On hearing of Cathal Brugha’s death on 7 July 
1922 he wrote, ‘to think of Mrs Brugha and those 5 quaint little children. Somebody 
ought to write his life. The moment I spoke to him I loved him’.9 Writing to his 
parents in July 1922 Childers  expected to read of his father’s wounding and 
suggested that the I.R.A. would never be successful until they returned to the old style 
warfare. He read volumes on the history of Ireland and had a love for classical music, 
literature, poetry and nature in general. When he was fifteen and attending Gresham’s 
School in Norfolk, he wrote what he described as ‘one of the best essays I have ever 
written. It is the record in the school for length and it is top mark’.10 During his 
political career Childers wrote many long and sometimes over elaborate memoranda 
which did not always receive top marks from his political colleagues. 
The unrest in Ireland had a very deep effect on Childers. In a letter to his 
parents dated 1922 he hoped that they were well and that he: 
Can’t stand the fighting. It is too awful. Heaven help Rory O’Connor. I 
pray night and day for him. Has he any chance at all. Remember father 
please what I told you when I was leaving in the train. I feel I ought not to 
be here, while fighting goes on. Oh mother please help me in this 
dilemma. I long to go and help. How can I stay here while Rory is battling 
for the Republic. 
I know I ought to be educated, but I swear I will make up for it.11 
 
While it is not possible to definitely say that Childers was prepared to fight, neither 
can it be refuted that he never held such aspirations in his younger life. In a note to 
Childers dated 2 July 1922 his father stated that ‘I am working for the Republic in the 
war. I am sure you will understand what it all means and I know how you are 
feeling…it’s such a passionate joy that our boy is with us and will carry the torch 
when we are gone’.12 Although this note can be interpreted in many ways what can be 
said for definite was that in his later political career Childers was totally opposed to 
violence. This was the last letter from his father to Childers. 
                                                          
8
 Letter to his parents, 11 Dec. 1921 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/201). 
9
 Ibid., Jly. 1922 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/229). 
10
 Ibid., 4 Nov. 1921 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/198).  
11
 Ibid., Rory O’Connor was one of the party that seized the Four Courts on 14 April 1922, they 
surrendered on 30 June. O’Connor was executed by the government on 8 Dec, one of the seventy-seven 
anti-treaty prisoners executed. 1922 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/240). 
12
 Letter from his father to Childers, 2 Jly. 1922 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9991/332).  
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Robert Erskine Childers was captured on 10 November 1922 in County 
Wicklow whilst in possession of a hand gun given to him by Michael Collins. 
Childers’s mother sent a note to him with the news that his father ‘was arrested this 
a.m…he is in Wicklow jail. Pray for him that he may be kept safe…thank God he is 
not killed – a miracle. He is wonderful beyond words’.13 On hearing of his father’s 
arrest Childers left at once for Dublin. Despite attempts by his legal team and 
representations from influential friends on both sides of the Irish Sea, the Free State 
Government imposed the death penalty on Robert Erskine Childers. The last time 
Childers saw his father was in his prison cell at Dublin’s Portobello Barracks. His 
father sought his promise that he would never refer to the Civil War and that he would 
do everything possible to reconcile Irishmen with one another and with Britain. 
Robert Erskine Childers requested his son to approach those who had signed his death 
warrant and convey his forgiveness. During his last days, Childers’s father ensured 
that every action led to reconciliation and even shook hands with the firing squad at 
Beggars Bush Barracks.14 His father’s words of healing and reconciliation helped 
Childers to overcome the instincts of bitterness and hate which would naturally cloud 
the thinking of most sixteen-year-old boys in such circumstances. However, his 
daughter, Nessa Childers, recalled her own concerns with death bed promises.15 
Childers would subsequently spend his entire political life living up to the promises 
he made to his father and this arguably limited his career prospects.  
After his father’s execution on 24 November 1922, Childers returned to 
England but was feeling very miserable. Writing to his mother in December 1922 he 
recounted a meeting with a journalist who sat down beside him for dinner. The 
journalist remarked that ‘it was jolly good thing that fellow Childers was executed’.16 
Childers responded with dignity and an enormous amount of restraint saying that ‘it 
may be for some people. My feelings might be different as I am his son’.17 Childers’s 
mother was a remarkably strong person and a great comfort to the young Childers. In 
a letter dated 5 June 1923 he tells his mother of the ‘wonderful spirit you have to 
suffer so bravely as you do. I don’t know what I would do if I hadn’t the example of 
                                                          
13
 Letter from his mother to Childers, 10 Nov. 1922 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9991/351). 
14
 Uachtaráin, TG4 documentary series, Wed. 9 May 2007. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Letter from Childers to his mother, Dec. 1922 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/250). 
17
 Ibid. 
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you, and those mothers I saw, to follow’.18 He was living in a world where ‘half of 
everything is blotted out obliterated and refilled with that awful suffocating sorrow 
that I never knew of before’.19 He sought for meaning in the sorrow he experienced 
and turned to his religious beliefs to provide him with a beacon of light. In the same 
letter he continued: 
Sometimes I want to thank God that he gave me this to bear when young 
to help me to understand the suffering of the world. It is hard to do that 
because it seems to contradict so many wonderful God given things, such 
as the deep personal love between father and me. What a wonderful friend 
he was. 20 
 
Some weeks after his father’s death, Childers met his grandmother in London 
following her arrival from the United States. Ruth Ellen Dow, whom his grandmother 
had met on her journey from the United States, joined them on a visit to the British 
Museum. Both were searching to fill voids in their lives at that time and they 
immediately struck up a rapport that was to grow and flourish. Ruth Ellen Dow would 
become Childers’s first wife on 26 September 1925. 
His deep sense of loss was still with him as he wrote to Ruth on 17 April 1925: 
I am feeling so lonely at this minute….This afternoon I have been reading 
father’s letters and missing him, missing things he could give to us which 
no human mortal can, missing him with an ache of misery….I feel 
exhausted with loneliness…the horror of it all makes me lose my 
breath….Why does life do these things, out of suffering cometh joy. And I 
know I cannot give in. I cannot accept human nature and become 
disillusioned as most mortals….I want to cry my heart out and I can’t.21 
 
The August 1923 general election coincided with school holidays and Childers 
returned to Ireland to campaign for Robert Barton who was in prison at this time. 
With most of the leading opponents of the Treaty in prison or in hiding, the youth and 
women of Sinn Féin carried on much of the electioneering. At a rally in O’Connell 
Street, Dublin in August 1923 Childers made his first public address. He addressed 
the crowd as republican comrades and continued: 
In the name of Erskine Childers, my beloved father, I stand here to protest 
against the arrest of our President and great leader, Mr de Valera, a friend 
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to every one of us. Does the Free State Government believe that they are 
promoting peace when they take him away from us? 
Though we are deprived of his inspiring guidance we will remember his 
noble example and what he has taught us, and will do all that in us lies by 
faithful labour and, if need be, sacrifice, to strengthen the Republic….I ask 
you to pray night and day for his safety and that Ireland may never again 
be stained by the blood of her faithful sons.22 
 
  In an article for The Republican Leader: Wicklow Edition dated 22 August 
1923 Childers pleaded with the electorate to vote for Robert Barton, and to remember 
Barton’s self-sacrifice for Ireland and the ideals for which he stood. The land of 
Ireland for the people of Ireland held in complete freedom. In a rare comment on his 
father’s death, the young Childers stated: 
For believing in and working for this Gaelic ideal my beloved father, who 
was Robert Barton’s dearest cousin, friend and fellow-worker, was shot in 
Beggar’s Bush Barracks by Irishmen who have betrayed Ireland’s 
freedom. 
 But Robert Barton, by the mercy of God, still lives to accomplish his 
work and to vindicate my father’s life and death.  
Is my father’s sacrifice for you to be in vain? The answer rests with you. 
I ask you in his name to vote for Robert Barton and to redeem our 
National Honour.23 
 
In the same publication dated 26 August 1923 Childers made a final appeal to the 
Wicklow electorate on Robert Barton’s behalf, referring once more to his father’s 
death: 
Can you see him facing the foreigners’ squad? Do you hear the shots of 
the rifles? He died for your sake. His last prayer was “God grant to our 
people victory and peace”. Be true to his memory….Show to England that 
Erskine Childers and the Martyrs of Ireland have not died in vain.24 
 
In England the newspapers featured the O’Connell Street rally and showed pictures of 
Childers on the platform.25 Pressure from the British establishment led to the 
headmaster of Gresham’s School asking Childers to leave the school in July 1924. 
Childers recalled that the headmaster was ‘not in the least disappointed with me and 
says that I am to remember that it is entirely circumstances connected with me not any 
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fault in me’.26 He was successful in the entrance examination for Cambridge and 
passed through the Great Gate of Trinity College, Cambridge in October 1924.  
Childers and Ruth Ellen Dow continued to write to each other and their talk of 
marriage led to his grandmother advising Ruth that nothing was to interfere with her 
grandson’s studies.27 However, the marriage of Childers and Ruth took place on 26 
September 1925 at Exeter, New Hampshire. Back at Cambridge they lived in a tiny 
flat and Ruth obtained a secretarial position to finance them. By Christmas 1926 Ruth 
was pregnant and Childers missed a term which necessitated a further year’s study. 
He needed a summer job and wrote to Carlos Drake, a Chicago hotel and travel 
magnate. Childers was successful and spent the summer acting as a courier for 
Americans touring England. The highly enjoyable courier work led Childers to visit 
Paris in October 1927 to consider further possibilities. He returned to Cambridge with 
two offers of employment secured and studied hard to graduate as a Bachelor of Arts 
in June 1928. A character reference from Trinity College, Cambridge described 
Childers as having ‘an unblemished character. His conduct and diligence have given 
satisfaction to the authorities of the college’.28  
Childers returned to Paris after the June 1928 examinations and commenced 
work in the Drake offices. He coped well with the complexities of international travel 
and was made Travel Manager. Childers’s detailed planning and attention to detail 
was all part of his day’s work. The position allowed Childers to demonstrate his 
administrative abilities and he shared in the firm’s success. He bought a car and the 
family moved to a large apartment in a more fashionable suburb of Paris. It is worth 
noting the detail and service offered by the Drake organisation to its customers. This 
would have contributed to the success of the company and its ability to remain open 
during the world depression of the late 1920s. Attention to detail suited Childers well 
and this would be very evident in his style of working during his political career. An 
example can be gleamed from an extract of the itinerary prepared for Mrs. Emil W. 
Wagner. After arriving at Bremen the client was met by a company representative and 
assisted through customs control. Once through customs the client was taken by a 
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company agent to her hotel. All activities were arranged for the client and an English 
speaking representative provided when necessary. The tailor made itinerary for the 
client was in the form of a pocket sized booklet comprising thirty-four pages of details 
and a map of the travel destinations.29 In early 1929 Ruth returned to Dublin for the 
birth of their second child and work pressures prevented Childers from travelling to 
Dublin to see his new-born son. Childers’s letters to Ruth tell of how busy he was at 
C.C. Drake and that he had lots of clients. During this period he was promised a 
considerable increase in salary and he was advised that he had ‘a very big future’ in 
the firm.30 In a letter to Ruth dated February 1929 he stated that ‘the most tremendous 
thing in my life is Ireland’.31 He dreamed of being in Ireland making election 
speeches and with the experience gained away from Ireland he naively speculated on 
starting a business in Ireland that would employ all in the Republican movement. In a 
note to Ruth, probably dated early April 1929, Childers informed her that his new 
salary was 6,350 francs and that ‘this is secret will explain when I see you’.32 Despite 
the continuing good fortunes at C.C. Drake this was a period of economic turmoil and 
it appears that Childers’s mother was at least preparing the ground work for Childers’s 
return to Ireland. She wrote to him on 29 July 1930 outlining his options in Ireland as 
she saw them. After consulting with de Valera and others she suggested the possibility 
of a minor position in the planned Fianna Fáil newspaper but she was anxious that 
Childers not commit himself ‘to any party policy’.33 Another suggestion for Childers 
to consider was that of lecturing but his mother advised him that the salary was 
‘starvation wages’.34 Childers’s best prospects lay, according to his mother, in the 
legal profession. This letter is important as it shows that his mother did not exert any 
undue influence on Childers to enter politics in Ireland. However, in relation to the 
legal profession, she did state that ‘most of the Irish patriots came forward out of that 
profession’.35 
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The world depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s changed the world 
order and provoked extreme nationalism paving the way to dictatorship and the 
Second World War. The turmoil had an inevitable effect on the tourist industry and 
the financial pressures experienced by Childers were taking their toll on him. 
Childers’s third child and second son, Robert Winthrop was born in Paris in June 
1931 and as soon as he could travel, Ruth and the children travelled to America.36 The 
intention was that Childers would join his family in America for a brief holiday. 
However, by 27 August 1931 the situation at C.C. Drake was ‘gloomy not hopeless 
everyone sacrificing one months salary’.37 Writing to Ruth on 13 September 1931 
Childers stated that up to September the loss at Drake for the year was 4,000 US 
Dollars ‘which in view of the crisis is rather satisfactory’.38 Constantly outlining their 
cash position in letters to Ruth, he stated that ‘I never want any more children. We 
have one too many already, God bless him, for people of our probable income’.39 By 
16 October 1931 Childers had decided to see what was available for him in Ireland 
when he next visited there. His desire to return was also driven by the fact that ‘I see 
no way with my means of learning more about businesses’.40 He considered going to 
America for one year to study but his financial situation prevented him from doing so. 
The issue of Childers’s return to Ireland is one which requires some consideration. It 
is true that the depression of 1929 placed a financial burden on him and hastened the 
date of his return to Ireland. However, it is clear that his intention was always to 
return to Ireland and enter politics. There is plenty of evidence to support this view. In 
a letter to his mother in 1924-5 Childers pondered his future career and stated that: ‘I 
wish to follow father in perhaps at some date being a TD if I can attain to this’.41 The 
influence of his father ‘inspired me to work for Ireland and I owe everything to his 
influence and to his name’.42  Childers was sad leaving Paris particularly his office but 
‘real life is in Ireland and the rest is momentary reaction’.43 A letter to Childers, dated 
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27 November 1931, from his former headmaster at Gresham’s School in Norfolk 
stated that it was always Childers’s desire and intention to return to Ireland: 
I am glad that you are going back to Ireland. I always knew you would 
because you felt a call to carry on your father’s work. I should like to say 
“God-speed” to you. You will take it up with the right sort of ideals and 
enthusiasm, and I very much hope you will feel, by the time that you have 
lived to my age, that you have done something to create “the simple 
harmonious civilisation in Ireland” which is your aim.44 
 
In a letter to Ruth in 1923 he spelled out the sort of Ireland he hoped to see in the 
future. He did not want to see Ireland industrialised, if Ireland could not survive and 
prosper on agriculture, then it should stay poor.45 He goes on to say in the letter that 
he hopes people will not try to bring Ireland ‘into line with the foremost nations of the 
earth. Let her remain pure and simple in frugality’.46 This aspiration would have 
pleased de Valera who echoed it so famously many years later. Childers was most 
likely reflecting something of a romantic view of Ireland. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Childers shared de Valera’s vision of a Gaelic Ireland. Childers refused to 
learn Irish, and in his letter, dated 10 February 1948, to Tom Mullins, General 
Secretary of Fianna Fáil, he stated that: ‘whether it is right or wrong to teach Irish 
intensively, the men brought from the Gaeltacht to become teachers in many cases 
have neither the personality nor the qualifications fore such work….our 
supporters….have little hope that the Taoiseach will achieve his ideal’.47 No clear 
demonstration by Childers of his support for de Valera’s Gaelic Ireland. Later in his 
political career Childers’s aspirations for a frugal Ireland would change significantly. 
The influence and support provided by Ruth may be judged in her correspondence 
with Childers. In late 1927 she wrote: ‘I would follow you to the ends of the earth – 
my torch bearer’.48 In February 1929 Ruth was in Ireland and wrote to Childers: ‘I am 
terribly lonely for you here in Ireland’.49 Ruth considered living in France and was 
certain that she did not want to live in America. Circumstances dictated that she spent 
some time in America, but she wrote, ‘of course I shall never want to live anywhere 
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but Ireland’.50 In a letter to Childers in 1930 Ruth suggested that the C.C. Drake 
Company would not survive the depression but she is ‘not in the least depressed and 
my confidence in my darling Erskine is complete and sure’.51   
Ruth’s suggestion of the demise of the Drake Company proved incorrect. 
Childers resignation from C.C. Drake was ‘accepted but with deep personal regret’.52 
His reference from the C.C. Drake Company tells us much about Childers and his 
return to Ireland. Signed by C.C. Drake, President of the company, it detailed the 
period Childers had worked in the Paris office and that: 
He is leaving us of his own accord in order to engage in work which he 
has long wanted to do in his own country. We appreciate the motive 
causing him to resign as Manager of our Paris Office....Mr. Childers is a 
young man of absolute honesty, strong will, and extraordinary ability. He 
carried on his work….with intelligence and imagination under many 
difficult conditions….And he was always one in whom a management 
abroad could place the greatest confidence.  
We feel that any organization employing Mr. Childers is fortunate to have 
such a young man.53 
 
C.C Drake survived the great depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s largely due 
to its reputation for more individual service. In fact when Childers resigned to return 
to Ireland a notice to this effect was published and his replacement notified to the 
public. The piece goes on to say ‘though some travel agencies are restricting their 
activity, Drake is extending its facilities, expecting France to attract even more 
tourists next year’.54  In an autobiographical article for Town & Country in November 
1946, Carlos Drake described Childers as ‘enthusiastic and almost absurdly boyish-
looking’. Drake referred to Childers’s one ambition, ‘to become President of 
Ireland’.55 It would appear that Childers harboured aspirations of becoming President 
of Ireland as far back as the late 1920s or early 1930s.  It should be noted that 
becoming president prior to 1937 was different to becoming president after 1937. 
Childers maintained contact with his former employer. The relationship that existed 
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between Childers and Carlos Drake is represented in a letter from Drake to Childers 
received in the Department of Transport and Power on 7 December 1961. In the letter 
Drake apologised for failing to write to Childers and invited him to his home as they 
‘would have so much to talk about before a warm fire. I could think of nothing more 
enjoyable’.56  
In Ireland, the political scene was changing quite radically. The formation of 
Fianna Fáil in the La Scala Theatre in Dublin in 1926 was ‘to transform Irish 
politics’.57 The party’s formation followed ‘divisions within anti-Treaty Sinn 
Féin…about the future direction of Irish republican politics’.58 De Valera, President of 
Sinn Féin, had his motion to work towards the removal of the oath of allegiance to the 
English Crown defeated at the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis of 1926. He resigned as president 
and launched the Fianna Fáil party, which soon eclipsed Sinn Féin. Following the 
assassination of Kevin O’Higgins an Electoral Amendment Act was introduced by 
Cosgrave in 1927 which required parliamentary candidates to swear that if elected 
they would take the oath of allegiance. This presented de Valera with a problem 
which he solved according to J.J. Lee by: 
Reassuring his conscience that inscribing his name in the book containing 
the oath, which the clerk of the Dáil kept in his office, while placing the 
bible in the furthest corner of the room, face downwards, and covering the 
words of the oath while he was signing his name, insisting all the time that 
he was taking no oath….thus, seeing no oath, hearing no oath, speaking no 
oath, signing no oath, the Soldiers of Destiny shuffled into Dáil Éireann in 
August 1927.59 
 
De Valera had considered the launching of a newspaper to represent 
republican aims and in September 1931 the first edition of the Irish Press was 
launched. Childers returned to Ireland for a few days and was warmly greeted by de 
Valera when he went to see him. Childers wrote to Ruth on the 30 October 1931 that: 
I have been to see Dev and he can almost certainly get me a job on the 
paper. Miserable salary to begin with of course. He wants me to become a 
T.D. as soon as the oath is abolished as he says the party needs young 
blood….Remember that our life is going to be tough, is there any way 
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your father could give you an  allowance….We have got to manage 
without it being drudgery for you.60 
 
All was settled by 24 November and in a letter to Ruth, Childers stated: 
It is wonderful to be really going back to Ireland to our real life 
together….There is so much to do that it almost overwhelms one. You and 
I are going to do it together hand in hand….in spite of all the difficulties. 
It’s all too wonderful.61 
 
Childers would be in the Dáil as soon as a suitable seat was available. In the 
meantime he accepted the position of Assistant Advertisement Manager with the Irish 
Press and was promoted to the position of Advertisement Manager within a few 
months. Childers frequently cycled to his office and took every opportunity to head to 
the west or southwest for breaks. Hill climbing was his way of escaping life’s 
pressures. The Irish Youth Hostels Association was founded in 1931 and Ruth took a 
keen interest in its activities. Childers believed that if young people could visit Ireland 
at a reasonable cost they would see for themselves the beauty of the country. At the 
Irish Press Childers actively encouraged a Buy Irish campaign. In a letter to the 
General Manager of the Irish Press dated 21 January 1935 Childers stated that his 
personal affairs dictated that he increase his income. He proposed to do this by taking 
directorships while continuing to work at the paper. Childers was considering having 
one permanent directorial interest as it was his intention ‘to go seriously into political 
life (if the fates permit!)’.62 Childers’s other choice was to take up an interest ‘in one 
of the best firms in Dublin….but this would preclude me from being a salaried official 
in “The Irish Press”’.63 Coming from his background in C.C. Drake, Childers found 
his position in the Irish Press frustrating. His activities were ‘supervised, and 
proposals for publicity submitted are held up for too long periods….Plans I suggest, 
such as future Spring campaign do not receive the attention they should in a modern 
organization’.64 Childers resigned from the Irish Press and joined Arks Limited, 
advertising agents, as Director in 1935. On 26 February 1938 he applied for the 
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position of General Manager at Aer Rianta and requested that his application ‘be 
regarded as absolutely confidential’.65  
The year 1932 was the beginning of a new era in Irish politics and also the 
start of a new phase of Childers’s life. Fianna Fáil electoral success over Cumann na 
nGaedheal in March 1932 led to a period of tariffs and trade restrictions. Tariffs did 
initially boost industrial output and employment and the balance was tipped away 
from the large farmers to the small farmers and farm labourers. Protectionist policies 
of the early 1930s did have their critics, but as Cormac Ó Gráda correctly asserts, 
‘evidence of the damage caused was elusive before the 1950s….It was only when the 
rest of Europe left the Irish economy standing in the 1950s that the bankruptcy of the 
old policies became clear to policy-makers’.66 Childers was full of enthusiasm, 
energetic and very active in political matters from the moment of his return to Ireland 
in the early 1930s and he hoped to become a Wicklow deputy in due course.  
After the Fianna Fáil success in 1932 Childers set about establishing a format 
to gather information on the economic and social position of Ireland. Childers showed 
imagination and analytical skills not common in politics during the period concerned. 
However, it must be noted that he was not an economist and it is difficult to establish 
if the Fianna Fáil leadership placed any value on Childers’s contributions on 
economic matters. T.K. Whitaker recalled that he was unaware that Childers claimed 
‘to be versed in economic theory relating to development. My impression is that 
government colleagues would tend to regard some of his proposals as too idealistic’.67 
Childers’s contribution in the area of economic development lay not in breaking new 
ground but, according to Whitaker, in using his ‘fertility of mind and facility of 
expression’.68 A memorandum penned by Childers, dated 9 April 1934, is 
enlightening on a number of levels. While it was not original in concept it 
demonstrated Childers economic and social outlook, his view of how to measure and 
inform the public and the Fianna Fáil party of its successes, and it was a blue print on 
how Childers would communicate during his ministerial career. Throughout his 
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political career Childers answered questions in Dáil Éireann by way of statistics 
whenever possible. Memoranda by Childers to government colleagues and to 
personnel within his departments were elaborate and sometimes confusing. The main 
thrust of his April 1934 memorandum was to collect and present information to the 
public to ensure Fianna Fáil’s success at the polls. To achieve his plan Childers set out 
the information required to establish the economic and social position of the country 
in 1932. This information could then be compared with the actual results achieved by 
Fianna Fáil in subsequent years. The plan included data on unemployment, 
emigration, agricultural and industrial activity, exports to England and the issue of the 
land annuities which Childers considered an ‘illegal imposition’.69 The plan also 
required information on land and the number of landless persons requiring land and 
the cost to the government of supporting landless men. Uneconomic holdings were 
still not addressed and much food was being imported which, in Childers view, could 
be produced in Ireland. On the social side, people living on the verge of destitution 
were practically ignored. Children lacked proper care and there was insufficient milk 
available, these areas and others were neglected because there was ‘no constructive 
policy to meet these by previous administration’.70 While the issues selected by 
Childers were very topical in the early 1930s, these very same concerns were to 
occupy Childers throughout most of his political career.   
However, gathering the information required for comparative purposes was 
only identifying a potential problem. Childers also sought to remedy the situation by 
suggesting a range of actions. Here Childers largely repeated what was existing 
Fianna Fáil policy. His proposals included the creation of industries to supply 
Ireland’s requirements as far as possible. The home market was protected by a 
restriction on imports and he encouraged the use of native fuels such as turf. Changes 
in agriculture were also envisaged with the emphasis on the production of wheat, 
vegetables and all foods at the expense of cattle production. He called for the 
subsidisation of exports similar to that practised by other countries. His plan 
encouraged reafforestation and the rehabilitation of inland fisheries. On the social 
side, Childers called for adequate pensions to be provided and unemployment 
                                                          
69
 Taken from Childers memo., 9 Apr. 1934 (U.C.D.A., Fianna Fáil papers, MS P176/50). 
70
 Ibid. 
 
  
  
22 
assistance where necessary. Large ranches should be divided among the landless men 
and relief works instigated to improve roads and the value of land. Local government 
needed to be reorganised and the hospital and health services needed improvement.  
In 1937 Childers hoped to demonstrate, for example, the number of houses built 
compared to the number built in ten years under the Cosgrave government. Childers’s 
plan also included a list of measures to be passed and these included a labour code, 
local government act, fisheries act and insurance act. Adult education needed to be 
addressed and the tourist industry required development. Hospitals and the health 
services needed developing and he put forward the concept of partnership in industry. 
Unfortunately he did not expand further on the concept of partnership as he saw it. 
Childers envisaged his four year plan as ‘only a step in 25-year plan of work. Results 
will be sufficient to compel the whole nation to give vote of confidence to 
government’.71 Testament to Childers’s efforts can be obtained from various Fianna 
Fáil publications which sought to compare its record with that of Cumann na 
nGaedheal. Key economic and social indicators proposed by Childers in his 
memorandum of 9 April 1934 were among those used to show Fianna Fáil’s record 
since coming to power in 1932.72  
Upon his return from Paris in 1931 Childers quickly began an active political 
life in Ireland. Within the Fianna Fáil party he was the constituency delegate for 
Wicklow on the National Executive (hereafter cited as the NE) of 1934-5. Wicklow 
would be an obvious choice for his entry into politics. The first meeting of the Fianna 
Fáil NE elected by the eleventh Ard-Fheis was held on 9 November 1936 and 
included Seán Lemass, Seán MacEntee and Childers. During this meeting Childers 
was elected to the Publicity Sub-Committee (hereafter cited as the PSC). His energy 
and general administrative skills were also brought to bear on a special sub-committee 
set up to report on the dissolution of the P.H. Pearse Cumann in Waterford, and he 
was also appointed to report on the Fianna Fáil organisation in Scotland.73  
Childers was again elected to the NE at the twelfth Ard-Fheis, in October 
1937, and was re-appointed to the PSC. The importance of this committee and 
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Childers appointment to it can be judged by the appointment of other key personnel, 
such as Frank Aiken and Seán Lemass, as members. With prime responsibility for 
Fianna Fáil publicity, it supervised all material to be included in the monthly Bulletin 
before publication. The NE considered the publication of a weekly newspaper but the 
PSC recommended at its meeting of 3 January 1938 not to undertake such a venture. 
However, the meeting did appoint a sub-committee, which included Childers, to 
‘report on what steps should be taken by the Organisation to assist in increasing the 
circulation of the Irish Press’.74 He was one of the fifteen members of the Standing 
Committee of the NE in 1937-8. Childers was exposed to key personnel within Fianna 
Fáil and showed his work ethic early on. However, he was soon to suffer a political 
set-back through no fault of his own. 
The new Constitution of 1937 re-established the Seanad and Childers was one 
of de Valera’s nominees. At a special meeting of the NE held on 28 February 1938 
candidates were adopted to the various Panels for election to the Seánad. Childers was 
chosen to represent the Wicklow Comhairle Dáil Ceanntair on the Industry and 
Commerce Panel.  However, in the process, it was discovered that Childers was not an 
Irish citizen and therefore was not eligible to stand. Childers had considered himself 
Irish based on his father’s qualification through his Irish mother. However, because 
Childers’s father was not living on 6 December 1922 he did not qualify for Irish 
citizenship through his Irish mother.75 To overcome the problem an Order was made 
by the government to issue Childers with a Certificate of Naturalisation under the 
provisions of section five of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1935.  Childers 
was declared an Irish citizen on 2 March 1938. In a letter to de Valera on 7 April 
1938, Childers informed him that the same problem of citizenship affected his mother, 
Mary Alden Childers, and his brother, Robert Alden Childers. A second order was 
made by the government on 14 April granting Certificates of Naturalisation to Mary 
and Robert Childers. The certificates were issued to Childers and his mother and 
brother because his father, Robert Erskine Childers, who ‘in the opinion of the 
Government, rendered distinguished service to the Irish Nation’.76 Whatever 
embarrassment this must have caused de Valera it was ‘a very great honour for the 
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Childers clan. The Article has never been invoked before’.77 Childers failed to secure 
a seat in the Seanad and his brother, Robert, believed that his chances of election to 
the Seanad were slim. In a letter to his mother, Robert also expressed his reservations 
concerning what he referred to as the ‘Irish nationality business’.78 Robert Childers 
did not like the way Erskine Hamilton Childers was suddenly made an Irish citizen. 
His point was that if the government had wanted to honour their father they could 
have done so when the nationality bill was passed. As it turned out, the granting of 
Irish citizenship to Childers was for ‘purely party ends, which I don’t like’.79 Robert 
Childers recognised the fact that Fianna Fáil wanted to use the Childers legacy for 
their own electoral purposes. But it also has to be understood that Childers yearned for 
a political career and that Irish citizenship was absolutely essential to this end. 
Childers’s father had considered himself Irish and his widow was anxious to secure 
recognition for him as an Irish citizen. Childers pressed for his mother’s consent to the 
publication of their Irish citizenship but his mother urged the inclusion of his father in 
the official publication. De Valera was aware of the request and replied to Childers’s 
mother as follows: 
Have seen your cablegram to Erskine. Publication in his case urgent. 
Request your consent. Existing law does not permit of suggested steps 
regarding your husband but his position in history as a great Irishman is 
assured and could not be added to or taken from by any formal action now. 
Will write you later. Kindest regards.80 
 
Childers’s mother replied to de Valera accepting his advice and granted her 
permission for the official publication of Irish citizenship for the Childers family 
members. A draft text of the proposed Nationality Certificate was forwarded to the 
Childers family for consideration. It read as follows: 
The Government of Ireland, cognisant of the Irish ancestry of the late 
Robert Erskine Childers and of his wish (unfulfilled for reasons of a purely 
technical and legal character) that he should be regarded as an Irish 
citizen; mindful also of the distinguished services rendered to the Irish 
people by the said Robert Erskine Childers, who finally gave his life in 
their cause, and by his wife, Mary Alden Childers, have directed that the 
status of natural-born citizens of Ireland be conferred on the said Mary 
                                                          
77
 Letter from Childers to his mother, 1938 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/319). 
78
 Letter from Childers brother to his mother, 31 Mar. 1938 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/320). 
79
 Ibid. 
80
 Telegram from de Valera to Childers mother, 19 Apr. 1938 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9990/324). 
  
  
25 
Alden Childers, widow of the said Robert Erskine Childers, and also on 
Erskine Hamilton Childers and Robert Alden Childers, their sons.81 
 
There is no evidence of resentment following the granting of citizenship to Childers 
and his family members. However, the issue of whether or not Childers was an Irish 
citizen would surface again later in his political career.   
 Childers’s involvement in Fianna Fáil party politics eventually led him to a 
more creative public political role. At a meeting of the NE held on 28 May 1938 
arrangements were undertaken for the forthcoming general election. Seán Lemass was 
appointed General Director of Elections and given the authority to appoint the 
personnel of the General Election Staff. This meeting also decided that a special 
meeting of the NE would consider the ratification of election candidates on 2 June 
1938. At the 2 June 1938 NE meeting, candidates selected at the various Conventions 
were considered and ratified. The constituency of Athlone-Longford, a newly formed 
three-seat constituency, previously part of the Longford-Westmeath five-seat 
constituency had selected two Fianna Fáil candidates who were duly ratified. 
However, a third Fianna Fáil candidate was sought to support the two sitting Fianna 
Fáil deputies. A note under the ratification of the candidates stated that ‘the question 
of a third candidate for this constituency was considered and it was decided to 
authorise the Director of Elections and the General Election Staff to examine this 
question further and to nominate a third candidate if such action was considered 
advisable’.82 
In his report to the NE meeting held on 27 June 1938, Lemass stated that ‘Mr. 
Erskine Childers was added to the list of Candidates selected by the Athlone-
Longford Constituency’.83 Nobody was more surprised than Childers when he was 
asked to stand for this large rural constituency. His sights had always been on 
Wicklow or possibly rural Dublin. However no opportunity could be missed and 
whatever the outcome he would gain valuable experience. His knowledge of the 
constituency was minimal and he had no local associations. It was a strange choice 
given his background. De Valera had his own agenda; this was the constituency of the 
arch Treaty rival Seán MacEoin. On a personal level, Childers’s sincerity, courtesy 
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and integrity compensated for his lack of local knowledge. Eamon de Valera achieved 
his goal nationally winning seventy-seven of the one hundred and thirty-eight seats.84 
The result was also significant because the 1938 general election was the only time 
during the career of de Valera that Fianna Fáil secured over 50% of the first 
preference vote; Fianna Fáil received 51.9% of the vote.85 There was a surprise in 
Athlone-Longford. Childers was elected, securing the third and final seat, and had 
taken the first step in his political career.86 He could now ‘carry forward the work of a 
beloved father’.87 Both Childers’s parents had high ambitions for him in political life. 
The many messages of congratulations he received on his success in 1938 included 
one from his mother. In her letter she stated that his success ‘is deserved-that means a 
great deal to me….last night I lay thinking of your future. I say “your future”-it seems 
to be fathers and mine and all our high expectations for you. God bless you in the 
coming days’.88  
How did a man born and educated in England and with no contacts or 
knowledge of the constituency get elected in Athlone-Longford? Childers’s success is 
explicable on several grounds. The first concerns the party he was standing on behalf 
of, Fianna Fáil, only six years in existence when it had its first general election victory 
in 1932. The Fianna Fáil success was not solely due to the magnetism of de Valera 
and key personnel such as Seán Lemass, Frank Aiken and Seán MacEntee. From the 
beginning the party set about organising itself locally and nationally. The basic unit of 
the organisation was the cumann, which in rural areas was the parish and in urban 
areas represented a group of streets. These cumainn elected delegates to a regional 
structure called a Comhairle Ceanntair and to an electoral structure called a Comhairle 
Dáil Ceanntair. Fianna Fáil had a more advanced system and structure than the other 
parties at that time and arguably Childers was a beneficiary of this. The organisation 
and administration of elections was carefully controlled from the top right down to the 
members who canvassed from door to door. The well-developed local and national 
structures really came into full effect at election time to the benefit of Childers. 
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The second reason for Childers’s success was due to the man himself. His 
genuine nature and sense of kindness appealed to the constituents of Athlone-
Longford. One of those constituents, Michael O’Neill, recalled his memories of 
Childers. On visits to Athlone Childers addressed the crowds after mass and met as 
many people as possible. These visits, usually once a month, generated much 
excitement and discussion during and long after his visits. He held his clinics in the 
local hotel and was not put out by the conditions of the streets at that time. He would 
often arrive by train and would cycle to his meeting place and to constituents’ homes. 
Michael O’Neill pointed out that money was in short supply during the 1940s and 
1950s so it is difficult to compare his material results with that of his successors.89 
Childers did his best to avoid controversy, good or bad, and was generally regarded, 
according to Michael O’Neill, as being a gentleman politician. He received many of 
his votes in Westmeath with the majority of votes in Longford going to Seán 
MacEoin, who was known as the blacksmith of Ballinalee. Childers represented the 
old style politics and with the backing of the Fianna Fáil party machine, he was sure 
of success. There was great local sadness when he was transferred from Longford-
Westmeath to Monaghan in 1961 but as Michael O’Neill recalled, the local population 
could do little. The people were very down; they had lost a real gentleman.90  
The third reason for his success was his name and the legacy left by his father, 
Robert Erskine Childers. His father’s legacy and the subsequent expectations for 
Childers are demonstrated in a letter to Childers from the Royal Liver Friendly 
Society dated 20 June 1938. The letter offered Childers: 
Hearty congratulations on being elected to the Dáil. You have energy, 
ability, and personality which are possessed by few men and which I trust 
will before long place you in the Cabinet of the State.  
It was my good fortune to have known your highly esteemed and much 
respected father, and he has left in you a son worthy to carry on the 
traditions of his great name. 
I can only say in conclusion that I hope you will be long spared to serve 
this little Nation which owes your late father so much.91 
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This letter encapsulates one view point of the Irish Civil War. Robert Erskine Childers 
was thoroughly disliked by the Free State government and was one of the first 
republicans to be executed during the civil war. Eoin O’Duffy’s opinion of Robert 
Erskine Childers prominence within the anti-treaty leadership is refuted by Fearghal 
McGarry. O’Duffy’s suggestion that Robert Erskine Childers was the Irregular 
commander-in-chief, revealed, according to McGarry, ‘his lack of understanding of 
the balance of power within the anti-treaty leadership’.92 Brian Hanley states that 
Robert Erskine Childers was considered sinister and ‘openly referred to as a British 
agent intent on the destruction of Irish property in the interests of British business 
interests’.93 Robert Erskine Childers attracted particular attention from the Free State 
government because he was English. Childers’s early political career undoubtedly 
benefited from the impact that his father’s execution had on de Valera. In relation to 
that execution, Barry Desmond, former TD and MEP, told the author that this was 
‘quite unwarranted in most opinion even now’.94 In a similar view when interviewed 
by the author, Seán Sherwin, national organiser of Fianna Fáil, commented that 
‘without the War of Independence legacy of his late father, Childers would not have 
succeeded in entering the Irish political system’.95 This is true, de Valera did promote 
Childers within the party and this did benefit Childers. On the other hand, Barry 
Desmond asserts that Fianna Fáil used the Childers name for political gain as ‘Dev 
quite cynically parachuted this Cambridge don [Erskine Hamilton Childers], who had 
little experience of a rural constituency, in on top of his arch Treaty rival, Seán 
MacEoin’.96 In short, it was a mutually beneficial relationship for both the Fianna Fáil 
party/ de Valera and Childers.  
As a backbench TD Childers had the opportunity and energy to work with 
organisations outside of politics. In February 1939 Childers was appointed Secretary 
of the Federation of Irish Manufacturers, the body that subsequently developed into 
the Confederation of Irish Industry in March 1970. Childers’s levels of energy and his 
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range of economic and social interests led to the preparation of a memorandum on his 
views of Ireland’s economic position in 1940. Among other issues he set out Ireland’s 
imports and exports, stating that the adverse trade balance was paid for through 
invisible exports such as tourist expenditure and remittances from emigrants. Childers 
promoted the use of modern methods of agriculture which would lower the cost of 
production. Childers argued that the question of an Irish Central Bank should be 
examined again in the light of conditions prevailing in 1940.97 However, Childers 
views were not ground breaking. In 1934 Fianna Fáil set up ‘an official inquiry into 
banking and credit…. [which] cautiously recommended a central bank’.98 The 
establishment of a Central Bank was also one of the recommendations of the Banking 
Commission published in August 1938 and eventually set up in 1943.99 The 
importance of this memorandum was not so much its content as its range of diversity 
and the fact that Childers was prepared to put forward his opinions, on such a diverse 
range of issues, for discussion. Throughout his long political career Childers was bold, 
sometimes to the point of being naïve, in expressing his views on issues outside the 
remit of his portfolio.  
The 1940 memorandum also highlighted the remarkable change in Childers 
romantic view of Ireland which he held in 1923. By 1940 he had realised that the Irish 
people would have to be willing ‘to work as never before in order to develop home 
industries....in order to develop exports at lower prices and export to countries other 
than England’.100  Other countries had, according to Childers, established their exports 
through the brainpower of their people, ‘the secret lies in their use of brains – more 
brains – and yet – more brains, in outwitting other countries’.101 The English were 
selling produce to America every year despite the huge tariffs that existed. They could 
do this, argued Childers, because they had knowledge of the American market, good 
design capability and had established trade contacts through private initiatives. Quite 
a drastic change from his pure and simple in frugality concept of 1923.  
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In concluding his 1940 memorandum, Childers suggested that to compete 
successfully on foreign markets the complete production of Ireland would have to be 
organised on a semi-compulsory basis. This process would, according to Childers, be 
controlled by a government production council ‘with wide dictatorial powers acting 
through local corporative Committees’.102 Unfortunately, Childers did not elaborate 
any further on this point. He concluded: ‘I venture to say, however, that a certain 
proportion of what I have forecast will come true in any event’.103 Although he was 
not an economist, the important issue is the thought process around the issues that he 
felt were important for Ireland’s survival.  
Childers was aware of the need for planning to ensure the future of Ireland’s 
economy. In July 1941 he emphasised that there was ‘practically no examination of 
our future being made in this country’.104 The Irish economy in the 1940s continued to 
decline. There were only two ways, according to Childers, to prevent a decline in 
standards of living. The first was industrial development, which had very limited 
scope, and the second was industrial exports. In the past various issues had prevented 
the development of industrial exports; very high wages, low production outputs, lack 
of knowledge of foreign markets, and ‘a lack of desire to export because of the 
existence of high protection’.105 The lack of market knowledge and the policy of 
protectionism were important issues that had to be tackled and overcome. Childers 
had pronounced the failure of Fianna Fáil’s economic policies. The two key elements 
of Irish economic policy in the 1930s and 1940s, agriculture and industrial self-
sufficiency, had according to Diarmaid Ferriter, ‘failed to transform the economy’.106 
Childers advocated an end to protectionism and the formation of an export board as 
proposed by the Federation of Irish Manufacturers. The development of exports was 
fundamental according to Childers. The government was spending 8 million pounds a 
year on the army during war time so therefore after the war it should continue to 
spend this amount yearly ‘on the improvement of agricultural production and the 
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development of exports to other countries’.107 Childers’s views reflected the actual 
happenings of the period. By the late 1930s it seemed clear, according to Diarmaid 
Ferriter, that: ‘Fianna Fáil’s economic policies had reached the end of their shelf 
life’.108  
Childers was still Secretary of the Federation of Irish Manufacturers in 1942. 
In this capacity, Childers decided to visit England and speak to as many officials as 
possible to ensure Ireland had sufficient levels of raw materials to enable the 
economic fabric of Ireland to continue and develop. Childers wrote to J. Dulanty, the 
High Commissioner for Éire, and outlined details of his scheduled visit to England in 
1942. Childers held no government position but he used his position as Secretary of 
the Federation of Irish Manufacturers to assist the economy in whatever way he could. 
This was important for the war effort from the English point of view as the export of 
foodstuffs would continue.109 Production plants should not be idle in Ireland if they 
could be used for the production of Irish and English consumables. Childers needed to 
meet those people who understood ‘that they were achieving something if they can 
release 80,000 English workers by the employment of 80,000 Irish workers’.110 In a 
letter to Joseph Walsh at the Department of External Affairs, Childers outlined his 
scheduled visit to England ‘to discuss supply questions and to add one more voice to 
the many that are raised to enable this country to live through the difficult period 
ahead’.111 In England the press coverage of the visit was positive. A condition of the 
supply of raw materials would be that two-thirds of the manufactured goods would be 
sent to England. In Ireland the unemployment problem would be eased while in 
England ‘more British man power would be released for war activities’.112 Childers 
had shown initiative and commitment during these difficult times for the country. 
However, Lemass would not have been impressed when Childers suggested that the 
Department of Industry be reorganised and more emphasis placed on planning in the 
following years. Throughout his political career Childers commented on issues 
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outside of his own portfolio. Inevitably such commentary did not gain Childers favour 
from his fellow colleagues in Fianna Fáil. 
While building his reputation, Childers, in common with all elected 
representatives, had to cater to the needs of his constituency. Childers never lived in 
the constituency he represented and this necessitated long journeys to meet his 
constituents. The majority of country deputies were local men who lived in their 
constituencies and travelled to Dublin for Dáil sittings. Not wanting to be known as 
the absentee deputy, he gave priority to monthly visits to his Athlone-Longford 
constituency. There were no problems while a car was available but the outbreak of 
World War II made travelling more difficult. Train journeys were slow and Childers 
took his bicycle with him on journeys to the Midlands. Deputy Mary O’Rourke, 
Fianna Fáil, recalled to the author her memories of Childers arriving by train to 
Athlone.113 On arrival in Athlone, Childers would immediately go with her to her 
home. Deputy O’Rourke’s father, Mr. Paddy Lenihan, would have all the local issues 
organised for Childers who then visited the various constituents to discuss their 
issues.114 It was a similar situation when he visited other areas of the constituency. 
Arriving at Longford by train Childers would have lunch before cycling to his first 
appointment. He would spend the night in a supporter’s home and leave next morning 
for his next meeting. His fitness and fondness of cycling was nothing new to Childers 
and through his many cycle rides on the lanes and roads of Longford and Westmeath 
he slowly became an accepted part of rural life in the constituency.115  
Childers surmounted the difficulties of not living in the constituency he 
represented in Dáil Éireann. In a letter dated June 1943 de Valera offered Childers his 
‘congratulations on your election to An Dáil. Your success at the polls is an indication 
of the esteem in which you are held by the people, as well as proof of their adherence 
to the national and economic policy for which our organisation stands’.116 The esteem 
in which he was held was rewarded with his successes in the 1943 and 1944 general 
elections. Childers’s success at the polls and his contributions to Fianna Fáil’s policies 
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were finally rewarded with his appointment as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister 
for Local Government and Public Health on 31 March 1944. This led to his 
resignation from the Federation of Irish Manufacturers.  
Despite his work ethic and his organisational and administrative abilities, it 
had taken six years for Childers to gain his first appointment as Parliamentary 
Secretary in 1944. He received many letters of congratulations including one from the 
Irish Times which congratulated the government ‘on its belated recognition of the 
services of an outstanding deputy, and – what from my point of view is even more 
important – an honest man’.117 From the outset when he entered the Dáil in 1938 he 
was different to the other members of the Fianna Fáil party. Childers was educated 
outside the country and had gained experience working in the United States and 
France. In written communications during the course of research for this thesis, T.K. 
Whitaker suggested that:  
Because of his English education, accent and mannerisms I feel that he 
was never quite accepted as ‘one of us’, though his patriotism would never 
have been in doubt. 
There was also a certain dilettantism-a lightness of touch and charm of 
manner-which tended to distance him from apparently more serious and 
purposeful colleagues.118  
 
He was also different in that he was determined to erase the bitter civil war memories 
that divided Dáil and country rather than to perpetuate them. This was a period when 
the Treaty and the Irish Civil War were extremely delicate issues and Childers did not 
publicly comment on either. Given what had happened to his father, he displayed 
enormous restraint. During our interview, Barry Desmond stated that Childers was 
neither ‘pro nor anti-treaty per se. He was utterly determined to travel the road of 
reconciliation’.119 Childers always did his utmost to fulfil the promises he made to his 
father.  
There is, however, another issue which cannot be ignored when evaluating 
Childers’s political career; the fact that he was a Protestant. When Fianna Fáil came to 
power in 1932 Seán MacEntee gloated in the fact that they had won the Catholic vote. 
However, with the overwhelming majority of the population Catholic they would not 
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have been in government if they had not done so. De Valera and the Irish Press 
played the Catholic card to its ultimate and the Eucharistic Congress provided de 
Valera with the opportunity to equate republicanism and Catholicism.120 During most 
of Childers’s political career, religious affiliation was virtually synonymous with 
being a citizen of the Irish Republic.  As stated by R.V. Comerford: 
From the 1920s to the 1960s, a series of politicians from parties large and 
small publicly professed their fealty to the Church or the pope and 
affirmed that they were Catholics first and Irishmen or politicians 
second.121 
 
The influence of the Catholic Church in the Irish Republic would lead an observer, as 
R.V. Comerford correctly states, to thinking ‘that there was, indeed, an Established 
Church in the land’.122 A two-page memorandum from Childers to MacEntee in 1945 
outlined Childers’s concerns regarding anti-Protestant activities since 1939. He stated 
that a large number of people had condemned the Hunt decision and it was viewed by 
many as a challenge to the government. Hunt, a Protestant, was received into the 
Catholic Church and married a Catholic woman despite a previous civil marriage in 
London to another Catholic woman. He was charged with bigamy, pleaded guilty and 
received a suspended sentence. The Church authorities were however aware of his first 
marriage when permission was given for Hunt’s second marriage, despite its illegality 
under civil law.123 The Catholic Church in Ireland was concerned during 1936-7 with 
the outcome of the Spanish Civil War and viewed the conflict as one of Communism 
versus Catholicism. Great Britain saw the conflict as a political issue and the Church 
of Ireland and many of the newspapers in Ireland did not endear themselves to the 
Catholic hierarchy in Ireland. Fearghal McGarry states that the Catholic Church 
‘demanded….unflinching and unequivocal support’ of Franco.124 This was not 
forthcoming from the Church of Ireland who did not form a firm position on the war. 
Protestant and Catholic relationships in Ireland were not aided by comments made by 
the Church of Ireland hierarchy in relation to events that befell the Spanish Catholic 
Church. While acknowledging the barbaric experiences faced by the Spanish Catholic 
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Church, the Church of Ireland stated that they were, states McGarry, ‘not in a position 
to judge which of the opposing parties was the more cruel or the more savage’.125 
Childers felt that even though the activities of Dr McQuaid, Archbishop of 
Dublin, had diminished and that there were more Catholics than ever in Trinity 
College, Dublin this made little real difference. Childers was concerned with the 
suppression of the Mercier Society, the attempt to exclude Protestants from the Youth 
Unemployment Commission and the suppression of two mixed charitable societies, 
whose supervisors were practising Catholics. The Mercier Society was a mixed group 
of Catholics and Protestants set up to debate religious matters and to promote better 
understanding among both religions. Archbishop McQuaid suspended the society in 
April 1944. The Youth Unemployment Commission was set up to consider the 
problem of unemployment which affected the whole community. Archbishop 
McQuaid was chairman and he refused to accept answers from Protestants to a 
questionnaire concerning religious and spiritual welfare. He suggested that answers 
from Protestants be sent to Seán Lemass for consideration, as he would not deal with 
them as archbishop of Dublin.126 Childers pointed to the suppression of Church of 
Ireland books on sex and censorship in general. He suggested that, in the view of 
many Protestants, when it came to employment opportunities and the Local 
Appointments Commission, there was no point in applying. He did however state that 
he had no specific foundation for this view but that it was widespread. Childers 
concluded, ‘I do not propose to recommend to you what should be done officially’.127  
Although Childers did highlight his concerns regarding anti-Protestant 
activities, he also recognised that it was not all negative and he defended the position 
of Protestants in the twenty-six counties when their well being was challenged. In 
1946, Mr Edmund Warnock, then Minister for Home Affairs at Stormont, stated that 
Protestants in the twenty-six counties were unhappy and did not prosper. Childers 
challenged Warnock to tour the twenty-six counties and then repeat his statement. 
Protestants, argued Childers, living in the twenty-six counties enjoyed religious 
tolerance and their share of the industrial and commercial activity was in greater 
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proportion to their actual numbers. This was not a contradiction by Childers. He had 
highlighted specific problems and issues, but in general terms, Protestants enjoyed 
religious tolerance and were well represented in the industrial and commercial sectors. 
Childers had to challenge Warnock in public and bring some balance to the issue. 
Childers was not only defending the position of Protestants in the south but also 
defending Fianna Fáil against allegations of discrimination. However, he had to be 
careful as he would undoubtedly have been aware of de Valera’s sentiment that ‘if 
there is anything more contemptible than another, more disgusting than another, it is 
for people in any political party in this country to try to drag in religion to help 
them’.128  De Valera has been described as primarily a Catholic head of government, 
but not Catholic enough at times for Archbishop John Charles McQuaid.129 The 
church did not get its way in relation to the 1937 Constitution but had considerable 
success in drafting sections of the 1953 Health Act.130 Dev Valera tried to be non-
confrontational but his support in 1930 of the campaign to insist on a Catholic 
librarian in Mayo over the appointment of a Protestant, Letitia Dunbar-Harrison, was 
an unusual reaction from the normally cautious de Valera. However, in relation to the 
Fethard-on-Sea boycott in 1957, de Valera dismissed it completely.131 The balance of 
power between church and state was complex, and Childers strove for that balance.  
In his new position as Parliamentary Secretary, Childers soon made a name for 
his administrative abilities and his attention to detail. A highly skilled speaker yet shy 
and reserved, Childers had an intense interest in whatever work was assigned to him. 
Whatever the task, he studied every aspect and analysed problems and situations in a 
cool and rational manner, though his decisions were not always appreciated by the 
electorate. He possessed qualities of compassion and integrity mixed with certain 
grandeur or aloofness derived perhaps from his background. If Childers appeared 
distant from people his enthusiasm for his work left its impression everywhere. 
Although dedicated to serving Ireland he was proud of his English family and 
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education. He was a non-Irish speaker and refused to learn Irish, as he did not want to 
appear to be something he was not.132  
Seán MacEntee was Minister for Local Government and Public Health during 
Childers’s term as Parliamentary Secretary. MacEntee previously held the portfolios 
of Finance, and Industry and Commerce. During this period the Irish economy 
remained depressed but the demand for Irish emigrant labour was strong in Britain. 
Between 1940 and 1945 136,000 passports or travel permits were issued to men and 
62,000 to women.133 After the war the industrial sector recovered and by 1946 both 
employment and output were higher than they had been in 1938. However, industry 
continued to rely on the home market under the protection it was given in the 1930s 
and ‘apart from drink and confectionery Irish industry exported very little’.134 It was 
against this background that Childers commenced his public career in government.  
A memorandum from MacEntee to Childers outlined his duties and 
responsibilities as Parliamentary Secretary. Childers would act as MacEntee’s 
personal representative and would take responsibility for defined areas within the 
department and only involve MacEntee in these areas if he considered it necessary. 
Childers’s main areas of responsibility included widows and orphans pensions, the 
audit section, the roads section, purchasing section and the old age pensions appeal 
section.135 MacEntee particularly emphasised the audit section of the department 
stating that audits of many institutions and local authorities’ accounts were badly in 
arrears. Another priority highlighted was the planning of new road works. The 
government attached particular attention to this work as a measure of economic 
reconstruction but also as a source of much needed employment. Childers was to 
ensure that ‘nothing is left undone which would expedite the completion of the 
planning for these works and their ultimate realisation’.136 With little money or 
materials Childers set about his duties as Parliamentary Secretary. He succeeded in 
overseeing the drawing up of plans for a national road network that included 
regulations as to road width, elevation and curvature, and provided standards for non-
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skid road surfaces.  His other main contributions included an overhaul of the local 
authority audit system, a reorganisation of the county engineering service and the 
introduction of amenity schemes to improve urban areas.137  
In November 1946 MacEntee outlined in Dáil Éireann his proposals for the 
establishment of separate Departments of Health and Social Welfare. This was a far 
reaching decision at that time but one which had according to MacEntee public 
opinion behind it.138 As far back as February 1944 MacEntee had announced that in 
order to improve and develop health services a separate Department of Health would 
be necessary. However many changes were required including the administration and 
re-organisation of local authorities who at that point were responsible for part 
financing of health services. This restructuring was aided due to their supervision 
under the combined Ministry of Local Government and Public Health.139 This would 
undoubtedly impact on Childers’s career and narrow his field of operations. As a 
result of the division within the Department of Local Government and Public Health 
Childers wrote to MacEntee and outlined his position as he saw it. Always cordial and 
wishing to avoid conflict, Childers commenced by thanking MacEntee for giving him 
the opportunity to gain valuable experience in administration, and to express his 
appreciation of the working relationship that existed between them. However, 
Childers also conveyed his position in the aftermath of the division of the functions 
within the department. According to Childers, much of the pioneering work assigned 
to him by MacEntee was now completed and with the department divided Childers 
stated that his ‘usefulness is gradually diminishing’.140 
Childers outlined his new functions as Parliamentary Secretary to MacEntee 
and hoped that he would realise that change was needed. Many of his previous 
functions were transferred and those that remained needed less attention or creative 
ability. Childers remained in the Local Government section and areas such as 
pensions and the appeals process were transferred to Health. Policies were in place in 
relation to local engineering services and this area also required less time and activity. 
                                                          
137
 Taken from the notes compiled during Childers presidential campaign, 1974 (U.C.D.A., Fianna Fáil 
papers, MS P176/923).  
138
 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 103, 14 Nov. 1946. 
139
 Seán MacEntee’s proposals to establish separate Depts. of Health and Social Welfare, Nov. 1946 
(U.C.D.A., Seán MacEntee papers, MS P67/577). 
140
 Letter from Childers to Seán MacEntee, 11 Nov. 1947 (U.C.D.A., Seán MacEntee papers, MS 
P67/292). 
  
  
39 
Work was also nearing completion on the national road plan; however, road traffic 
safety still needed attention.141  
Childers viewed his position as extremely serious. He was now well 
established in the constituency of Athlone-Longford having served there since 1938. 
However, his current functions and responsibilities led him to believe ‘that I will 
probably lose my seat and in view of the way I have slaved for the Party since 1943 I 
find the prospect very heart breaking’.142 He had expected a promotion in the recent 
reorganisation and was fearful that the people whose allegiance shifts at election time 
had decided that he was not a success. Since his election in 1938 he had told the 
people, at the cost of great unpopularity, the adjustments that were required in policies 
as a result of the war. From 1943 he had provided more publicity for the Fianna Fáil 
party than any other deputy and most ministers, but he never ‘received even a word of 
commendation from “the Chief” save indirectly once by Frank Gallagher’.143 Childers 
stated that if he was thinking of his future career ‘I should have resigned’.144 He had 
less to do than in the beginning and this was noted in his own constituency.  
 Childers’s observations did not reflect on MacEntee, he was aware that 
MacEntee was a consistent advocate. He lamented his lack of promotion and while 
‘being passed over and deprived of functions may not be fatal but I feel very 
pessimistic....I shall go on defending the government policy although in many ways it 
is far from adequate’.145 Childers needed to be challenged in his work and needed a 
new set of responsibilities to restore himself to the status he held in 1945. Should 
Fianna Fáil win the next election change would be needed if his creative and 
organisational capacity were to be most effectively utilised. Childers had no difficulty 
working with MacEntee and would do anything for the country but ‘waste my years 
of youth doing nothing special’.146 He was not satisfied in securing his first 
government position unless he was challenged and contributing to Fianna Fáil’s 
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progress. Throughout his political career Childers spoke out on issues when he 
considered it necessary, though not always to his own advantage.   
In his February 1948 letter to MacEntee, Childers again outlined his workload 
and lack of promotion. His letter marked ‘Confidential’ told of the wonderful 
welcome that he had received when last touring his constituency and that this was no 
doubt due to the amount of time he had spent there defending government policy 
since 1944. He emphasised the feelings of his supporters who could not understand 
why he was overlooked up to this point but his promotion would ‘surely be this 
time’.147 Childers was embarrassed by the observations among his constituents and 
felt that it was also bad for the party. Childers reminded MacEntee that his current 
workload attracted no public attention and the work that required his abilities had 
come to an end.  
In trying to establish why or what was preventing him from getting the 
rewards that he felt he deserved Childers stated: 
Since I saw you last, Robert Barton (not to be quoted please to anyone) 
hinted to me that a Protestant was unlikely to be appointed to the 
Ministries of Justice, Health, External Affairs, Education and probably 
Social Welfare. 
If this is the case, Education excepted, I wish to resign immediately 
because there remains only three Ministries where special organising 
powers are needed. I cannot believe it but others in Fianna Fáil have hinted 
at this and I should be glad to know the truth.148 
 
After serving for ten years in Dáil Éireann had Childers arrived at the core reason for 
his perceived lack of progression within the political system? Was it a party decision 
to curtail Childers movement up the ranks, and if so was this in keeping with popular 
opinion and sentiment at that time? If based on popular sentiments how was 
Childers’s success at the various general elections explained? George Irvine provided 
further insight on religious attitudes during this period in his correspondence with de 
Valera in 1949. Irvine was a regular visitor to de Valera’s home and a devout 
Protestant. He had taken part in the 1916 rising and had been imprisoned as a result. 
Terry de Valera, youngest son of Eamon de Valera, recalled that ‘when Father was 
drafting the Constitution, he had an argument with him as to the use of the word 
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‘Catholic’. Irvine contended that he too was a Catholic, although not in the Roman 
tradition’.149 Irvine’s initial letter to de Valera concerned a recent remark made by 
MacEntee in Dáil Éireann, who referred to members of the Gaelic training college of 
the Church of Ireland ‘as non-Catholic’.150 Irvine also stated that ‘this insult was 
allowed to pass without comment from the Chair’ and infringed paragraph four the 
Declaration of Independence that cherished all people of the Republic equally.151  
Irvine was a member of the Church of Ireland and in his own words a 
Republican. The insult to the Church of Ireland by MacEntee could be dismissed as an 
example of ignorance. The issue arose because ‘it was offered in Dáil Éireann itself, 
constitutes a breach of the Declaration of Independence, of which Declaration our 
Representatives are the guardians’.152 In his reply to Irvine, de Valera stated that 
MacEntee intended no offence and that it was merely a slip in ‘phraseology which is 
very common’.153 De Valera suggested that he would also have used the term non-
Catholic instead of Protestant had Irvine not warned him against it many years 
previously. However, Irvine provided other examples of anti-Protestant behaviour 
during the period concerned. Letters in the newspapers ‘suggesting that Protestants 
were not of much account, that T.C.D. should not get a grant because it was a 
Protestant foundation’.154 Other issues outlined by Irvine included reviews of books 
written by Roman Catholic priests linking Protestantism with Communism and 
suggesting that both be exterminated. Some print opinion suggested that the 
constitution be changed and that the Irish Government swear allegiance to the pope; 
this change was also demanded by the Roman Catholic bishop of Down in a Lenten 
Pastoral.155 However, despite the episodes referred to above and the controlling 
influence of the Catholic Church on Irish political and social life up to the late 1960s, 
Garret Fitzgerald is not convinced that Childers’s political career was curtailed 
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because he was a Protestant. During an interview with the author, Garret Fitzgerald 
asserted that de Valera would not ‘have tolerated such a situation’.156 
Back in his own constituency of Longford-Westmeath Childers alleged that a 
Fine Gael speaker had made inappropriate comments about him. However, the Fine 
Gael election agent for Longford wrote to Childers and stated: 
I am directed by the Fine Gael Candidates for Longford-Westmeath to 
inform you that the allegation that a Fine Gael Speaker in Longford 
referred to you as an “Orange Weed” is untrue and unfounded. 
I am to request you to state in writing to me before twelve noon on 
Thursday 13th instant the name of the person whom you allege to have 
made the statement.157 
 
Childers clearly suspected that he was the target of religious discrimination in terms 
of his career advancement. His immediate family also believed this to be the case. 
According to his daughter, Nessa Childers, from his entry into politics to the early 
1960s ‘certain portfolios would not be open to him. These included the Ministries of 
Education, Health and the position of Taoiseach’.158 It may be more than coincidence 
that Childers was made Minister for Health in 1969, some four years after the Second 
Vatican Council, which ended in 1965. The enormous influence that was still 
exercised by the Catholic hierarchy in the period under discussion is clearly 
demonstrated in a letter dated 21 March 1951 from John A. Costello, Taoiseach, to Dr 
Noel Browne, Minister for Health in the first Inter-Party government. Browne wrote a 
letter intended for the Irish Medical Association but this was brought to Costello’s 
attention. In his letter Browne had stated that the introduction of the Mother and Child 
Scheme was fundamental to government policy. However, Costello informed Browne 
in unambiguous terms that: 
your scheme in the form outlined by you was not acceptable to the 
Government unless and until the express reservations made by the 
Hierarchy....and by the Archbishop of Dublin....are satisfactorily disposed 
of. Accordingly you are not entitled to describe your Scheme as 
Government policy and you must not so describe it hereafter unless and 
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until you have satisfied the Hierarchy that in respect of the matters relating 
to faith and morals your Scheme is unobjectionable.159 
 
The unsavoury issue of religious discrimination is one that periodically raised its head 
throughout Childers’s career.   
In his constituency Childers was confronted with the real and existing 
difficulties of the post-war years. It was particularly difficult for rural TDs with little 
or no industrial development. At a meeting of his North Longford constituency party, 
probably during 1947, Childers was confronted by members who were angry at the 
government’s response to a range of local government and other issues. Following the 
four-hour meeting Childers communicated the points raised at the meeting in a letter 
to MacEntee. The party, in the view of members, needed new blood in its membership 
and the administration also needed to be refreshed. Old age pensions needed to be 
increased considerably and cheap clothing provided for children, this ‘to be promoted 
by subsidies’.160 It appears unusual that Childers would recommend subsidies to 
MacEntee as a method of allaying constituency hostilities given MacEntee’s previous 
rejection of state intervention and allowances.161 This apparent slip on Childers behalf 
may not have had any negative effect on MacEntee’s opinion of Childers. The cost of 
fuel for transportation was also causing concern and Childers suggested to MacEntee 
that ‘transport costs might be reduced by direct removal of turf to merchants yards 
from the great bogs’.162 To help lessen hardship Childers also suggested to MacEntee 
that bog drainage and land improvements grants be increased.  
Childers was worried by the level of hostility he encountered in Longford 
during 1947, although this was not directed at him personally. He suggested to 
MacEntee that ‘there might be an emergency temporary cut in all salaries above a 
certain limit of 5% to 10% as a contribution to austerity. This however to include us 
and the President. Also Dublin TDs’.163 Childers also stated that something needed to 
be done to increase agricultural output and the number of new houses. Childers’s 
experiences were shared by TDs right across the country. He reported local party and 
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constituents grievances to MacEntee but he also warned of the danger to Fianna Fáil 
nationally. During 1947 Childers’s view was that Fianna Fáil required a major shake-
up and ‘unless we take risks in appointing new young or immensely popular 
candidates we shall founder’.164 He further warned MacEntee that ‘we maybe too late. 
It is possible that we should have founded a new Party at the end of the emergency 
embracing National Labour, F.G. and ourselves’.165 Childers clearly feared the loss of 
his own seat in Longford-Westmeath and a possible defeat for Fianna Fáil in the next 
general election.  
A general election was held on 4 February 1948 and Fianna Fáil won sixty-
eight of the 147 Dáil seats. They were still much the largest party but had lost eight 
seats compared with the 1944 result. Clann na Poblachta’s ten seats deprived Fianna 
Fáil of its majority but it could not be displeased with the outcome. 1947 was a bad 
year for the economy and Fianna Fáil ‘went into the election burdened with blame for 
the condition of the country....the cabinet had, admittedly, little idea how to respond to 
the situation’.166 De Valera expected to form a government but the first Inter-Party 
Government took up office. Childers had sensed the defeat for Fianna Fáil but he 
retained his own seat in the reconstituted Longford-Westmeath constituency. 
Longford-Westmeath was a five seat constituency and Childers secured the fourth 
seat.167 Fianna Fáil had been in power for sixteen years and Childers was an 
opposition deputy for the first time. At a meeting of the Fianna Fáil party in Leinster 
House de Valera was elected Chairman of the Party and its leader in Dáil Éireann. In 
opposition Fianna Fáil would pursue its objectives as if it was in office and be ‘ready 
as the great national reserve when the country needs it’.168 
There were many reasons why Fianna Fáil lost its overall majority in 1948 and 
Childers had his own views on the causes. In a confidential letter to MacEntee he 
stated that vested interests, general post-war disgruntlement and a feeling among the 
public ‘that we have ceased to be the poor mans government’, all contributed to the 
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election result.169 Childers had previously predicted the Fianna Fáil defeat in the 1948 
general election. The post-war period of continued scarcities would have presented 
Childers and his colleagues with a difficult enough situation even under favourable 
conditions. But things got worse. The summer of 1946 was one of the wettest on 
record and led to additional bread rationing. The awful summer of 1946 was followed 
by one of the hardest winters of the century. Fuel supplies sank to critical levels in the 
early months of 1947, transport and industry were almost at a standstill and ‘the 
miseries of the long-suffering population were intense’.170 Childers had alerted 
MacEntee in 1947 that the public were getting bored with Fianna Fáil and that new 
blood was needed in the party. As F.S.L. Lyons stated, the ‘signs appeared in the 
constituencies of a kind of cumulative boredom with the old party machines, the old 
party slogans, even the old party leaders’.171 Childers added a postscript to his letter to 
MacEntee: ‘I have omitted our failure to get all the farmers on our side. I have written 
about this before. We need a Lemass for agriculture with drive and imagination’.172 
Childers wanted the agricultural portfolio; perhaps this was the meaning of the 
postscript. Certainly he possessed drive and imagination and would have been in line 
for a ministerial position when Fianna Fáil returned to power.  
Childers also wrote to Tom Mullins, General Secretary of Fianna Fáil giving 
his post-mortem on the 1948 election. In this letter Childers addressed the 
administrative shortcomings of the Fianna Fáil party machine as he saw them. He was 
critical of their TDs both in respect to attendance at Comhairle Ceanntair meetings 
and more particularly ‘in respect of their duties as educators of their electors’.173 
Unless TDs met their constituents outside churches or at Cumann meetings a 
government in office as long as Fianna Fáil were could not hold its position. In future, 
Childers suggested, where Comhairle Ceanntair fail to meet frequently they should be 
investigated by a special committee of the NE. Every constituency should keep a 
record of all meetings held and Fianna Fáil headquarters notified of such meetings.174 
TDs whose attendance record was poor should be warned that they would be asked to 
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resign from the party should their attendance remain unsatisfactory. Where it was 
difficult to meet the public directly, as in Dublin, because church gate meetings could 
only take place during election time, meetings should be arranged in halls at regular 
intervals. At these meetings TDs would explain current legislation, point out Acts that 
had been passed that benefited the local community, and answer all criticisms. 
Childers argued that the electorate could not be updated through speeches in the Dáil 
and announcements by ministers, personal contact was required.175 Childers had set 
out one of the key components that was to dominate his entire political career; 
community involvement and local self-help. Fianna Fáil’s success would be secured 
at local level, in government, Childers encouraged local involvement and participation 
in local projects. To get back into government Childers also advised Mullins that 
Fianna Fáil needed fresh blood: 
There is no question the people are tired of some of the old faces and we 
may as well make up our minds that something will have to be done, 
regretfully perhaps, about members of the Party who have given great 
service in the past but who have become inarticulate between elections and 
whose personal prestige has been constantly declining....It would appear 
that younger relations of existing T.Ds, who are able to speak well and 
who have some political sense, are a very valuable asset to any party’.176 
 
  Childers had stated his reasons to MacEntee and Mullins for the Fianna Fáil  
 defeat in the 1948 general election and what was required to reinvigorate the party. 
Also included in his letter to MacEntee was an attachment providing ‘a summary of 
the intelligent waverer’s view of education’.177 Childers marked the attachment on 
education ‘absolutely confidential’. But why? He was communicating the feelings of 
the electorate and it was no secret that the education system lacked progress. 
Diarmaid Ferriter has stated that ‘there was a certain pessimism in the post-war period 
in relation to lack of progress in education, the Irish language and the universities’.178 
School buildings were bad, teachers underpaid and the first national teachers strike 
took place in 1946. The education minister at that time was Tomás Derrig, and 
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according to Diarmaid Ferriter, Derrig ‘seemed to reflect the arrogance of 15 years of 
uninterrupted power in rejecting calls for Ireland to follow the educational reforms 
being put in place in post-war Europe’.179 Derrig argued that during the war Ireland 
was free ‘from any hindrance to our educational schemes’.180 Education in general 
was unsatisfactory and Childers expressed the views of the Fianna Fáil mothers; 
children leaving school could not write English or Irish and their mathematics was no 
better. He concluded that changes were necessary in the light of his experience.181 
Throughout his political career Childers commented on issues of general public 
interest even when such issues were outside his own portfolio. On this occasion it is 
clear that Childers and his colleague in education were not in agreement on education 
issues. 
With Fianna Fáil in opposition Childers was appointed to the publicity 
department within the party and submitted reports to de Valera on the work completed 
over a period of time. This was an opportunity for Childers to engage with colleagues 
outside the pressures of government and use his abilities to promote and develop the 
Fianna Fáil party. His early memoranda demonstrated his organisational and 
administrative abilities, and his desire to get as much relevant information to TDs as 
possible. In one of his reports to de Valera he highlighted the trouble it took ‘to get 
people to sign letters prepared in the office’.182 Trying to get the best use from the 
office Childers suggested that ‘a long discussion of ways and means of using the 
office is needed by the Party’.183 His attention to detail and the desire to maximise the 
resources of the publicity office gives credence to Childers as an effective 
administrator. But here he had an opportunity to introduce change to office routines 
and monitor the results; a chance to manage and lead. But Childers was conservative, 
not a risk taker, and it would be many years before Childers would show his real 
potential as a politician and leader. Out of government Childers sought employment in 
the business sector. In a letter dated 19 October 1948, Blackwood Hodge confirmed 
that ‘we should like you to act in a full time capacity as Manager of Blackwood 
                                                          
179
 Diarmaid Ferriter, The transformation of Ireland 1900-2000 (London, 2005), p.532. 
180
 Ibid. 
181
 Childers views on education to Seán MacEntee, Feb. 1948 (U.C.D.A., Seán MacEntee papers MS 
P67/299).  
182
 Childers memo. to de Valera, 13 Jan. 1949 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9959/12). 
183
 Ibid. 
  
  
48 
Hodge (Ireland) Ltd., at a salary of £700 per annum, payable monthly’.184 His work at 
Blackwood Hodge was impressive enough to have been offered a yearly retainer of 
£300 on return to government in 1951.  
In March 1950 Childers’s wife Ruth died leaving him a widower at the age of 
forty-four. They had met at difficult times in both their lives and Ruth supported 
Childers as he made his way back to Ireland and into politics. Childers could well 
feel, stated Young, that life had dealt harshly with him. But he would soon be back on 
the campaign trail in Longford-Westmeath.  
On the political front another idealist, Dr Noel Browne, caused controversy 
with his Mother and Child Scheme. It came under attack from both the medical 
profession and the Catholic Church. However, relations between Browne and 
colleagues within his own party, Clann na Poblachta, led to Browne’s resignation 
from government. Other resignations followed, some due to the government’s failure 
to solve its economic problems, and Taoiseach John A. Costello decided to go to the 
country. However, according to J.J. Lee, it was not Browne’s resignation that led 
directly to the 1951 general election but rather ‘the price of milk – cows’, not 
mothers’.185 After the fall of the Inter-Party government Childers was once again on 
the campaign trail in Longford-Westmeath in the spring of 1951. His time in local 
government had provided him with practical experience of political life and gave him 
a base on which to progress his political career. The coalition government provided 
Fianna Fáil with the opportunity of an early return to government.  
There is no doubt that from a young age it was Childers’s intention to return to 
Ireland and embark on a political career. As a fact he returned to Ireland in 1931 and 
commenced his public political career in 1938. Whether it was 1931 or 1941 is not 
important. What is important is that it was his decision and desire. He did not have to, 
he wanted to. Arguably, this position was strengthened following the death of his 
father. He gained considerable exposure within Fianna Fáil prior to his election in 
1938 where he demonstrated his considerable administrative abilities. Focused and 
hard working, he got his reward when made parliamentary secretary in 1944. His 
political progress and his concerns at his lack of promotion on religious grounds must 
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be viewed against the calibre of his political colleagues. Never one to shy away from 
opinion, in the period up to 1948, Childers commented on colleagues, on the Fianna 
Fáil organisation and on government departments. He may have been correct in many 
instances but displayed a political naivety in being so forthright. He solved problems 
by comprehensive analysis and discussion of alternatives. This was Childers’s style 
and he avoided risk and exposure when he was in a position to be innovative and lead. 
As his career developed and Childers matured as a politician he grasped the 
opportunity to demonstrate his leadership potential. For now, if he and Fianna Fáil 
were successful in the 1951 general election and with de Valera Taoiseach, it seemed 
likely that he would be given a ministerial portfolio in the new government.    
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 Chapter 2   
First ministerial challenge, Department of Posts and Telegraphs, 1951-4 
Following the 30 May 1951 general election Fianna Fáil ended up with sixty-
nine seats, one seat more than the 1948 general election result.1 Clann na Poblachta 
lost eight of its ten seats and the balance of power lay with the fourteen independents. 
De Valera formed a government with the assistance of the independent deputies. 
Although it lasted for three years it was dogged from the beginning to the end by 
inflation and an adverse balance of payments. Childers continued his success and was 
re-elected in Longford-Westmeath taking the fifth and final seat. After serving 
thirteen years in Dáil Éireann, Childers secured his first ministerial portfolio when he 
was appointed Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in June 1951. 
Childers and his fellow colleagues faced a period of economic challenge on 
return to government. The economic growth achieved in the late 1940s did not last 
and did perhaps conceal ‘the futility of the protectionist strategy adopted in 1932’.2 
The 1950s, ‘a miserable decade for the Irish economy’ commenced with a balance of 
payments crisis.3 A massive deterioration in trade due to the sterling devaluation of 
1948 and the escalation of the Korean War in 1950 was mainly responsible for the 
balance of payments crisis. Emigration continued and in 1951 the total number of 
persons at work was only 12,000 more than in 1926.4 The same familiar weaknesses 
were evident in the economy. Lack of capital investment, conservative agricultural 
practices, the poverty of the home market and a lack of exports were among the issues 
that faced the government. In general, the increasing cost of living coupled with the 
absence of social services, comparable with those in Northern Ireland, was causing 
real hardship. The contentious Mother and Child controversy required delicate 
handling by de Valera and was a significant achievement for the government. 
 Now in government Childers had the profile to develop his career and apply 
his abilities to his new portfolio. However, the cabinet of 1951-4 has been described 
by some as having ‘strong claims to be considered the worst de Valera government’.5 
Seán MacEntee’s 1952 budget was deflationary and contributed to the atmosphere of 
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depression. Introduced due to the balance of payments situation, it seriously damaged 
domestic industry due to lack of investment and development of exports. Childers 
tried to deflect attention away from the budget and suggested that people started 
talking about yields per acre and stock density. The opposition blamed the budget for 
the trade depression but Childers argued that there was a trade slump of varying 
degrees all over the world. He suggested that government operations be compared 
with a gardener working in a fruit orchard, ‘there must be pruning and there will be 
some grafting, while waiting for the growth of many urgently needed young plants’.6 
It was easy to blame the Costello government for the situation faced by Fianna 
Fáil and Childers did his part in explaining the position to the public. He and Fianna 
Fáil now had the task of revealing to the people the true state of the finances of the 
country. Childers spoke at many locations across the country and informed the people 
of the economic condition of the country and what needed to be done to remedy the 
situation. The outgoing Minister for Industry and Commerce had, according to 
Childers, a stack of price increases on his desk prior to the election.  
To maintain the standard of living agricultural output, according to Childers, 
needed to be increased. Imports in general would have to be reduced and it was vital 
to stop the flood of imports that could be produced in Ireland.7 The tourist industry 
was hampered by the lack of theatres and Childers viewed the promotion of 
entertainment as much a national concern as the standardisation of hotels and 
restaurants.8 The Irish economy had functioned, stated Childers, under the previous 
government as follows; Ireland was buying goods from the United States but not 
selling anything to them to pay for the imports. National development, argued 
Childers, rested in long term planning and not in short term expedients. He urged all 
local authorities to support the Tourist Association and showed its significance by 
comparing the revenues from tourism with those from the export of live cattle. In 
1951 the export of live animals generated revenue of thirty million pounds while the 
earnings from tourism amounted to twenty-five million pounds.9   
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Childers argued that the previous government did not carry out their election 
promises and he attacked their performance: 
It was curious that after three years of claiming to do the largest amount of 
work in the shortest possible time…102,000 people emigrated. 28,000 
more persons had gone off the land, the national debt had been 
doubled….farm production was in 1950 slightly below the 1938 
figure….actual quantity of all goods exported was virtually the same as in 
1938.10 
 
What the country needed ‘was twenty years of resolute government with plans made 
carefully and wisely by ministers collaborating and not rivalling each other’.11 
Childers admitted that agricultural production had not increased during their sixteen 
years in government. This was not only due to the economic war and the world war 
but also due to the absence of modern methods of farming. Capital spending was 
required on fertilizers, drainage, farm buildings and modern machinery.  
Representing a rural constituency and with his love for the countryside, it is 
not surprising that Childers had an interest in the condition of the agricultural sector 
and he harboured aspirations of one day becoming Minister for Agriculture. Once 
again Childers ventured outside his brief and this was a feature during his political 
career. In a draft memorandum to de Valera on Fianna Fáil party agricultural policy 
dated 9 May, 1952 Childers set out his observations on the general condition of 
agriculture. There had been no increase in crop yields since 1911 and livestock 
production showed no significant change. On the social front, Childers was concerned 
at the reduction in the numbers working in agriculture and the age profile of farm 
owners. Childers was correct in his observations but what he was really saying was 
that Fianna Fáil economic policy had failed. Fianna Fáil was in government from 
1932 to 1948 and it was their economic policies that Childers was in fact criticising. 
Childers’s vision for Ireland and agriculture in particular, had changed from that 
which he held in the early 1920s. He and de Valera were no longer singing from the 
same hymn sheet and de Valera accused Childers of thinking too much of the 
economics of farming when he had responsibility for lands.12  
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In criticising the Land Commission, he argued for ‘limiting the work of the 
Land Commission to very narrow objectives’.13 He queried the policy of land division 
and its minimal effect on emigration. As a future Minister for Lands he would 
experience the difficulties of land allocations and realise that there was not sufficient 
land available to satisfy the demands. Childers would realise that it was easy to 
identify problems in the workings of the Land Commission; it was a different matter 
to find solutions giving the prevailing circumstances. There was under-investment by 
farmers in buildings and land maintenance, and new methods were required to 
increase yields and capital investment. Childers proposed the establishment of an 
agricultural board similar to the then existing Tourist Board but ‘divorced from Civil 
Service procedure’.14 He concluded the memorandum as follows: 
I feel that the conditions are now suitable for a reorientation of agricultural 
policy. The facts are indisputable and the farming community is a little 
more on the defensive than ever before. I would ask you [de Valera]….to 
consider this proposal and not to mention my letter at a meeting of the 
government unless you are certain it would not cause resentment. I would 
equally on your advice write the Minister for Agriculture direct on this 
matter.15 
 
Childers displayed his frustration in a memorandum to de Valera dated 25 June 1953. 
Surely it was time to make ‘some decisions on unemployment, agriculture and 
credit’.16 He wanted urgent planning to deal with unskilled and semi-skilled labourers, 
and ‘some dramatic plan for stimulating agricultural production such as Seán Moylan 
and I prepared in separate memos’.17 Childers reflected ‘the sense of strangulation by 
Fianna Fáil’ on the lives of his constituents. Unemployment was a major concern and 
with a reduction in employment on local authority works, ‘this is doing terrific 
damage to us’.18 Again, Childers asked for confidentiality as he did not want to cause 
resentment. His language demonstrated genuine concerns and a real sense of passion 
and frustration.  Reflecting the situation as he saw it, Childers was doing no more than 
stating the obvious realities of the time, the sense of doom that prevailed. Emigration 
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was the answer for many Irish men and women and de Valera ‘no more than any other 
Irish politician of his era, had no answers’.19  
 Childers could not understand why the problems of agriculture were not 
attacked ‘in the same dramatic way we did other problems’.20 In the thirty years of 
self-government agricultural stagnation was evident but little was done to reverse this 
trend. One of the problems suggested by Childers was that many in Fianna Fáil were 
adverse to risk taking and ‘if the farmer is happy, why change him?’21 The 
agricultural community should have been dominant socially, culturally and 
technically but the inverse was true according to Childers. In a general attack on 
agricultural policy and the Minister for Agriculture, deputy Thomas Walsh, he stated 
that ‘no Minister of Agriculture has conceived of modern propaganda. The leaflets are 
dull, the Agricultural Committees are dull, the method of teaching is dull, the 
instructors are dull’.22 From his previous commercial experience Childers knew the 
importance of directing advertising to the key concerns of the audience. The Irish 
farmer was thought of as something unique, but Childers believed the farming 
community ‘to be just as receptive as other sections of the community to propaganda 
but it must be brilliant and not condescending and, above all, it must talk of money’.23 
Childers was aware of de Valera’s vision for rural Ireland, he held such views himself 
back in 1923, but now Childers wanted change. 
 Childers also shared his views on the position of Irish agriculture with the 
Minister for Industry and Commerce, Seán Lemass. Lemass was one of de Valera’s 
ablest ministers and arguably Childers recognised a future leader in Lemass. Eager to 
impress, Childers wrote to Lemass on 24 January 1952 with his results of ‘many 
hours studying statistics in regard to our agricultural production’.24 Yields from all 
farming produce made dismal reading and the room for enormous expansion never 
took place. In his view ‘the most urgent matter affecting the whole country’s life is 
that of making farmers feel that the future of their families and of their country 
depends on the acquisition of scientific knowledge and its application to farm 
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production’.25 Childers stressed the need for farmers to invest in their farms and 
increase production. The success of agriculture also depended on the widespread use 
of machinery due to the reduction in the labour force. He refused to believe that ‘there 
is no system by which machinery can be used co-operatively by small farmers’.26 He 
advocated the use of creameries to make financial incentives for high production 
quotas.   
Farm instructors should not only have the knowledge and capability of passing 
on information but also ‘the gift of propaganda’.27 Childers once again proposed the 
need for an Agricultural Board and suggested ‘that the present Minister for 
Agriculture has too much to do to devote three-quarters of his time to propaganda 
which is in fact what he should be doing’.28 To emphasise the position of agricultural 
production he used a fictitious contrast with the industrial sector: 
If you were informed by the Secretary of the Department of Industry and 
Commerce that in the year 1951 the whole of industry suffered a 
deficiency of 10,000,000 units of spare-part replacements and that having 
made up that deficiency a million and a half units should be purchased 
each year whereas, in fact, the present position was that only 300,000 units 
were being purchased, you would go through the roof.29 
 
Childers recognised that there were difficulties, for example, the high cost of 
machinery and of fertilisers. On the positive side, there existed additional electric 
power and a plentiful supply of good seed. He wanted everyone to realise that there 
was a crisis in regard to agricultural production. However, he was not convinced that 
his colleagues realised that for the first time ‘we are actually able to inaugurate a new 
agricultural policy without either an economic war or a world war obliterating all 
chances of ultimate success’.30 
In 1953 Childers wrote to Thomas Walsh, Minister for Agriculture outlining 
his political fears. The mystique of Fianna Fáil was declining steadily with the 
possible result of defeat and a coalition government. This decline was, according to 
Childers, contributed to by the fulfilment of many of Fianna Fáil aims and the ‘almost 
complete conversion of Fine Gael to our policy at least so far as official policy is 
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concerned’.31 He also suggested a frustration due to their failure to end partition and a 
disillusionment common to all countries as a result of the Second World War. There 
was now, according to Childers, a general agreement that agricultural production was 
the number one problem confronting Ireland.  
The Fianna Fáil ‘dream of making a new Ireland is unlikely to become reality 
unless we dramatise the most important problem - agricultural production. The result 
may be a failure, the risk is no greater than the danger to the future of Fianna Fáil if 
we do nothing’.32 Childers had warned Fianna Fáil of its impending demise in 1948; 
here once more in 1953, he warned the party that change was necessary if Fianna Fáil 
were to remain in government. But de Valera, Lemass and Childers colleagues were 
aware of the economic position during this period. In January 1952 Sean MacEntee 
described the finances of the country as ‘difficult, almost to the verge of 
desperation’.33 T.K.Whitaker’s suggestion that Childers’s proposals were regarded by 
his colleagues as too idealistic and therefore ignored is substantiated by Bruce Arnold. 
Childers forwarded letters and magazine cuttings, on educational issues, to Jack 
Lynch while he was Minister for Education. Similar material was also ‘sent in other 
directions as well. Lynch never read them! An immense pile grew up in the corner of 
the office, and was ignored’.34 
Against this bleak economic background, Childers settled into his first 
government portfolio in the Department of Posts and Telegraphs. This department 
could be divided into two distinct sections; that of the postal and telephone services. 
However, crucially for Childers, responsibility for the national broadcasting service, 
Radio Éireann, hereafter cited as RE, was also vested in the Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs and it is in this area that Childers left a lasting impression. Within the 
Department of Posts and Telegraphs Childers was called ‘the Minister for 
Broadcasting’ because of his keen interest in broadcasting.35 As a consequence, the 
focus of this chapter is primarily on his contribution to the development of the 
broadcasting service.  
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At this time, the Irish Press newspaper was undergoing fairly dramatic 
changes. Childers held the view that the broadcasting service was another method of 
communications and no doubt was influenced by developments in the Irish Press. The 
novelist Benedict Kiely was appointed literary editor in 1951 and the newspaper 
became a haven, particularly for younger Irish writers, and the paper’s politics ‘were 
also undergoing a discreet change’.36 Although Eamon de Valera remained in control 
of the newspaper until his retirement from politics in 1959 Sean Lemass’s term as 
managing director from 1948-51 had left its mark. The Irish Press took sides in the 
internal argument within Fianna Fáil on the issue of tariffs and protection. Lemass 
realised early in the 1950s the inadequacy of Fianna Fáil’s policy in relation to home 
industries and the Irish Press endorsed his arguments while ‘sidelining or minimising 
contrasting party views’.37  
The Fianna Fáil government inherited a very difficult situation on its return to 
power in 1951, but what lay ahead of Childers in the Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs? Specifically, what did he confront within the broadcasting service in 
1951? A considerable increase in revenue from licence fees and vitally important 
technical improvements in the 1ate 1940s and early 1950s were significant 
contributors to changes in radio broadcasting. Restrictions on advertising ‘were 
considerably relaxed after 1949….and content was changing’.38 In 1951 RE was still 
primarily a public service organization strictly controlled and used ‘for ideological 
ends which were primarily politically driven’.39 A major constraint on the 
development of radio was, according to John Horgan, financial.40 The Department of 
Finance ‘always apprehensive of expenditure in the area of broadcasting, would….put 
up stout resistance against further extravagance on this modern luxury [radio]’.41  
It had been accepted that up to 1948 ‘Radio Éireann was effectively a 
government mouthpiece, at least insofar as news and current affairs were 
concerned’.42 There were no live political debates and while opposition spokesmen 
were allowed on the radio at certain times it was in the context of a concession rather 
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than a right. The period 1948-51, did result in financial and technological advances 
but was ‘not notable for much in the way of innovation in broadcasting’.43 All efforts 
to remove broadcasting from direct government control were resolutely ignored.    
Childers had inherited a government controlled, under-funded organisation 
that ranked lowly in the eyes of the Department of Finance, and with little or no 
interaction with its audience. It is worth noting that the secretary of the Department of 
Posts and Telegraphs was León Ó Broin, cited hereafter as Ó Broin, who joined the 
civil service in the early 1920s. Childers and Ó Broin were of similar age and both 
knew nothing of the postal and telephone services when they joined the department. 
However Childers ‘was manifestly desperately keen to learn’.44 Ministerial 
responsibility would necessitate that a minister provide direction and control through 
periodic meetings with the broadcasting management. Not so with Childers. The 
success of his working career to date was based on attention to detail and he brought 
this with him to his new portfolio. Childers showed a level of passion in the area of 
broadcasting that he did not exhibit again until later on in his career as Minister for 
Health.  
An analysis of the Radio Review, the only radio programme journal available, 
provides a picture of the broadcasting service in Ireland on Childers’s arrival, and a 
means of measuring his contribution to it. The Radio Review was published weekly 
and included a daily listing of radio programmes not only of RE but also for the BBC, 
Radio Luxembourg and other stations. During the years 1949 to 1951 transmissions at 
RE commenced at 13.00 and usually closed at 23.00. Programme composition 
included news, music, religion, literature/drama, live song performance, sport, 
farming information, sponsored programmes, listeners’ letters, Irish and children’s 
programmes.45 From 1949 to 1951 RE did not offer any programming to compete 
with the political discussion and live audience programmes broadcast by its 
competitors. However, on occasion broadcasts did commence at 9.30am, for example 
the broadcast of Mass from an outside location, and close down could be as late as 
00.45.   
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Childers faced a tough task as he set about reforming and developing the 
broadcasting service. He saw the broadcasting service as another method of 
communications and set about extending its programme variety, transmission times 
and opening up the service to the public. Childers inherited a situation where political 
broadcasting was almost nonexistent, confined to news reports on Dáil Éireann and 
Seanad Éireann proceedings. His liberal attitude led him to convince the government 
to widen this coverage and include speeches by the Taoiseach and government 
members. However, it was not until April 1954 that Seán MacEntee as Minister for 
Finance, inaugurated the first series of political broadcasts from RE. He furthered the 
political coverage on radio with special commentaries on the Dáil and Seanad 
proceedings and provided for political broadcasts during general elections. The 
political broadcasts were based on ‘numerical strength in Dáil Éireann on the date of 
the dissolution, subject to appropriate arrangements being made in respect of 
independent Deputies’.46  
Not all TDs were of the same opinion as Childers on the use of radio for 
political purposes. Childers opposed those who suggested that a state sponsored radio 
station should not allow, for example, political discussion. This conflict of opinion 
was clearly evident when, in July 1951 Sean MacEoin, Fine Gael TD in Childers’s 
constituency, wrote a letter to RE complaining about references in a broadcast speech 
by Childers. In the course of the radio broadcast Childers had suggested that MacEoin 
had lowered ‘the standard of political controversy in Longford-Westmeath’.47 
MacEoin regarded the use of RE for such purposes as an abuse of the station whereas 
Childers viewed it as another medium of general communication.  
The only limitations on RE were those forbidding indecency, blasphemy, 
treason, personal insults and vicious attacks against friendly nations. Childers 
proposed to the government that RE broadcast ‘interesting political matter in the same 
manner as the newspapers, with the proviso that balance between the political groups 
be maintained as far as possible’.48 He gave details of much wider political 
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broadcasting in many countries in Europe and he emphasised the need for balance in 
allocation of time and State security. He also proposed that: 
between the date of the announcement of a General Election and polling 
day, a number of special party political broadcasts will be arranged and 
will be allocated to the political parties and Independents in accordance 
with their numerical strength in the Dáil at the time of the dissolution.49   
 
Childers continued his political programme expansion with the broadcast in March 
1952 of a programme on the week’s events in Dáil Éireann. Transmission commenced 
on a Saturday night initially scheduled for 21.30 and the programme was usually of 
fifteen minutes duration. This represented the first of such programmes and the result 
of Childers’s initiatives.50 Government ministers also used the broadcasting service to 
explain new pieces of legislation.  
Childers viewed broadcasting as an example of working democracy and 
Ireland was sadly lacking in this area. On 17 August 1951 Childers informed RE that 
‘for a trial period of six months….discussion-groups should be allowed to debate 
freely questions in which political view-points are involved’.51 Where scripts of the 
proposed discussions were not provided to RE the discussion was to be recorded in 
advance. This was to ensure reasonable balance and compliance with, for example, 
the issue of comment on religious organisations, which was not allowed. Childers 
viewed broadcasting as encompassing society in general but he was aware that radio 
broadcasting was not developed in Ireland among professional and other bodies.    
However, the development of new programmes in itself was not sufficient. 
Childers was committed to increasing standards across all areas of broadcasting. 
Transmission of programmes to the listener in a clear and professional manner was 
paramount to Childers. To this end, Childers listened to many programmes over a 
weekend and remarked on the technical problems as he perceived them. Quoting one 
example, the broadcasting of mass from the Holy Ghost Missionary College in 
Kimmage, Childers wrote to the Director of Broadcasting in January 1952 and stated 
that: 
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When Miss Peg Monahan began to read….her voice became muffled and 
as I can presume she was not speaking too close to the microphone it is 
obvious that some technical expert should have been there to correct the 
broadcasting effect. I understand that there are balance and control officers 
for practically all features in the BBC I should like confirmation that we 
are getting a second balance and control officer.52  
 
This attention to detail was representative of Childers throughout his political career. It 
was however a characteristic which suggested that Childers would not evolve from a 
very efficient administrator to a more general role of leader. Childers was a 
moderniser and according to John Horgan, ‘much given to direct interference in 
broadcasting’.53 His interference was a symptom of his genuine interest and he 
exhibited such symptoms throughout his political career, straying into whatever briefs 
he felt passionate about.    
  Paramount in Childers’s vision for the broadcasting service was the end user, 
the listener. Childers’s cultural and social aspirations for radio included the recording 
and transmission of singing in community halls throughout the country. Not only was 
the transmission of song important but Childers wanted to create an atmosphere at the 
live venue which would make ‘the people sitting by the fireside….feel they were 
taking part in the performance’.54 Involvement and interaction with the people of 
Ireland was paramount to Childers in the evolution of radio programming. He 
suggested programmes that encouraged the public to request information and answers 
on a range of issues.   
In keeping with his theme of customer satisfaction, Childers sought to bring 
some sort of regularity to programme timing. Due to technical and personnel reasons 
programme transmission was unplanned and very irregular. Due to pressure from the 
public he suggested greater regularity of particularly popular programmes. Always 
conscious of the listening public he was annoyed at the lack of professionalism and 
listener awareness in RE. This was the era of light hearted sponsored programmes and 
he was not impressed when these programmes were immediately followed by: 
gloomy, distressing, tortured music. I always ask for the co-operation of 
the Directors in matters of this kind and I do not want to have to give an 
order that never, never, on any possible occasion should the programme be 
                                                          
52
 Letter from Childers to Director of broadcasting, Jan. 1952 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9943/79). 
53
 John Horgan, Irish media, a critical history since 1922 (London, 2001), p.71. 
54
 Childers memo. to RE, 8 Jan. 1952 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9943/85). 
 
  
  
62 
so drastically altered in character that persons who have been listening to 
Sponsored Programmes will wish to turn-off the radio at whatever time 
these end.55  
 
It is understandable that Childers would have taken a keen interest in sponsored 
programming and advertising in general. Having worked as advertising manager of the 
Irish Press and also acted as secretary of the Federation of Irish Manufacturers, he had 
a long-standing acquaintance with many commercial concerns. Additional advertising 
revenue was available to RE from March 1952. From this date Irish companies 
importing goods for sale in Ireland were allowed to advertise for the first time, as long 
as their products were not in competition with Irish made goods.56  
 Like P.J. Little, former Minister for Posts and Telegraphs 1939-48, Childers 
was a music enthusiast and demonstrated this in his continuing support and 
development of Radio Éireann’s orchestral output. Childers had a particularly keen 
interest in the Radio Éireann Symphony Orchestra and the Radio Éireann Singers. 
Childers maintained tight control over their programmes by way of memoranda to the 
secretary of his department and the Director of Music at Radio Éireann. When a 
performance did not match Childers’s expectations he let this be known. His control of 
the orchestra went as far as providing the Director of Music with a list of suggested 
music for the coming year and thereby made it ‘easier to choose soloists and give 
variety’.57   
An analysis of programmes led to the formation of the Radio Éireann Singers 
and the expansion of the Radio Éireann Symphony Orchestra. Childers wanted to 
increase the number of performances of the orchestra and suggested a series of popular 
concerts on Sunday nights in the Gaiety Theatre. However, Ó Broin informed Childers 
on 16 May 1952 that there were no free Sunday nights in the Gaiety until January 
1953. Ó Broin suggested to Childers that ‘we are trying to handle so much with 
concerts this year that it would probably be better to defer further consideration of the 
Sunday Gaiety Concerts until next year’.58 A series of concerts arranged throughout 
the country led to increased clerical and general administrative pressure on the music 
department at RE and Ó Broin did not want to add to their workload. The Irish Times 
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commented on 28 October 1952 that Childers seemed to be establishing himself as the 
cultural leader of the government.59  
Childers’s contribution to the radio orchestra and singers was acknowledged 
and appreciated many years following his term as Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. 
In 1965 the Radio Éireann Singers toured Europe and recorded a disc of their tour. A 
letter from Dr Hans Waldemar Rosen, then Radio Éireann vocal adviser and 
conductor, to Childers stated: ‘may I, in grateful remembrance of your initiative in 
forming this group, ask you to accept a proof copy of this record’.60  
 Childers demonstrated his awareness of radio as a national archive. On 1 
February 1952 he asked the broadcasting service if they considered approaching 
people who had  experiences of 1916 and whether they would come together to 
discuss and reminisce. He was conscious of what would be lost to the Irish people and 
posed the question ‘how many are left’.61 Social and cultural topics were also 
discussed and programmes ranged in variety from a discussion on the future of the 
small farms in Ireland to the role of Shannon airport. However, in a later portfolio 
Childers did not show the same concern and sense of urgency and potential loss to the 
Irish people when questioned in the Dáil in relation to the preservation of 
documentation held by the Land Commission.62   
News bulletins were not very exciting when Childers became minister. 
Recorded interviews were far too few in the news broadcast and he proposed 
‘ordering immediately at least two portable tape recording machines to be carried on 
the backs of staff whose duty it is to interview prominent persons and carry out 
recording where the recording van is not available or where there is no reason for 
using it’.63 This may appear comical today but in August 1951 a live interview could 
only be recorded when a special recording van was available. News interviews were 
but one example of how Childers viewed the changing face of radio in Ireland. He 
suggested that this same process be used to capture interviews of disasters, sporting 
events and to record political speeches.    
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Childers’s development of the broadcasting service in particular, the political 
content and the news programmes led to him answering questions in the Dáil on the 
issue of government favouritism. Deputy Sweetman, Fine Gael, enquired as to the 
number of news bulletins over a four day period in July 1952 and the number of such 
bulletins which contained reports of Childers’s speeches or other activities. Over the 
period in question, there were twenty news bulletin broadcasts of which eleven 
contained reports of speeches by Childers.64 However, over this particular four day 
period, Childers had several non-political appointments of a nature always reported by 
RE. Opposition deputies were not going to let radio be a voice solely for the 
government. Further questions by deputy Sweetman in relation to by-election 
candidates required Childers to state why only Fianna Fail candidates were announced 
in news bulletins.65 Childers assured deputies that there was ‘no question whatever of 
Party discrimination’.66 Despite newspapers naming opposition deputies taking part in 
the by-election, RE could not announce their names until official notification was 
received.  
During 1952 Radio Éireann was only broadcasting for five hours per day if the 
sponsored programmes are excluded. Childers planned to increase the hours with the 
installation of new transmitters and was also considering, ‘whether broadcasting will 
require proper studio buildings in the foreseeable future’.67 Childers’s influence within 
broadcasting and the commitment to change and development began to reap rewards. 
A letter from the Director dated 27 January 1953 to Childers advised him of more 
regularity in programme scheduling, the recruitment of additional control officers and 
enhancement of the news service. The popularity of radio among the public can be 
gauged from the increase in radio licence purchases. In 1950,  the number of radio 
licences in the country was 298,129 and this had increased to 427,660 by 1954.68  
The issue of non-nationals working within the broadcasting service was raised 
during question time in Dáil Éireann in 1952. Opposition deputies were anxious to 
know the number of non-nationals holding positions in the Radio Éireann orchestra. 
Reservations were expressed concerning the replacement of Irish members by non-
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nationals and the hardship this caused. Out of a total of sixty-one members of the 
radio orchestra, sixteen were non-nationals as at 30 June 1951 and this had risen to 
seventeen of the same total by 30 June 1952.69 According to Childers this was ‘not 
abnormal when compared with leading foreign symphony orchestras in countries with 
a longer history of concert development’.70  
He also defended, during questions in the Dáil, their inclusion by reference to 
the contribution they made to the improved standard of performance and to the fact 
that ‘improvement has also taken place in the standard of teaching as a number of the 
orchestra members are engaged in the teaching establishments and give instruction of 
high calibre not fully available here before’.71 Childers suggested that ‘it maybe 
possible in time to secure more nationals of adequate professional standard to fill 
vacancies in our orchestra as they occur. This of course, depends on what can be done 
by the teaching organisations’.72 This was a situation where a standard of competence 
would have been accepted by some in order to secure Irish musicians positions within 
the orchestra. However, Childers’s aim was to raise standards and the only way to 
achieve this was to employ musicians based on ability. There was stated Childers ‘no 
prejudice whatever in that matter’.73  
Broadcasting as a function of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs meant 
that it was controlled by the civil service and constrained particularly by the 
Department of Finance. Aware of the constraints on the development of the 
broadcasting service, Childers wrote confidentially to León Ó Broin, secretary of the 
department, requesting evidence of constraints on RE due to civil service control: 
If it will serve your purpose better they can be written unofficially but I 
insist on having them. Examples are….permits required to secure funds for 
entertaining debaters, all of which I regard as utterly ludicrous and 
fantastic and fully justifying the change….unreasonable restraint by 
Finance on matters which are purely artistic or literary.74 
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He could see the limitations imposed on RE by the civil service and initiated the 
process by which the broadcasting service would gain its autonomy.  
 After a settling period Childers initiated a major reorganisation of the 
broadcasting service revenue streams. The finance system operated by the civil 
service was not flexible enough to ‘enable broadcasting to run smoothly’.75 The 
government recognised that financial flexibility was required to enable RE deliver the 
service expected from it. Childers told the Dáil that ‘Radio Éireann must function 
with the speed and the vigour of a newspaper’.76 His earlier career experience would 
be brought to bear in the development of RE. Traditionally the amount provided for 
the provision of the service was arrived at following discussions between the 
Department of Finance and the Post Office. Following negotiations with the 
government Childers announced to the Dáil that ‘an annual grant will be made for 
broadcasting equal to the total of the receipts from licence fees and sponsored 
programme fees’.77  
 Capital expenditure was paid by way of subsidy following discussions 
between the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs and Minister for Finance. This was a 
real breakthrough in the development of the service and the alterations to existing 
practices gave ‘much greater freedom and flexibility than it has now both in providing 
programme staff and in the many innovations where speed of decision is essential and 
it will be possible to plan development much farther ahead’.78   
By March 1952 Childers had introduced a system of committees and an 
advisory committee. The individual committees were responsible for different items 
of broadcasting, such as drama, light music and the Irish language. The advisory 
committee met periodically to hear and review progress. It was Childers’s intention 
that the different features of broadcasting be reviewed and discussed at least every six 
months. However, as part of the reorganization process, Childers negotiated with his 
government colleagues a fundamental change in the broadcasting service. The 
government had agreed to the appointment of a five member council to advise and 
assist the minister ‘in the conduct of broadcasting and….responsible under him for the 
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general control and supervision of the service’.79  The membership of this council was 
chosen by Childers and submitted to the Dáil for approval. Members gave part-time 
services to broadcasting at a rate of £500 per annum for the chairman and £300 per 
annum for each of the other four members.80 The first council included Seán Ó 
Suilleabháin and Theodore William Moody.  
The council broadly speaking took the place of the department in the 
management of RE. This was a significant achievement for Childers in the process of 
complete autonomy for the broadcasting service. It was a step in the right direction, an 
improvement, but Childers and the government’s control was not altogether lost as he 
chose the membership of the council. The council directed daily policy and gave 
advice to the Director of Broadcasting. In choosing the first council, Childers used his 
intuition ‘more than anything else in believing these men to have the administrative 
gift of providing good management and of co-operating with the director’.81 The new 
council began its work in January 1953 and among its notable successes was the 
introduction of a series of lectures that became known as the Thomas Davis lectures.  
From a political point of view the new structure meant that Childers could 
redirect questions from opposition deputies on routine broadcasting issues to the 
Director of Broadcasting. Childers remained responsible to Dáil Éireann for the 
broadcasting service but if he commented on daily issues he would have removed the 
freedom granted to the broadcasting authorities.  The political convenience of the new 
structure was commented upon in Dáil debates. In a critical tone deputy Sweetman, 
Fine Gael, remarked that it was clear ‘that if there is anything good he will take the 
praise, and if there is anything bad he will not stand the blame himself, but shelter 
behind the council’.82 Childers refused to answer questions in the Dáil relating to 
daily issues within the broadcasting service and his reasons were logical. He adopted 
a similar position in differing portfolios throughout his political career. When 
responsible for lands, Childers would not interfere in the workings of the land 
commissioners. Similarly when he was responsible for transport and power, Childers 
refused to intervene in the closing of uneconomic railways.  Childers had appointed a 
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council and did not want to undermine their position. However, his own behaviour in 
relation to the broadcasting service points to a blatant contradiction when compared to 
his approach to questions in the Dáil.   
 Wanting to keep listeners tuned to RE, Childers’s new council moved the 
broadcasting service into the scientific age with the inauguration of listener research. 
The things RE needed to know when planning radio programmes were ‘when listeners 
listen, what they listen to, and what they think of the programmes they hear’.83 
Surveys were carried out in 1953, 1954 and 1955. The first survey revealed that 85% 
of the potential audience listened to RE, compared with 53% for Radio Luxembourg 
and 49% for the BBC.84 The survey showed, according to Horgan, ‘an unexpectedly 
large audience for Irish dance music programmes. This was an oddity-Irish dancing on 
radio seems an unusual attraction at best’.85 However, the audience figures indicated 
that RE did not have the luxury of operating in a vacuum.  
 The survey results included information on the time periods during the day 
when radio sets were on and the various radio channels people listened to. Programme 
appeal was measured and Childers could see at a glance what the public thought of 
established and new programmes. Childers was aware of broadcasting trends in other 
European countries and would no doubt have noticed a very sizeable percentage 
tuning in to the BBC and Radio Luxembourg. A high degree of selectivity was 
demonstrated by those interviewed. Radio sets were not merely switched to RE but 
people tuned to specific programmes despite the irregularity of programme schedules. 
The findings of the research were forwarded to Childers by the director of Radio 
Éireann, for his views before making ‘a selective statement to the Press’.86    
 While the results showed the number of listeners that tuned to the most popular 
programmes, the survey also indicated the numbers tuning into the more specialised 
tastes and interests. The important thing was, according to Maurice Gorham, ‘to see 
that everybody gets what he wants some of the time….a radio station has a duty 
towards all sections of its listeners’.87   
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 Childers’s strategy to remove the broadcasting service from under the control 
of the civil service and proceed with its development was considerably enhanced with 
the appointment of Maurice Gorham, cited hereafter as Gorham, as Director of Radio 
Éireann in 1953. Gorham had joined the BBC in 1926 and had considerable 
experience in both radio and television. This appointment was significant in that 
Gorham was the first Director to be appointed from outside the civil service.   
However, the appointment of Gorham had its complications because; in Ó 
Broin’s words Childers ‘never really learned that there were some things he should 
leave to others’.88 The re-organised structure of the broadcasting service should have 
allowed Childers to remove himself from the daily issues and to concentrate on wider 
policy issues. However, Childers’s interest in the broadcasting service made it 
difficult for him to distance himself from routine matters.    
 This was typified when Childers intervened in Gorham’s salary negotiations 
and agreed a salary directly with him. However, MacEntee as Minister for Finance 
would not agree to the salary which undoubtedly caused embarrassment to Childers. It 
was left to Ó Broin to retrieve the situation and secure Gorham’s services. In January 
1953 Gorham was appointed Director of Broadcasting and spoke of Childers in the 
following terms: 
When Erskine Childers came in as Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, 
Radio Éireann had for the first time a Minister who had a genuine 
enthusiasm for broadcasting in all its aspects….took a lively interest in 
everything broadcast-news, talks, discussions, Irish music, sponsored 
programmes. His constant enquiries….passion for information….were 
sometimes embarrassing to those who were doing the job, but the staff 
appreciated that here was a Minister who really wanted to do something 
for the broadcasting service as a whole.89 
 
Ó Broin had been influential in obtaining the semi-independent structure of RE and 
‘refrained nobly from interfering in any way in Radio Éireann’s affairs….though 
always ready to help the Director when required’.90 However, Childers: 
Found this self-denying role harder to sustain. His interest in every detail 
of organisation and programmes overflowed in constant telephone calls 
and copious minutes-they might run to 22 numbered paragraphs, many of 
them expecting a reply. It was sometimes tempting to ask him why he had 
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taken the trouble to install a new regime and a new director if he wished to 
run the service himself.91  
 
Evidence supporting the contradiction of his non-interference in daily issues when 
questioned on RE matters in the Dáil and his obvious, although well intentioned 
interference, on a personal level.  
 In his private life Childers was preparing for his second marriage during 1952. 
Childers was engaged to Rita Dudley, a Catholic, who had worked at the British 
Embassy in Dublin as Assistant Press Attaché, and later at the Irish Desk in the 
Empire Division of the Ministry of information in London. During his reign 
Archbishop John Charles McQuaid discouraged mixed marriages. When permission 
was granted, no mass was permitted and the ceremony had to take place in the sacristy 
of the church. Childers wrote to Archbishop McQuaid on 9 July 1952, requesting 
permission to marry in a Catholic church in Ireland, and that they be allowed marry 
before the altar rather than in the sacristy of the church. In an extract from his letter 
Childers outlined his case as follows:  
My fiancée wishes to attend Mass immediately before or after the 
ceremony as in France and she feels most intensely that for us there is no 
need to hide our actions from the public at large. With all respect I suggest 
to Your Grace that no serious precedent will be created if you should in 
your wisdom make an exception of this kind for me.92 
 
The reply from the archbishop’s house dated 12 July 1952 was short and to the point. 
Childers’s views had been frequently expressed but the policy on mixed marriages 
had been maintained: 
I regret that I cannot see my way to make an exception in favour of a 
Minister of State which I could not fairly refuse to grant to other and 
humbler applicants. 
It is open to the parties to a mixed marriage to have the ceremony 
performed in another diocese and country. If the ecclesiastical authorities 
in the Diocese chosen consent to the publication of the marriage, I shall 
not make any objection.93  
 
Childers pondered his position and during a visit to Rome he visited Cardinal Montini, 
later Pope Paul VI, for talks. Despite all-night discussions, the Cardinal was unable to 
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dispel Childers’s reservations and the idea of a conversion was dropped.94 After 
consulting with Rita they decided to marry outside Ireland and the ceremony was 
carried out in St. Joseph’s Church, Paris on 16 September 1952. Childers contacted the 
Irish Embassy in Paris and was supplied with the documentation required for the 
ceremony. He was also informed ‘that the marriage could actually take place within 
the church and not only in the sacristy. The ceremony would, of course, precede and 
not be a part of the Mass’.95 Childers had got his wish to be married before the altar of 
a church. This episode demonstrated the powerful position of the Catholic Church in 
Ireland and is testimony to the hard line adopted by Archbishop McQuaid. During his 
political career Childers expressed reservations concerning promotion prospects 
because he was a Protestant. He had now experienced the control of the Catholic 
Church in Ireland in relation to his private life.  
Back in Ireland Childers was confronted with the arrival of television. 
Although the broadcasting of television in Ireland was many years ahead, Childers 
replied to a letter from the Council of Europe seeking advice on the drafting of a 
European Convention to regulate the television service and copyright issues. In his 
reply Childers stated that when television was established in Ireland it would not be 
operated under the control of the civil service. His department had proposed sending 
officers abroad to investigate television and gather some expert information. 
However, the conditions attached to the proposal by the finance department were such 
that Childers department could not accept them. As a result, Childers department was 
not in a position to give any official advice on television matters.96    
At the end of 1951 there were approximately 500 television sets along the east 
coast area of Ireland receiving British television. The setting up of a television 
transmitter in Belfast meant that a wider area of the Republic received foreign 
television channels. Childers stated as early as 11 November 1952 that it was bound to 
come to Ireland and if we did not provide it ourselves foreign networks would cover 
the country.97  By 1953 the prospect of a national television service was looming. A 
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proposal from the Federated Trust to Childers regarding the formation of a company 
to run a commercial television station in Ireland prompted deputy Sean MacEoin, Fine 
Gael, to suggest that his involvement in the project would influence Childers’s 
decision on the proposal. The proposal included a weekly television guide of 
programming and stated that the Federated Trust had the necessary capital for the 
project. No state grants or loans would be required. A licence fee of two pounds was 
proposed for the first three years of the project and the fee thereafter to be agreed with 
the government. Childers’s reply to MacEoin expressed surprise at the suggestion and 
stated that should the government accept the proposal but find insufficient detail or 
objectionable areas an opportunity would be given to the Federated Trust to consider 
these issues before any final decision was made.98 
 In the autumn of 1953 Childers visited London, Paris and Brussels to examine 
the television services. Childers realised the benefits socially and culturally and that 
the capital cost, spread over eight years, was not prohibitive. However, there is the 
feeling that Childers was not totally committed and supportive of this new innovation. 
When questioned in the Dáil on the progress made towards establishing a television 
station he replied: 
No decision has so far been taken to proceed with the actual establishment 
of a television service. I am, however, keeping in the closest touch with 
television developments elsewhere with a view to enabling the government 
to decide whether and when a television service should be provided here.99 
 
Childers viewed television as competition to radio and its listeners. He would also 
have been aware of the possible erosion of cultural values with the introduction of 
television. However, Ó Broin and Childers had begun the planning process that led to 
the launch of Irish television in December 1961. Childers was not responsible for the 
broadcasting service when television was introduced by the Irish government. 
However, Ó Broin played an enormous part in deciding the ownership and structures 
of the new television service.100 
 Despite Childers’s passion to expand and improve the broadcasting service 
and, his interest in the cultural and social aspects of it, it was nevertheless just a 
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section of his overall responsibility in posts and telegraphs. While there is no doubting 
his immense interest and influence in the area of broadcasting, this does not mean that 
he neglected or ignored the postal and telephone sections of his portfolio. This was a 
period of expansion and development in postal and telephone services. New post 
offices and telephone exchanges were planned throughout the country. At the opening 
of a new automated telephone exchange in Waterford in October 1952 Childers 
announced plans for a new telephone exchange in Athlone, County Westmeath. This 
exchange, in his own constituency, was opened in September 1953 and further 
exchanges were planned for Limerick, Galway, Sligo, Drogheda and Mullingar. His 
participation in the announcement and opening of telephone exchanges was what 
would have been expected from the responsible minister. He had travelled to see the 
latest developments in telephone technology but Childers did not, indeed could not 
have the same influence in this area due to its technical and other specialised 
considerations.  
Childers was unhappy with the difficulty experienced by the farming 
community in securing the telephone service. The balance Childers had to consider 
was that between social good and financial loss. This was also the dilemma that faced 
Childers later in his career in relation to uneconomic railway closures. It is difficult to 
envisage the structure and challenge that faced Childers in these key areas of 
communication in the 1950s. An example of the telephone structure and service in 
rural areas may be had from a report in the Longford Telegraph dated 1 September 
1951. The article reported on a meeting of Longford County Council at which it was 
noted that it took between two and five hours to get a call through to a local 
number.101 The telephone service showed improvement during 1951 with 6,639 new 
subscribers and seventeen new or updated telephone exchanges.102 There was a record 
7,234 telephone installations in 1952.103  
During question time in the Dáil Childers regularly answered questions from 
deputies on the provision of telephone kiosks in villages and towns throughout 
Ireland. This was a particular concern for deputies during 1951 and Childers 
responded with the number of telephone kiosks in a particular location and a promise 
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to have additional requests examined. This may seem trivial by current standards but 
the task that confronted Childers in 1951 can best be understood by his answer to a 
query on the installation of a public telephone in a County Monaghan sub-post office. 
Childers replied: 
It is the intention of the Department to install a telephone in every post 
office. As there are still about 700 offices to be dealt with – most of them 
in remote areas – the work will have to be spread over a number of years. 
So that the best progress may be made, the order in which call offices are 
installed is determined mainly on engineering considerations.104 
 
Waiting times for telephone installations was considerable and in reply to Dáil 
questions on installation backlogs in the Cork city district Childers replied in July of 
1951 that ‘service for persons who applied last year will commence shortly’.105 Other 
issues of interest to deputies ranged from the delays in delivering telegrams, the 
number of postmen in the service, the cost of delivering post to the provision of new 
post offices.106   
            It is very clear from Childers’s speeches in the Dáil where his enthusiasm and 
real interests lay. When speaking on matters concerning posts and telegraphs he listed 
the notable achievements for the year without displaying any sense of personal 
involvement or enthusiasm. Backlogs and arrears were explained away with reference 
to similar problems in other telephone administrations. In 1952, the policy of clearing 
telephone applications was continued; priority was given to those areas with 
outstanding applications going back to 1949 or earlier.107 Childers read the script, 
answered deputies’ questions in his usual thorough way, but it lacked Childers’s 
personal enthusiasm and drive. However, when speaking on broadcasting issues 
Childers’s tone and approach was very different. He took joint ownership of 
initiatives, appointments, and developments. There is a sense of someone who had a 
real interest, not only in the longer term strategic objectives of the broadcasting 
service, but in the daily routines of broadcasting. From planning new programmes and 
highlighting current progress, to the appointment of a young Irish assistant conductor, 
this was Childers’s department.108  
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However, not having the same enthusiasm for the telephone and postal sections 
of his brief does not mean that he was not interested in the workings and improvement 
of the telephone system. Barry Desmond recalled that: 
He was inclined to get embroiled in the minutiae of his portfolio, for 
example, as Minister for Posts and Telegraphs he used to walk around 
Dartry. I well remember people accused him of testing out the phone 
boxes, the public phone boxes, and writing a little report on them to the 
Secretary the following morning.109 
 
 Childers encountered negative views and opinions in the appointment of non-
nationals to the radio orchestras and he also encountered this issue in relation to the 
telephone and postal services. Questioned on why a non-national was appointed to the 
position of sub-postmistress instead of an Irish applicant he replied that candidature 
for sub-postmasterships ‘is not restricted to Irish nationals’.110 Employment and 
emigration were a major concern during this period but the memories of not too distant 
times were also evident. During Dáil discussions on postal appointments deputy 
Everett, Labour, commented in regard to one appointment that the lady ‘had a Black 
and Tan brother’.111     
Within government, Seán MacEntee’s handling of finance contributed to 
independent deputies withdrawing their support for Fianna Fáil which resulted in the 
1954 election. He received most of the blame for the 1954 result and ruined his 
chances of succession.  Fianna Fáil had sixty-five deputies following the 1954 general 
election, a loss of four seats from its 1951 result.112 Childers was once more successful 
in Longford-Westmeath taking the fourth seat in this five seat constituency. After the 
election, Fine Gael and Labour dominated the situation and constructed another 
coalition government under John A. Costello. Childers was frustrated; in total control 
of his department it was all taken away from him overnight. His successor, Michael 
Keyes, paid tribute to Childers for his energy and considerable success within the 
Department of Posts and Telegraphs. Childers would have responsibility again for the 
Department of Posts and Telegraphs later in his political career. Childers’s interest in 
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broadcasting continued and he was involved in a proposal to develop Ireland’s V.H.F. 
radio programming during the early 1960s.  
In opposition Childers reminded the government of the healthy position they 
inherited from Fianna Fáil. Public demand increased imports but exports also 
increased to new levels, one-third higher than in 1950. Private incomes reached an all 
time high with workers earnings rising higher than increases in living costs. Sales of 
farm produce reached record levels and livestock numbers reached post-war records 
in 1953. People had saved sufficient amounts during 1952-3 to enable them to invest 
in the National Loan. The loan would not have been successful if the view taken by 
the inter-party speakers on the economic state of the nation was true.113 
Childers’s portrayal of a healthy economic position was just not true. 
Following the Second World War Ireland had the prospect of a constant demand for 
her exports. However, unemployment continued at a high level and wage claims soon 
created an inflationary situation. The unpleasant fact was, according to F.S.L. Lyons, 
‘that the economy had not fundamentally changed since the war and that its inherent 
weaknesses had not been eradicated’.114 The growth outlined by Childers owed ‘an 
unhealthy large proportion to heavy state spending….what was happening in the 
decade after the war was that the government was making frantic attempts not merely 
to provide work….to reduce emigration, but also to provide amenities and 
services….normal elsewhere.’115 Government expenditure on agriculture increased 
from just over four million pounds in 1939 to over thirteen million pounds in 1952.116 
Despite this spending, the return ‘was hardly impressive, indeed distinctly 
unimpressive by comparison with those Western European standards by which Ireland 
was beginning to measure herself’.117 The increases outlined by Childers were not 
sustainable, it would not be until the late 1950s that ‘something changed, and Ireland 
entered a period of sustained economic growth’.118 
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The inter-party government encountered a particularly difficult period in 
Ireland. It faced industrial and agricultural slow-downs, rising unemployment, 
emigration and a balance of payments deficit. The then Minister for Finance, Gerard 
Sweetman realised that economic expansion was the solution to the county’s problems 
and appointed T.K. Whitaker as Secretary to his Department. Sweetman believed 
Whitaker to be the person most capable of planning Ireland’s economic future and 
few could have envisaged the long-term effect of his appointment in May 1956.  
An outbreak of Republican activity in December 1956 commenced with a 
series of bombings in border areas. Speaking at Granard, county Longford, Childers 
made no secret of his views on such bombings. He stated that: 
Blowing up transformers and buses in the Six Counties was like bringing 
back horses to replace tractors or flying tricolours from every house to 
prove that the residents were Irish. During the war the same group had 
imperilled neutrality by conspiring with one of the warring countries 
whilst after the war the same group had achieved a 26-county Republic by 
agitation in the Dáil.119 
 
There was no place or excuse for violence in Childers’s politics. He preached 
reconciliation throughout his political career and was to the forefront in calming very 
difficult times for government and country in 1970. 
John A. Costello’s inter-party government was no more successful with 
inflation and general economic matters than was Fianna Fáil. Costello was also 
confronted by the ominous revival of IRA activities. The government had no option 
but to use the existing law against those who were bringing the gun back into politics. 
Seán MacBride withdrew Clann na Poblachta’s support for the government thus 
forcing the 1957 general election. He withdrew support for the government because of 
Sweetman’s financial policies and also because of Costello’s hostility to the IRA. The 
1957 general election saw Fianna Fáil return to government with seventy-eight 
seats.120 It was de Valera’s greatest electoral triumph and also saw the virtual 
obliteration of Clann na Poblachta as an electoral force. Fianna Fáil secured 51.9% of 
the first preference vote in 1938 compared with 48.3% in 1957.121 However, Fianna 
Fáil won one seat more than it did in 1938, and more importantly, it stretched its 
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advantage over Fine Gael from fifteen seats in the 1954 election to thirty-eight seats 
in 1957.122 Childers had another successful campaign in Longford-Westmeath, again 
taking the fourth seat; it was to be his last campaign in this constituency. 
Childers’s first ministerial portfolio coincided with a very difficult period for 
Fianna Fáil in government. However, despite this the Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs provided Childers with the opportunity to indulge his creative imagination 
and boundless energies. The period of the inter-party government of 1948-51 had not 
been innovative in relation to the broadcasting service. However Childers’s 
appointment: 
gave a completely new tone and impetus to the direction, content and 
control of Irish broadcasting. Childers was a moderniser….among the few 
Irish politicians of his era who saw broadcasting as an opportunity rather 
than a threat.123 
 
Childers inherited a broadcasting organization that was starved of financial 
resources and the necessary drive to develop its potential. The introduction of political 
discussion and unscripted debate led the way to the opening up of radio to the wider 
community.  That wider community was of special interest to Childers. Listener 
research was among Childers’s priorities and this process commenced in 1953. The 
improvement in programme quality, variety and scope can be traced to Childers’s 
imaginative policy of convincing the government to grant RE almost autonomy.  
Childers was fortunate that Ó Broin was also interested in change and not 
typical of civil servants during that period. Gorham’s appointment, crucial in the 
development of the broadcasting service, was the first non civil servant in the 
organisation. The appointment of the five member council to advise and assist 
Childers lasted until the broadcasting authority took over in June 1960. Childers 
restructured the revenues of RE thereby facilitating expenditure and development 
plans. During his term Childers showed innovation and a determination to make the 
changes necessary for the development of the broadcasting service.  
However, having put a management structure in place he found it difficult to 
break away from the day to day detail. This may well have signalled to his party 
colleagues his undoubted administrative skills but that he would never be able to 
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make the transition from the specific to the general.  While recognising the drive and 
imagination of Childers, it was the combination of Childers, Ó Broin and Gorham that 
laid the foundations for the developments that occurred within the broadcasting 
service. The new structures introduced by Childers as minister and maintained by 
subsequent ministers paved the way for the eventual separation of broadcasting from 
direct government control and the creation of an autonomous body to control both 
radio and television.  
Whether or not the 1951-4 cabinet was the worst de Valera government, there 
can be no denying the positive contribution made by Childers to the development of 
the broadcasting service during this period. Childers well deserved the accolade of 
‘Minister for Broadcasting’ within the Department of Posts and Telegraphs. While 
developments in the telephone service were not as significant some progress was 
made. Later in his political career Childers had responsibility once more for the 
department of posts and telegraphs. His efforts led to the modernisation of the 
telephone service in Ireland. For now, Fianna Fáil was back in government and 
Childers could look forward to renewing his ministerial career. 
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Chapter 3 
Minister for Lands, Forestry and Fisheries, 1957-9 
The withdrawal by Seán MacBride of Clann na Poblachta’s support led to the 
fall of the inter-party government and the return of Fianna Fáil to government in 1957. 
De Valera gained his greatest electoral triumph with Fianna Fáil winning seventy-
eight seats in Dáil Éireann. Childers was again successful in Longford-Westmeath and 
was appointed Minister for Lands, Forestry and Fisheries in March 1957. The three 
components of this portfolio provided Childers with the challenge of managing vital 
national resources. His appointment as Minister for Lands was seen by some as 
disappointing but the Westmeath Independent contended that ‘no matter what 
anybody says to the contrary, his office is a very important one, dealing as it does 
with the activities of the Land Commission and of the Forestry Sections’.1 In his new 
portfolio he faced an enormous range of issues. The ongoing problems of uneconomic 
farm holdings needed to be progressed, forestry schemes that needed to be pushed 
ahead not to mention the fisheries section of the Department of Agriculture that had 
been transferred to the care of the Minister for Lands. He wanted the agriculture 
portfolio but if successful in lands his case for agriculture would only be strengthened.  
The 1950s was a miserable decade for the Irish economy and things had not 
changed when Childers took up his new office. Emigration and unemployment were 
still rampant but a change was on the horizon brought about by a combination of 
events. Amongst these events was the publication in 1958 of Economic Development 
and the ensuing Programme for Economic Expansion which even today ‘can be seen 
as a watershed in the modern economic history of the country’.2 Ireland appeared at 
last to be moving towards participation in the world of that time. New emphases on 
attracting foreign investment, the modernisation of agriculture and the development of 
a wider range of exports all contributed to moving Ireland from its old position of 
protection and inward looking to a new position of initiative and aspirations towards 
the Common Market. The substantial investment in social projects also contributed to 
the recovery process along with the considerable growth of Ireland’s trading partners. 
The hopelessness, stated F.S.L. Lyons, had begun to give way ‘to a drive and 
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optimism previously unknown’.3 However, political will and leadership was required 
to drive this new momentum and the retirement of de Valera from active politics led 
to the appointment of Seán Lemass as Taoiseach in 1959. While credit must go to de 
Valera for the initial favourable government reaction to Whitaker’s report in 1958, as 
he was still Taoiseach, the responsibility for its implementation rested upon Seán 
Lemass.    
Back in government Childers travelled the country widely addressing major 
issues affecting the country and criticising the economic planning of the opposition. 
Emigration was one such issue and he explained that it was not solely an Irish 
problem. Emigration from rural areas to centres of industrial wealth was universal. It 
would not be stopped by panic measures such as spending money on employment for 
employment sake. What was required, in Childers’s view, was a steady build up of 
scientific agricultural production and getting the cost structure correct. He asserted 
that Ireland’s recovery required the belief ‘that a greater amount of produce sold at a 
competitive price, using adequate capital and modern methods, brought real 
prosperity’.4 Increased production would automatically lead to employment according 
to Childers. He suggested a complete reorganisation of the Department of Agriculture 
and for ministers to show leadership and not, according to Childers, to ‘start the old 
round of correspondence, using exactly the same phraseology….how much is a T.D. 
an advocate of production-how much a carpet-bagger’.5 The crisis in the Irish 
economy in the 1950s was according to Brian Girvin ‘not so much within industry as 
within agriculture’.6 One of the major difficulties that faced Lemass when he became 
Taoiseach was that the agrarian sector could not increase exports nor could it provide 
additional employment.7 
Foreign investment was needed in 1957 but Childers warned that conditions 
must be favourable if foreign capital was to be invested in Ireland.8 He advised that 
economic stability for a period of ten years was required ‘so that investors would feel 
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certain of their position’.9 Childers’s ten years of stability was exaggerated, in fact by 
early 1958 Lemass had decided that the time was right to encourage foreign 
investment in Irish industry. The government started a publicity campaign in the 
United States to attract investment into Ireland. Speaking at the annual dinner of the 
Wexford Chamber of Commerce, Lemass stated that capital generated within the 
country was not sufficient to produce the industrial expansion that was required. 
Foreign capital and technical aid were crucial in the effort to secure additional foreign 
markets. Industrial growth was the key to reducing unemployment and emigration. It 
was planned to expand the campaign to other countries but this would depend on 
results and the availability of funds for such promotional activities.10  
Childers was utterly frank on the issue of emigration. He argued that Ireland 
could only afford wage levels in proportion to levels of production. Childers 
concluded that if people did not want to live on Irish income levels then they would 
emigrate and the government could do little to prevent them emigrating.11 There are 
two issues here in relation to Childers’s argument on emigration. Accelerating 
emigration was a feature of the 1950s and Irish wages rates, which had historically 
‘remained quite close to those prevailing in Britain, fell far behind in this period. By 
1960, the average British worker earned at least forty per cent more than his Irish 
counterpart’.12 This gap in wages served as a strong incentive for workers to emigrate 
even when not faced with unemployment. But Childers failed to conclude that Fianna 
Fáil’s policy of protectionism since coming to power in 1932 failed to provide 
sufficient employment opportunities for those leaving agriculture and for those 
entering the labour market for the first time. Ireland required better marketing, 
improved quality and design while always reducing costs by incorporating new 
productivity techniques. Childers stressed the need for savings in order that the 
government could provide capital for productive purposes. The ‘government was 
pledged to facilitate productive capital....excessive restriction of capital outlay for 
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reducing costs or expanding output was intolerable’.13 Evidence of Childers’s 
changing position on industrialised Ireland from the view he held in the early 1920s. 
He was no longer in tandem with de Valera on the economic future of Ireland. De 
Valera was, according to Niamh Puirséil, ‘stubbornly refusing to let go of the reins of 
office….seemed out of touch with the lives of most people for some time’.14 Childers 
was not only in touch with the real situation facing the economy, he also knew that 
Lemass was ‘growing increasingly irritated by what he saw as de Valera’s passive 
leadership’.15  
Childers took every opportunity to criticise the economic plans and results of 
the opposition. It would ‘take five, if not ten years to uproot the political weeds sown 
by the Coalition mentality since 1947’.16 Fianna Fáil, he argued, was responsible for 
every important project in the rebuilding of the country. The coalition governments of 
1948 and 1954 promised lower prices, decrease in taxation and generally a better time 
for all. Fianna Fáil had to combat the negative legacy of coalition governments whose 
policies ‘of increasing wages without increasing production and of using up all the 
savings beyond the absolute minimum had left no reserves’.17  But it was not only the 
coalition governments that left a negative legacy. Brian Girvin quite rightly also 
attaches blame to de Valera and stated that ‘evidence from the 1950s suggests that de 
Valera was paralysed politically, without any clear understanding of what was 
happening to his society’.18 Ireland was in crisis at the time of the 1957 general 
election and it was not until 1959 that decisive actions occurred. The first action was 
when Lemass became Taoiseach in 1959 and had full power for the first time. He 
promoted an ‘active expansion of the economy….accepts Whitaker’s position that 
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state investment should be for expansionist purposes’.19 The second action was 
Britain’s decision in 1961 to apply for membership of the European Community.20 
This was an important period in Childers’s political career. If successful in 
Lands his ambition of securing the agricultural portfolio would be strengthened and 
advanced. Even more important for Childers was the fact that de Valera was nearing 
the end of his political career. Childers had a very short period of time to demonstrate 
his abilities to Lemass and his suitability as a future Minister for Agriculture. Land 
had been a dominating factor in Irish life. This dominance continued into Childers’s 
term as he arrived in the Department of Lands in March 1957 and indeed long after he 
departed this portfolio. Representing a rural constituency with responsibility for land 
challenged Childers understanding of land issues, and the deeply held convictions of 
his rural constituents and rural Ireland as a whole. He immediately began to query all 
aspects of the Land Commission procedures (hereafter cited as the LC) and this led to 
unprecedented flows of additional work. In his memoirs, after spending forty-four 
years working in the service of the LC, Patrick J. Sammon recalled that Childers 
‘gave the firm impression that he was going to do a root and branch examination into 
the Land Commission and all his queries merited and got priority treatment’.21 Along 
with all the queries that followed, Childers also called for a full review of land policy. 
Existing policy gave land to previous employees, smallholders, migrants and so forth 
but the number of landless men who got land was very small. The term landless man 
referred to an applicant for land with knowledge and practice of farming routines but 
who did not possess any land. As a result of Childers’s call for a review of land policy 
in 1957, a conference was held within the LC. The majority of the participants, stated 
Sammon, recommended no change in land policy. However, Sammon prepared a 
minority report which proposed a model farm structure for landless men.  The 
proposal envisaged one such model farm structure for each county. Each standard 
holding was to comprise thirty-three acres of good land, fully equipped with dwelling 
house and farm buildings. Those selected were to be fully trained in agriculture and 
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their performance monitored. Nothing more was heard of this proposed change and no 
change in land policy took place.22  
 In his efforts to update and reform the working of the LC Childers was 
blocked by procedures and the internal workings of the LC. The annual estimate and 
Dáil speech by the minister was a highlight in the LC calendar. Sammon was one of 
those who had a significant input into the minister’s draft speech and in preparing 
Childers’s draft speech for 1958 he incorporated many new ideas, including the model 
farm experiment for landless men. However, Sammon’s draft speech probably never 
reached Childers as it was, according to Sammon,  fairly certain that it ‘was removed 
altogether from the file before the minister saw it’.23 Sammon was informed by his 
superior that Childers would not accept the new ideas. Sammon argued ‘how could 
the Secretary say, in advance of discussing our draft with Erskine, whether he would 
embrace this new material or not?’.24 Sammon concluded that this was ‘surely a clear 
case of the top administrators feeding the minister a standard type of estimate speech 
without any embellishments or alterations in policy or other proposals’.25 The meeting 
that followed between Childers and LC officials to discuss his speech was scheduled 
for the night before Childers’s speech in the Dáil.  If Childers was to use the estimate 
speech to announce new policy decisions he was leaving himself very little time to 
reflect on such changes.  
From the beginning of his term as minister Childers identified issues and 
procedures that needed changing within the LC. Presenting his first estimate for Lands 
on 24 April 1957, Childers informed the Dáil that he had commenced ‘a thorough 
examination into the policy and working of the Land Commission, but it is too early 
yet to have taken decisions on such major changes as maybe needed’.26 He would be 
in a better position for the next presentation of estimates. However he did make some 
comments on LC activities and the need for the best use of Ireland’s land resource. 
Childers acknowledged the criticism levelled at the standard of houses provided by 
the LC and undertook to implement new house designs. He also posed the question as 
to how the LC could contribute to the interrelated problems of low agricultural 
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production and emigration. Childers proposed that the LC focus more attention on the 
quality of farmers receiving land allocations. He made it clear that in future: ‘the Land 
Commission will adopt a firm attitude towards the inefficient working of 
allotments’.27 Those who received land were not to consider it a gift from the State, it 
must be worked to maximum capacity and contribute to overall economy. Land 
availability was the limiting factor for Childers and all those who held the portfolio. In 
any one year only fourteen out of every one thousand uneconomic farmers got land 
and of every one thousand farms investigated; only one hundred and fifty were 
suitable for acquisition.28 An uneconomic holding was one not sufficient in size and 
quality of land to enable the owner to derive a livelihood from working it.  During 
Childers’s term as minister thirty to thirty-five acres of good land was recognised as 
an economic holding.  Childers recognised that the primary need was increased 
agricultural production. Throughout his term he constantly urged the use of better 
methods of work to increase agricultural output. Government expenditure of ‘£500 as 
an investment on making a farm economic, surely can expect a notable increase in 
output from the producer’.29 The LC had spent many millions of pounds but with little 
improvement in agricultural output. The economic improvement of a relatively small 
number of families did not justify the Department of Lands. There was no general 
improvement in the county’s economic position and ‘social welfare, in Mayo or 
elsewhere, like patriotism, is not enough’.30   
 The current objective of the LC was to settle as many families on the land as 
was practicable. He wanted this modified to ensure ‘that the policy will result in the 
growth of high grade commercial farming’.31 He questioned the logic of the LC 
spending capital on land division while the country lost revenue on cattle exports 
because of ‘out-of-date practices’.32 Childers was aware of the problems with the LC 
and stated that ‘the problem for us then is how to spend the portion of the Estimate 
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devoted to land division in the most effective way….at this stage, I can only say this: 
the system must change’.33  
While much of what Childers said was generally accepted by opposition 
deputies he did attract criticism on some issues. As usual with Childers he tried to 
give a complete understanding of a problem that confronted him. He quite clearly saw 
the bigger picture in relation to the difficulties of land allocation and the best use of 
this asset. Childers constantly urged the use of better methods of production in order 
to increase output and commented on the negatives within agriculture as they 
appeared to him.  The LC could only ensure a change of ownership in land, how the 
land was used was the responsibility of the Minister for Agriculture. In the Dáil his 
comments on agriculture led to the suggestion from deputy Dillon of Fine Gael that if 
he wanted ‘to be Minister for Agriculture, he should persuade the Taoiseach to make 
him Minister for Agriculture’.34 Childers had not received competent advice because; 
in the opinion of deputy Dillon ‘there is nobody in the Land Commission competent 
to advise him on agricultural matters’.35 Childers’s comments on agriculture were 
valid and even though lands and agriculture were two separate departments he 
commented on the facts as he encountered them. This sensible and logical approach to 
issues was adapted consistently by Childers during his political career, though not 
always to his advantage. His interest and arguments should have led Childers to 
propose the amalgamation of lands and agriculture, but he did not. Childers did 
suggest that the Department of Agriculture use the valuable experience gained by 
many of the LC Inspectors. A high proportion of inspectors had agricultural science 
degrees and had become skilled in public relations with farmers. Future policy should 
encourage greater co-ordination between the Departments of Lands and Agriculture. 
Childers cited areas such as marketing projects, technical instruction and general 
assistance to farmers to progress.36 It was of course possible for the departments of 
lands and agriculture to exist independently; they had done so and would for many 
years after Childers term as minister.  
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Childers’s statements on agriculture in relation to production can be justified. 
However, he was walking on very thin ice when he spoke of firm attitudes by the LC 
towards inefficient farmers who received land allocations. The issue of fixity of tenure 
entered the debate and Childers was warned that he was treading on dangerous 
ground. During his term as minister Childers demonstrated a lack of feeling and 
understanding of land and the mentality of the Irish farmer. Childers’s upbringing 
could not be further from the life experience of small farmers in rural Ireland. In this 
respect Childers was an outsider. On most issues that Childers encountered during his 
political career being somewhat removed from particular circumstances would be an 
advantage. This allowed him to look objectively at a particular issue and propose a 
solution based on the information he had to hand. However, the Irish farmer and his 
land was not an issue that could be dealt with from the point of view of output; it was 
not just another industry. Childers’s study of history, in particular Irish history, made 
him aware of the land struggle down through the centuries. However, being aware of 
circumstances and having an understanding of the feelings of a people are two very 
different issues.  
On the question of land utilisation deputy Dillon, Fine Gael, asked Childers 
‘who is going to say what working it right is….the right user of land in this country is 
that user which will procure for the man who owns it under God and nobody else the 
best living for himself, his wife and his family’.37  He was warned by deputy Dillon 
that ‘our people will not stand for disruption of fixture of tenure….there is too much 
trying to undermine fixity of tenure in this country and in this House….there was a lot 
of blood spilt in this country in order to get the three F.s’.38  Doubts around land 
security would have impacted on land improvements and investments which 
ironically Childers repeatedly called for. In the Dáil debate he was reminded by 
deputy Dillon that ‘the best bank a farmer could have ought to be his land…if you 
once raise a doubt in his mind…not one penny of the savings will go into the land’.39 
Here again Childers crossed the line which divided the departments of land and 
agriculture. It was not likely that officials of the LC would wish to supervise the 
activities on lands which they allotted. It would have been the responsibility of 
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officials from the department of agriculture to assist those farmers in need of help. 
Childers never had the intention of introducing an element of insecurity into farming. 
The only thing he was interested in was the ‘high output farm….higher output per 
acre, for more development on the land, for better profits for the people concerned’.40 
For Childers the future lay in large well run farms and according to Terence Dooley 
‘there was greater cabinet consensus than at any time before’.41  
Childers had promised change to the LC systems and procedures and no doubt 
deputies expected announcements during his next estimate speech. In the meantime he 
continued his activities into the workings of the LC. He argued for young energetic 
farmers to be given an opportunity to get into farming and make a success of the LC 
efforts. The future of Ireland depended on the development of young, first-class 
scientifically minded farmers. This was not an unrealistic position for Childers to 
take. From the annual reports of the Minister for Agriculture it is clear that there was 
an education and training structure in place prior to and during Childers term as 
Minister for Lands. Under the section of the report dealing with agricultural 
education, a list of institutions is provided along with the courses offered and the total 
number of students registered. These institutions covered a wide geographical area 
and were either under the control of the Department of Agriculture or in the case of 
the university Colleges of Dublin and Cork, were in receipt of annual  grants. Grants 
for agricultural education were also paid to private agricultural colleges and secondary 
schools. Agricultural training was continually developed with short term courses 
offered when and where necessary. All aspects of agriculture were covered from 
general courses in farming to very detailed and specific topics.  
Whether Childers’s many speeches and general encouragement had any direct 
impact on agricultural education and training is not easy to determine. However, 
statistics do show an increased participation by students in agricultural education and 
an increase in the number of agricultural schools both under the control of the 
Department of Agriculture and those in receipt of grants from the department during 
his term as minister. For example, in the year 1954-5, there were 186 agricultural 
schools under the department’s control and 253 agricultural schools in receipt of 
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grants from the department.42 By the year 1959-60 these figures had increased to 220 
and 397 respectively.43  
 Approximately 20,000 farmers and farm relatives were registered as 
unemployed in April 1957. Unemployment assistance played ‘a considerable part in 
rural economy’.44 The LC recognised that change was required and were in favour ‘of 
establishing on the land an elite corps of young energetic married men with growing 
families so as to increase production and rejuvenate agriculture’.45 Their definition of 
this elite corps included men not exceeding thirty years of age with at least two 
children, son of a farmer or farm labourer, with practical knowledge of farming and 
with some capital. The overriding problem of land settlement was according to 
Childers ‘the absolute determination of the Irish people to seek quickly as near an 
English standard of living as possible’.46 The LC had acquired over 1 million acres of 
land since 1923 with no great sign of universal agricultural resurgence since the war. 
A comparison with Danish agriculture showed that Irish farm income was about half 
that of their Danish counterpart per acre.47 
Childers made observations on the current workings of the LC in relation to 
land allocation. Each year some 17,000 acres consisting mainly of badly used land 
was acquired but it was taking on average five and a half years to acquire an estate 
and to pay the owner. Of this great delay, the landowner was responsible for twenty-
six months. In July 1957 the LC had 45,000 acres of land of which 22,000 acres were 
on its hands for more than two years. Such delays in allocations were an annoyance to 
small landowners, as they could not make decisions as to their economic future. 
Childers did not lay the blame for this problem with the LC, and said that ‘the fault 
lies in the pressure exercised by successive Ministers to multiply the number of tasks 
carried out by Inspectors in a given period’.48 Those who were allocated land were not 
contributing enough to economic expansion. Childers highlighted the issue of 
migrants and the fact that they were selected to ease re-arrangement difficulties rather 
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than for their farming competence. While admitting the excellent work done in re-
arranging rundale holdings, he argued that the final result ‘is not stemming emigration 
to the slightest degree’.49 He quoted an example of how £25,000 was spent on a 
particular re-arrangement in County Mayo. The resultant holdings were still utterly 
uneconomic with some owners having let their units and emigrated to England. He 
suggested that the £25,000 could be more usefully spent to maintain families on the 
land, to educate, to improve farms or provide fertiliser subsidies. Childers highlighted 
social features in relation to land ownership that he considered required attention. Out 
of a sample of 5,000 holdings investigated permanent absentee tenants on farms of 
under £20 valuation represented, on average, 8.9% of the holdings.50 An examination 
of seventy-three enlargements totalling 762 acres revealed that one allotment had been 
sold and nine others were let. These transactions totalled one hundred acres or 14% of 
the total area examined. Given these results it may appear somewhat unfair when 
Childers suggested that: 
it is obviously right not to consider landless men on the present basis as 
experience has shown that the taking of continuous conacre is not by itself 
proof of good farm management and within its limitations the Land 
Commission selects tenants on the whole with care.51 
 
The LC policy of setting up smallholdings was failing with the number of holdings 
between one and thirty acres falling by 17,426 between 1938 and 1955.52 The 
National Farmers’ Association (hereafter cited as the NFA) was against a policy of 
smallholdings that would not support the people at a standard that they had come to 
expect. Holdings of approximately fifty acres of good land or its equivalent of less 
good land would allow farmers to educate their children adequately so they could be 
efficient and progressive farmers.  
Childers’s thorough examination of the LC and the identification of necessary 
changes in the system led to little change within the LC process. Sammon stated in his 
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memoirs that ‘no great decisions of any real worth were taken by the minister’.53 
Childers was won over by civil servants to maintain the status quo. Childers failed to 
do what he promised in his first year in lands. Full of energy and enthusiasm he 
examined the land question in great detail and identified the shortfalls and injustices 
of the system as he perceived them. However it is one thing to identify an injustice; to 
correct it, if it can be corrected, is quite something else. Simply put, Childers failed to 
recognise early on that the limiting factor in solving many of the social problems 
associated with agriculture was the finite amount of land available for distribution. On 
the political front, Childers ideas for land allocation were negative and contrary to the 
traditional Fianna Fáil/ de Valera view of family farm holdings. Terence Dooley 
correctly states that up to the 1960s those individuals in Fianna Fáil, who favoured 
commercial farming, were not allowed to abandon the traditional form of land 
division.54 It would have proved negative politically, something Childers did not quite 
grasp. Childers presented his second lands estimate for the year ended 31 March 1959 
to Dáil Éireann in July 1958. He provided the customary statistics across the various 
activities of the LC for the past year and informed the Dáil that the new LC house 
design had been prepared. There was improvement in the time taken to allocate land 
but continued effort was required ‘to dispose of lands on hands’.55  
However, Childers disappointed opposition deputies and those qualified 
farmers with no land who expected to hear announcements of policy changes within 
the LC. Childers’s speeches and statements made during the year would have led 
people to expect a new approach in the provision of land for landless men. This 
category included farmers’ sons who had worked the land but could not secure the 
necessary capital to purchase land. However  LC policy was not changed with 
Childers telling deputies ‘that to include landless men, sons of farmers and cottiers 
among those qualifying for land….would simply add to our difficulties’.56 Having 
gained agricultural experience, he was sympathetic towards these men but offered 
them no hope of securing land from the LC. Deputy Griffin, Fianna Fáil, reminded 
Childers that ‘a considerable number of these young men have no alternative but to 
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leave the country’. Deputy Tierney, Cumann na nGaedheal, stated that ‘the present 
system of land division is completely wrong’ and deputy Crotty, Fine Gael, severely 
criticised Childers stating that ‘when he went in first, we heard a lot about his being 
young and energetic….there would be a big change. Instead of that, as far as we down 
the country see, he has done nothing’.57 While the criticisms of Childers by opposition 
deputies could be explained as politics he nevertheless failed in his estimate speech to 
announce any significant changes to LC policy. The criticism of Childers in this 
regard is valid and he was forced to ignore his earlier statement that the system must 
change. Childers could do little for those farmers’ sons who deserved land. He was 
criticised for not performing a miracle but his error was in promising land that was not 
there for distribution. What he did do was improve administrative routines and 
procedures but the fundamental policies of the LC remained unchanged. His ideas of 
transforming the LC failed to materialise despite his energetic and imaginative 
mind.58   
Childers had virtually ruled out future allotment of lands to landless men not 
that they had received, stated Terence Dooley ‘very much since the Emergency’.59 
Although Childers was premature in announcing radical change within the LC his 
eventual conclusion was one that did stand the test of time. The publication of T.K. 
Whitaker’s Economic Development led to the Department of Agriculture emphasising 
increased cattle production which led to less land for division. From 1959 to 1973 no 
more than four landless people received land per year and only 1,376 acres was 
allotted to landless men during this period.60 This confirms the reality that there was 
insufficient land for distribution.  
 During the 1958 estimate debate an issue not directly associated with the daily 
workings of the LC but of some significance to historians was raised in the Dáil. This 
was the issue of LC records and their preservation. While making his observations on 
the problems faced by the LC in acquiring abandoned farms deputy Dillon had one 
final comment to make: 
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The last thing I want to say to the Minister concerns a very important 
matter, but nobody gives a damn about it…the Land Commission has 
become one of the greatest treasure houses of social history outside the 
British Registry of Deaths…is there no means of collaboration with the 
National Library to get that treasure house of documents preserved or at 
least microphotographed?...the Minister would serve the country well if he 
could get the National Library to collaborate with him and 
microphotograph this material for posterity.61 
 
In response, Childers assured the deputy that ‘these documents are in good hands. 
Occasionally, they are consulted by research students…these historic documents are 
well cared for’.62 Childers indicated that he would request the LC to approach the 
National Library for their view on deputy Dillon’s proposal. It appears that Childers 
did not attach the level of importance to the LC archive as did deputy Dillon. This was 
not only extremely unfortunate but also very surprising. While Minister for Posts and 
Telegraphs Childers showed a deep concern for the preservation of Ireland’s culture 
and heritage. He encouraged the recording of Irish songs and stories for future 
generations and was very aware of what could be lost forever.  
 Childers delivered his final lands estimate to Dáil Éireann for the year ended 
31 March 1960 on 9 June 1959. He reported on the LC achievements and addressed 
issues that caused concern for his department. He reminded deputies that the LC 
would not be coerced by agitation whether it was peaceful or otherwise. On the issue 
of land purchased by non-nationals he assured the Dáil that such purchases were not 
significant. His speech was structured as in previous years with deputy Jones, Fine 
Gael, remarking that he had ‘looked at the Minister’s statement and the main facts in 
it are similar to what we found in previous years’.63  
Childers failed to introduce any significant changes to LC policies but did 
work to improve the circumstances of those people aided by the LC. His plans for an 
improved type of house for migrants lead to the building of prototypes. However, the 
cost of the new house designs was considerably more than houses built to existing LC 
plans and were therefore rejected. In his own constituency of Longford-Westmeath 
Childers did have some positive moments as he announced government relief for 
farmers whose holdings were flooded due to their proximity to the river Shannon. 
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Childers proposed the migration of twelve people and the construction of new 
dwelling houses and farm buildings. Once more Childers was not prepared to play 
politics with the situation and entrusted the completion of the work entirely to the LC 
as part of its land settlement programme. He would not interfere in any way with the 
process of selection other than to ensure that it was carried out in an efficient manner. 
Inspectors called to the families involved and the LC decision was final.64 Childers 
was adamant that he had no part to play in the decision process as to who should 
receive land or assistance from the LC. Having secured some relief for local 
constituents he removed himself from the situation which was not in keeping with the 
usual political process. This recurring theme of distancing himself from the electorate 
followed Childers throughout most of his political career but did not hamper his 
popularity on polling days. This contradiction can be explained with reference to 
Childers himself. He was perceived as honest and sincere. The electorate did not 
always agree with his actions but these were overlooked in favour of his diligence. 
Childers’s attempts to change LC policies had not been successful but he 
would, in the main, be judged by the electorate on how he handled issues they brought 
to his attention. Due to the numbers of people calling to see Childers to present their 
claims for land he found it necessary to explain the procedure used by the LC in the 
acquisition and allocation of land. Speaking at a Fianna Fáil convention in Moate, 
County Westmeath he stated that lands were allocated first to deserving tenants on the 
estate and where possible some land could be made available to former employees 
who were considered deserving of land. The selection process centred on uneconomic 
landholders within one and a quarter miles of the estate with competence in farming 
being one of the important conditions. Land was also made available to western 
migrants but landless men were not given land. Childers explained that landless men 
could only be given land following the results of an examination as the total number 
seeking land in the country ‘was so great as to make ordinary selection impossible’.65  
He also pointed out that he had no power to allot land and that the Land 
Commissioners were independent. Neither he nor any Dáil deputy had any influence 
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as they all received far too many representations from applicants. Childers explained 
that if he had the power to allot land he would not be able to distinguish between one 
application and another unless he himself became an inspector. He was not going to 
get involved in land distribution and supported the Dáil decision ‘to take allotment of 
land out of the political arena’.66 Childers was clearly stating his position as minister, 
as he did in his previous portfolio; he would not make representations to the LC on 
behalf of the electorate. He was criticised by deputy Flanagan, Fine Gael, in the way 
he ‘deals with representations directed to him. It was the custom of all Ministers for 
Lands….to receive deputies, deputations from local committees and to hear the merits 
or demerits of the case which they had to put forward’.67 Childers made it known that 
to receive deputations on issues of land acquisition and allocation would serve no 
useful purpose. He was not going to interfere with the workings of the LC, he could 
have met the deputations, but generally he did not.  
Childers took a very tough line on land agitation, much to the anger of those 
demanding the acquisition and division of estates. This was a national and local 
problem for Childers. Speaking in Moate, County Westmeath, Childers made it very 
clear that land agitation ‘would serve no purpose whatsoever’.68 The pool of badly 
worked land was diminishing and Childers stated that the LC was not interested in 
well-worked land. Farmers, big and small, who were exercising good land practice, 
were assured that their property rights would be respected. This particular viewpoint 
was very contentious in the Midlands, as locals demanded that estates be taken over 
by the LC and divided out among them. Childers had to balance the rights of the 
landowners, big or small, with the demands of the small landholder and avoid the 
uncertainty that ‘would hang over hundreds of estates, a most objectionable feature 
which could not be tolerated’.69 This message no doubt registered with some as a 
sense of the ascendancy class looking after their own. Childers was not promoting the 
case of the large estate owner. Terence Dooley recounted an alleged incident in which 
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a deputation was told ‘that the minister did not care who owned the lands as long as 
they were well worked’.70 
The issue of the Boyd-Rochfort estate at Castletown in County Westmeath 
demonstrated the feelings of local people in the Midlands and Childers’s response to 
their agitation. A well-attended meeting in the area was held in July 1958 to impress 
upon the authorities the ‘advisability of dividing the Boyd-Rochfort Estate’.71 The 
meeting was organised by the local land league and their intention was to have the 
estate acquired peacefully. A letter from Childers to the meeting made it clear that the 
acquisition and division of land was the sole responsibility of the LC and that he could 
not interfere. It had been his practice not to meet deputations from land leagues or 
attend their meetings. The LC had no grounds for the acquisition of the arable portion 
of the estate but the question of turbary was being dealt with. Childers’s views were 
completely opposite to those held locally and aired at the meeting. As reported in the 
Westmeath Independent, there was no reason why the estate should not be divided. 
Evictions had taken place in the past and ‘it was only right that the descendants of 
those who had been evicted, and uneconomic land holders in the area, should get land 
on this estate’.72 There were 113 holdings under £15 valuation within one-mile radius 
of the estate. Emigration was a major concern locally and the proposed division of the 
estate was seen as a means of keeping many people in the area. The importance of 
strong agitation to have the estate acquired was stressed, but they would keep within 
the law. Responding to Childers’s views, Senator L’Estrange, Fine Gael, stated that it 
was the duty of the government to formulate policy and that there were valid grounds 
upon which to acquire and divide the estate.73  
Childers warned that agitation would only result in delaying the LC’s decision 
and even result in them withdrawing completely from the acquisition. The LC did not 
‘initiate proceedings against an owner who is and has been working his lands well’.74 
He also emphasised that the Constitution guaranteed equal treatment to all and that the 
State could not target certain individuals in a way that would leave doubt as to their 
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security. Since the foundation of the State, it had been made clear ‘that all residents of 
the State must be treated with complete impartiality, particularly in matters 
concerning property’.75 Much of the land agitation in the Midlands was blamed on the 
‘lackadaisical policy of the Land Commission’.76 While Childers could point to 
statistics that showed the amount of land acquired and distributed by the LC, the 
agrarian agitation was blamed on a department ‘which through unwillingness or 
inertia, refuses to budge, or move in the direction pointed out by the plain people’.77  
Childers backed the policies of the LC and was justified in doing so. 
Commenting on the plight of the small land owner deputy Blowick, Clann na 
Talmhúain and former Minister for Lands, stated that ‘the small uneconomic 
landholder is not responsible for the fact that he has a small holding. He is not 
responsible for the fact that most of the land was given to 10,000 landlords during 
Cromwell’s time….subdivision of land took place that we are trying to remedy 
today’.78 This sense of a sympathetic hearing for the small landholder was not 
entertained by Childers as minister. He made his decisions based on the policies of the 
LC. In doing so he could not be faulted in any way other than his ignoring the 
historical background. This is where Childers lacked sensitivity and a genuine feeling 
and understanding of the motives behind the land agitation. This lack of 
understanding would be paramount in defining his term as Minister for Lands.  
Childers had demonstrated that he was standing behind the policies of the LC 
in relation to land acquisition and allotment. In early 1958 he decided to tackle the 
problem of representations to the LC in relation to land allocations. This was 
Childers’s biggest political blunder as it called into question his understanding of the 
Irish political process. At best it further questioned his understanding of land issues in 
Ireland and banished his prospects of ever securing the agricultural portfolio. In fact 
following his term in Lands, Childers was to spend some ten years in the Department 
of Transport and Power which did nothing to advance his political career. As Lemass 
watched on, Childers initiated a career ending proposal. He proposed to end the 
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practice whereby TDs made representations to the LC on behalf of constituents. 
According to Sammon, in early 1958, and not yet one year in Lands, Childers 
circulated a letter to all TDs making representations directly to the LC.79 He stated 
that the selection of candidates for land allocation was the reserved function of the 
LC. Fianna Fáil TDs were, stated Sammon, up in arms with this situation, and 
following a party meeting Childers was forced to abandon his approach and revert to 
previous practice.80 Childers believed that people had come to rely far too much on 
government assistance and in a belief that public representatives could provide 
solutions to all their problems. He used the LC issue as an example and although he 
could show from statistics that a very large proportion of those who received land had 
made no representations to the LC, he was forced to back down on this issue.  It was 
true that deputies often recommended so many people for the proceeds of particular 
land divisions as to make the recommendations of no value. However, to suggest an 
end to the process of elected public representatives acting on behalf of constituents, 
no matter how futile the intervention, demonstrated political and social naivety on 
Childers part. It was one thing for Childers as minister to distance himself from the 
decisions of the commissioners but what he proposed contravened a key ingredient of 
the Irish political process, patronage politics. Lemass could not have been impressed.  
Childers’s position on the LC policy of not acquiring well run estates did not 
endear him to those farmers who believed that they were entitled to land allocations 
from local estates. This however was not the only difficulty that Childers had to 
confront in relation to potential land acquisitions by the LC. The relief of rural 
congestion was an ongoing process during the period Childers was Minister for 
Lands. However, not all land offered for sale was purchased by the LC or Irish 
citizens. Given Ireland’s background and land history it seemed, stated Canon 
McCarthy, ‘particularly unfair and anti-social that many of our bigger and best farms 
should be allowed to pass intact, by public and private sale, into the hands of new and 
oftentimes alien landlords and combines’.81  Non-nationals, also described at that time 
as aliens, were buying land and property in Ireland and this was one of the land issues 
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which featured prominently in newspapers and Dáil debates. In the Dáil, questions to 
the Taoiseach on 21 November 1957 included one asking him to clarify government 
policy on this issue. His response was that under the Aliens Act of 1935, an alien, 
non-national, could acquire property in the same way as acquired by an Irish citizen.82 
Many of the properties acquired by non-nationals were expensive residential 
properties for which there was little Irish demand. This was also a period when the 
government was trying to attract foreign investment into Ireland and to adopt a 
restrictive policy on the acquisition of property by non-nationals would have been 
counter productive. The Taoiseach did state, however, that circumstances might arise 
when restrictions on such purchases, as distinct from the abolition of the right to 
purchase land, may be necessary.83 Childers encountered similar questions in his 
previous portfolio and resolutely backed the non-national members of the radio 
orchestra. He would adopt the same position in relation to land purchases.  
In February 1959, Roscommon County Council questioned the policy of the 
government in allowing the 2,000 acre Rockingham Estate, outside Boyle, to go on 
the market. They called on Childers to have the estate acquired by the LC to relieve 
congestion in the area and to ‘prevent it being purchased by aliens’.84 The council 
suggested that the land be given back to the people who had a rightful claim to it. 
Farms close to the estate were in the Shannon Valley and subject to flooding, and this 
was also put forward as a reason to distribute the estate among local farmers. During 
question time in the Dáil Childers told deputies that the LC was unsuccessful in their 
attempt to purchase the estate.85 The property was not suitable for compulsory 
acquisition and under the Land Acts non-nationals had to be treated on the same basis 
as all other landowners. If the new owners were not using the land in the best interest 
of the nation then the LC could acquire the land and use it for land settlement 
purposes. No matter who owned land it could be ‘taken by the Land Commission if it 
wants it for the relief of congestion’.86  
This explanation did not satisfy local opinion and they questioned why the LC 
did not acquire the estate for relief of congestion. The Rockingham Estate comprised 
                                                          
82
 Dáil Éireann debates, vol.164, 21 Nov.1957. 
83
 Ibid. 
84
 Westmeath Independent, 21 Feb. 1959. 
85
 Westmeath Independent, 7 Mar. 1959.  
86
 Ibid., Response by de Valera, Taoiseach. 
  
  
101 
some 2,400 acres with 950 acres of forestry and fully equipped sawmills. It also 
included a stud farm, Lough Key and its islands along with sporting rights over 
40,000 acres of adjoining lands. The potential of this property for the tourist industry 
alone must have impressed Childers. The negotiations between the LC and the estate 
owners were on a voluntary basis and as such Childers would not disclose details of 
the LC offer for the estate. He went on to say that it was not the practice to publish 
any information in connection with unsuccessful negotiations ‘where there is a 
question of compulsory sale to the Land Commission’.87 The sale of the estate by 
public auction was scheduled to take place in Dublin on 5 May 1959.  A special stamp 
duty of 25% was payable by non-nationals on the purchase of agricultural land but 
this held very little weight among  the many thousands of small landholders. 
As of February 1959 Childers was not concerned over the amounts of land 
purchased by non-nationals, the situation did not ‘warrant any investigation’.88 He 
assured the Dáil that further steps would be taken to discourage non-nationals from 
buying land required for the relief of congestion if circumstances required such action. 
During the period 1940 to 1950 non-nationals purchased an average of 5,000 acres per 
year.89 From April 1957 to July 1959, purchases of agricultural land by non-nationals 
averaged roughly 2,100 acres per year.90 The records showed that land purchased by 
non-nationals from 1961 to October 1963 was approximately 6,500 acres each year, 
about one-fifth of the total land purchased by the LC for relief of congestion.91 
The controversial land issues that confronted Childers remained long after his 
term as minister. The findings of a joint committee of Macra na Feirme and the 
National Farmers’ Association were sent to Lemass in 1963. The committee found 
that there was insufficient land in Ireland to meet the requirements of Irish citizens. 
Even so, large tracts of land were sold to non-nationals and they recommended that 
legislation be enacted to preserve the land of Ireland for the people of Ireland. The 
rate of transfer of farmers from uneconomic holdings to viable farm sizes could not 
solve the problem in the foreseeable future. They called for the LC programme on 
land transfer and structural improvements to be greatly accelerated. They also 
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concluded that increased production was necessary in farming so that income could be 
raised to a socially acceptable level as quickly as possible.92  
Childers’s interest in agriculture was expressed in the many speeches he 
delivered on the subject. He constantly spoke on the economics of agriculture and the 
need to increase production while keeping costs under control. At a cabinet meeting in 
1958 de Valera suggested that Childers ‘thought too much of the economics of 
farming and too little of the small farmer’.93 This comment annoyed Childers and he 
reminded de Valera of previous memoranda on the position of the small farmer and 
that he had made an intensive study of the human problem in Longford. Childers’s 
view of agriculture had changed from the position he adopted in the 1920s. Childers 
suggested that the West of Ireland could produce and export to Britain ‘tens of 
millions of Pounds worth of early potatoes, vegetables and fruit products’.94 What was 
needed, according to Childers was ‘more scientific method and organisation’.95 He 
wanted modernisation of farm methods and an increased use of fertilisers. Childers 
asked the question ‘can we save the West and the small farm areas?’.96 Childers 
reminded de Valera that everything he wrote about the need for an agricultural policy 
applied most urgently to the small farming areas. But therein lay the problem as de 
Valera saw it. Childers no longer dreamed of Ireland as a ‘people who were satisfied 
with frugal comfort’.97 Aware of the views of those who never considered him as Irish 
he stated that ‘I am not speaking with a foreign outlook’.98 He was an Irish citizen, but 
his understanding of Irish politics and in particular his sense of judgement in relation 
to land issues can be questioned.   
Childers did not enhance his career prospects in Lands. His ambitions for land 
reform were flawed because he did not recognise early on in his term that there was 
not enough land available to meet the demands for land. He certainly did not 
demonstrate to Lemass that he was a potential Minister for Agriculture. His proposal 
to abolish representations from TDs to the LC on behalf of constituents showed 
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political naivety and a lack of understanding of the political process. Childers was an 
administrator and man of principle. As he matured as a politician he learned to 
manage and manipulate situations to produce the desired outcome.   
The land section of Childers’s portfolio proved challenging with very little 
positive impact for Childers. Forestry presented Childers with a different challenge 
and he set about expanding the acreage under state forestry and in particular the 
development of private forestry. He saw the industry as providing a source of 
employment nationally, an investment for farmers and an indicator that Ireland 
invested its money wisely. Ireland had the lowest number of privately owned forests 
in Europe and Childers was determined to rectify this situation. Ireland’s climate was 
favourable to tree growing and the possibility of associated industrial activity and the 
export of timber all seemed viable. Childers produced a detailed memorandum on 
afforestation as a national economic objective.99 An adequate intake of plantable land 
was the most essential prerequisite to increasing the annual planting programme. The 
total area acquired in 1956-7 was 18,725 acres and Childers anticipated acquisitions 
totalling 25,000 acres in 1957-8.100 Childers did not make the same mistake in dealing 
with forestry as he had done in his predictions in relation to lands. In relation to future 
acquisitions he told deputies ‘whether it will be possible to maintain the acquisition 
rate at that level in future years is, of course, more open to question’.101  
Childers was confident of maintaining the target level of 25,000 acres 
provided there was a market for the produce. The markets were available with Britain 
only able to provide 35% of its requirements. Europe and the United States were 
importers of wood products and in Ireland timber products to the value of ten million 
pounds per year were imported. Climate and yields were favourable for Irish timber 
production and much of the imported timber products could be produced in Ireland.102  
He advocated that timber production be organised on a sound economic basis with the 
government absorbing the short-term costs. The issue of finance in relation to 
Ireland’s afforestation project would be crucial. Under normal economic standards, a 
project ‘should be able to operate on borrowed capital and clear the capital and 
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interest charges thereon from the sale of the crops’.103 However, with a long 
production cycle and high interest rates this model was not the most suitable, but 
Childers decided that ‘there are good grounds for making the attempt’.104 Presenting 
his first estimate on forestry to Dáil Éireann in April 1957 he emphasised the financial 
reality for the industry. Given Ireland’s economic position he questioned ‘whether this 
small country, with limited capital resources….can really justify a steadily increasing 
annual capital investment in afforestation’.105 Forestry would have to compete for 
funding with for example agriculture, and Childers needed to be able to say that ‘this 
is an investment that will employ more people eventually at an economic cost'.106 
There was no more easy money available and the forestry programme ‘must be 
carried out at maximum output as a commercial undertaking’.107 Childers undertook a 
complete examination of every phase of the forestry operation. People, he stated:  
will not invest money in this country until they see widespread evidence 
that costs are being cut, scientific methods are being used....if the forestry 
work is carried out on commercial company lines they will say that this is 
a sound country to invest money because money is wisely invested and 
spent.108  
 
 He did not doubt the potential success of forestry but he had to consider the 
almost immediate returns if the capital invested in forestry was spent in other areas of 
national development. In 1957 the annual investment in forestry was close to two 
million pounds. His planting target would provide excess timber to domestic 
requirements and this would lead to additional exports. Childers concluded that ‘there 
is a definite possibility that State Forestry will ultimately prove a sound national 
investment’.109 Should there be a loss it would be small enough to justify the 
continued development of the forestry industry. Another possibility was ‘revenue of 
substantial proportions (free of Capital Debt) could be anticipated in thirty-five to 
fifty years’.110 Childers highlighted the potential gain in employment from forestry. 
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Employment on forestry work had declined over the two pervious years but based on 
planting 25,000 acres per year from 1959-60 onwards, Childers’s employment 
calculations appeared attractive. His calculations indicated employment levels of 
9,700 in 1958-9 increasing to 24,300 by 1998-9.111  
State afforestation was progressing nicely but private tree planting showed 
little progress. For the year ended 31 March 1957 only 625 acres were planted 
privately. Childers was ‘determined that there must be a really active campaign to 
secure more private planting….the House may rest assured that one of my main 
objectives….will be to secure a big increase in private planting’.112 Childers’s main 
difficulty was the one that he had faced in Lands, securing enough land to maintain 
the forestry programme. In the Dáil deputy Blowick advised Childers that ‘nothing 
less than good financial help will induce farmers to plant trees’.113 Forestry was a 
labour intensive industry and Childers could influence emigration from poorer areas 
through forest development. His deliberations at government level proved positive 
and he announced in the Dáil that ‘the government has decided to double the grant for 
private planting, raising it from £10 to £20 an acre’.114  
A campaign to promote private forestry was introduced with the assistance of 
rural organisations and forestry societies. Childers asked for ‘the help of Muintir na 
Tíre in securing a massive increase in the level of private planting of trees’.115 He 
assured the Dáil that farmers who planted waste land would not have their land rates 
increased as trees were considered as crops in determining land valuations. As an 
agricultural country development was planned over twenty to fifty years. The 
thousands of medium and larger sized farms had areas of cutaway bog or moor which 
was suitable for planting and which were producing little or nothing in their current 
state. The Department of Lands was for the first time charged with promoting private 
forestry as being of equal importance to State afforestation. Childers stressed the 
significance of trees as an investment. Properly planted, trees were ‘a magnificent 
investment – as safe as any gilt-edged investment or bank deposit’.116 Childers 
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explained the financial returns in simple terms as follows. One acre of Spruce would 
yield a return of about one thousand two hundred pounds at intervals of over fifty 
years. This would provide an endowment for family members from what was 
unproductive and unused land. A keen outdoor activist, Childers’s vision for the 
countryside included ‘a tree studded horizon’.117 
The forestry section of Childers’s portfolio provided him with the opportunity 
to plan and implement a policy for the forestry industry. This was a period of appeals 
for greater production and increased exports across all areas of production. Childers 
envisaged the immediate and longer-term benefits of investments in forestry. Ireland’s 
survival as an independent state depended on the maximum use of native resources. 
He viewed Ireland’s land resource as vital to the campaign for survival: ‘no land, 
absolutely no land, in the Republic capable of producing wealth and family security 
shall lie idle, apart from the lands that provide gardens and the ordinary social 
domestic and leisure time amenities’.118 More land was required for forestry to 
maintain the programme’s momentum. Childers always gained great pleasure when 
land was donated to his department for forestry. When the acreage was of 
considerable size he publicised the event and encouraged more donations to his 
department. Such a donation was made at Doneraile in County Cork. His speech at the 
event was published in local newspapers to encourage owners of land suitable for 
State afforestation to offer it to his department. Childers was referring here to the 
offering of larger areas of land not likely to be privately planted by the landowner. 
Useless land was a liability to owners as rates and annuities had to be paid on it. 
Those offering land to the department were ‘playing a vital role in a work of great 
national importance’.119 Childers’s efforts in dealing with forestry issues were 
generally supported by deputies across all political parties. In reply to a question in 
the Dáil on the length of time he expected to plant 25,000 acres per year he speculated 
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‘for as long as I have the responsibility of the Department of Lands and Forestry 
which may be for quite a long time’.120 
The Department of Fisheries completed Childers’s trilogy of responsibilities. 
Although not responsible for tourism at this time, Childers’s previous experience in 
this area aided his vision in the development of fisheries and the waterways in 
general. As usual, he undertook a comprehensive study of fisheries to ensure the 
preservation of fishing stocks and the continued development of the industry. In 
bringing the estimates before Dáil Éireann in June 1957 he reminded deputies that his 
short term in fisheries meant that he had not sufficient time to study the needs of the 
industry. He was however appalled ‘by the poor provision which has been made for 
the acquisition of technical knowledge by our fishermen’.121 He was aware of the 
potential that lay in Irish waters but Ireland’s sea fishing industry was confined to 
inshore fishing. If Ireland remained an inshore fishing country, exports would increase 
a little and funds would continue to be expended on boats and minor improvements to 
harbours. However, this was not Childers’s vision for the future of Ireland’s fishing 
industry. His policy was centred on long term development of fisheries and he 
outlined to deputies the changes required so that Irish fishermen could ‘catch some 
more of the 206,000 tons of fish that are caught in Irish fishing grounds of which we 
catch 5.2 per cent’.122  
To compete with the Spanish, English and French vessels, infrastructure, 
recruitment and training were required. Ports had to be developed, freeze and 
processing plants established and a marketing organisation established. An increase in 
fish consumption in the home market was required but it would not help Ireland’s 
economy ‘unless we can also link it with an export programme’.123 There was a vast 
export market available with Britain alone importing thirty-three million pounds 
worth of fish annually.124 An Bord Iascaigh Mhara was charged with the development 
of the sea fishing industry and Childers proposed that they ‘spend state aid in trying 
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out new markets….and in experimenting with new techniques in fishing and 
processing’.125  
Private investment was in its infancy with Childers telling deputies that 
‘encouraging progress is being made by private enterprise in the development of the 
processing side of the industry’.126 Programmes were put in place to train fishermen 
as skippers and to encourage new recruits to train as fishermen. Two fishing vessels 
were adapted as training vessels for new recruits. Despite considerable advertising the 
response was disappointing with ‘only 24 applicants attended interview’.127 The 
following year Childers reported that despite widespread publicity ‘the response this 
year has been even less encouraging; only eleven candidates attended for 
interview’.128 Childers had the opposite problem he faced in the Department of Lands. 
Ireland could not provide ‘enough land to go round all who seek farms but we have 
sufficient coastline to accommodate thousands’.129  Without fishermen and skippers 
the industry would not develop.  
From an employment point of view Childers knew that ‘in a developed fish 
industry up to 14 people are employed on shore for every one on a boat’.130 Catching 
power, according to Childers, was another key element in the development of the 
fishing industry. Bigger fishing boats were required to successfully ‘engage in fishing 
at greater distances from our coasts’.131 Some deputies feared the destruction of the 
inshore fishing industry with the onset of bigger boats. However, Childers assured 
them that ‘I have no intention of destroying the inshore industry’.132 The grants 
provided by the government to assist potential buyers of boats were outlined by 
Childers during his 1959 estimate speech. Buyers received a grant of fifteen per cent 
of the cost price and the deposit a fisherman had to put down on a boat could be as 
low as five per cent of the cost price. Interest on borrowings to purchase boats was 
reduced to four per cent. However, bigger boats required fishery harbours and none of 
Ireland’s harbours were developed as fishery harbours. Childers engaged an outside 
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consultant to recommend harbours for development and emphasised that the 
remaining harbours would not be neglected. The development of the sea fishing 
industry could not ‘easily be accelerated’.133   
The development of Ireland’s inland waterways was entrusted to the Inland 
Fisheries Trust which was a voluntary organisation run by anglers. Childers 
encouraged all anglers to become members of the Trust. Their work was appreciated 
by the government and Childers increased their grant in 1958 to £20,000.134 Childers 
recognised the contribution Ireland’s inland waters made to tourism and the 
importance of the tourist industry to the national economy. Within inland fisheries the 
salmon export trade was ‘vital to this country’.135 In 1957 exports of salmon 
amounted to six hundred thousand pounds and this was separate from the value of the 
fishing industry as a tourist attraction.136 Poaching, particularly of salmon had to be 
stopped in order to exploit the full potential of the salmon industry. He considered 
poaching as utterly irresponsible and ‘he would have no mercy on poachers insofar as 
his limited responsibility was involved’.137  
In the development of inland fisheries Childers advocated self-help at local 
level rather than government spending as the route to national success and prosperity. 
The concept of local self-help was a common theme throughout Childers’s political 
career. He congratulated the Westmeath Vocational Education Committee for their 
co-operation with Bord Fáilte in sponsoring a boat building course for instructors of 
Vocational Education committees. Childers attended boat-launching events across the 
country and the programme of co-operation in building new boats was referred to by 
Childers as: ‘one of the finest examples of co-operation and voluntary help towards 
bringing prosperity to their country’.138  
He was particularly interested in sea angling development and for its success 
Ireland needed to control costs, be efficient, methodical, co-operate together, be 
hospitable and ‘do a great deal of voluntary work in re-organisation’.139 Sea angling 
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was generally unexplored at this time and Childers earnestly urged the formation of 
sea angling clubs in all coastal areas. He suggested that this form of angling, like any 
other, be exploited in a controlled and steady manner rather than an over-enthusiastic 
approach. Visiting anglers treated well and provided with good fishing would return 
to the area again and bring others with them. The government assisted by inviting 
groups of anglers to visit various fishing centres and the industry was adequately 
publicised in the market place.140 However, he had no doubt that the success or failure 
of angling depended ‘on the many angling and development associations which have 
been called into being and are still being formed’.141 In a memorandum on inland 
fisheries Childers stated that ‘of all the economic projects in the entire country, 
angling tourism probably showed the highest return and had one of the highest rates 
of expansion’. The government guaranteed the promotion of the inland fisheries 
programme but its success lay ‘in the hands of the people’.142 
Speaking at the Bord Fáilte angling exhibition in Dublin on 15 April 1958, 
Childers announced the establishment of a joint long term plan between Bord Fáilte 
and the Inland Fisheries Trust. It aimed at stocking rivers and lakes with suitable fish 
types and providing the necessary infrastructure of jetties and footpaths to improve 
access. Childers emphasised that the plan needed the support of every angler if a 
successful outcome was to be achieved. He demonstrated the enormous potential of 
angling to the Irish economy by reference to market availability. France, Belgium and 
Holland had some half a million-sea anglers each, and there were approximately three 
million coarse fishing enthusiasts in Britain.143 Bord Fáilte estimated that within four 
years expenditure by anglers, Irish and foreign, would be a minimum of two million 
pounds. This revenue would provide thousands of jobs indirectly in addition to the 
five thousand people employed in the inland fishing industry. Local development was 
a key factor in the preparation of reports on the type of fishing available and an 
analysis of the accommodation available by categories. Provision of brochures and 
advertising would be necessary and Childers gave an undertaking that Bord Fáilte 
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would advise and assist in this.144 Local initiatives to provide additional fishing boats 
and generally improve fishing conditions were necessary to maximise the tourist 
potential from fishing. Childers cautioned against the false economy of high charges 
for boat usage by anglers and urged local organisations to co-ordinate the hiring of 
boats in an effort to reduce costs.145 The tourist industry needed all the help it could 
get during this period. Fianna Fáil were ‘worried about the poor state of Irish 
tourism….only one new hotel had been opened since the foundation of the state’.146 
Childers would get an opportunity to make his contribution to the tourist industry later 
in his career.  
Along with the varied challenges of his portfolio, other national issues arose 
during his term as Minister for Lands, Fisheries and Forestry. Nearing retirement, de 
Valera considered the future of Fianna Fáil and a change in the voting system 
appeared necessary to guarantee Fianna Fáil majorities. He proposed abolishing 
proportional representation and replacing it with the straight vote system. Despite his 
dependence on proportional representation for his political success Childers backed 
the introduction of the straight vote system. It is interesting to note Childers elections 
results from 1938 to his final general election campaign in 1973. Only once in his 
political career, his last election in 1973 was Childers first past the post. He was an 
example of a candidate who benefited enormously from proportional representation, 
yet he strongly advocated the straight vote system proposed by de Valera but defeated 
on 17 June 1959.147 This contradiction, one of many in Childers long political career, 
is simply explained. Childers believed that the straight vote system would produce the 
best government for Ireland; a Fianna Fáil one. A man of high principles he advocated 
the straight vote system because he considered it the best system. Throughout his 
political career Childers made decisions that cast doubts on whether he ever was a 
politician at heart.  
Childers explained the proposed new system as simply as he could. At the 
polling booth ‘the elector would have one vote to cast for one candidate. Any number 
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of candidates could be nominated. The candidate receiving the largest number of 
votes would be elected’.148 However, in his political career to date Childers was never 
first past the post. This was another contradiction in the political career of Childers. 
From 1932 to 1957 the opposition parties were convinced that de Valera alone held 
the vote and that the party would collapse without him. With de Valera and the older 
leaders of all parties retiring gradually Childers questioned the pessimism from Fine 
Gael and other parties on the proposed change to the voting system.149 He concluded 
that the fear was borne out of the fact that Fianna Fáil had devised every creative and 
imaginative plan and that Fine Gael had incorporated whole sections of Fianna Fáil 
policy. The opposition to the straight vote lay in the assumption that only Fianna Fáil 
would benefit from this system. However he discounted this by saying that any new 
group of candidates with new ideas on how to develop the economy could appeal to 
the electorate.150 Childers assured workers that they had nothing to fear from the 
proposed change and in every country using the straight vote system there were 
positive changes in social services. Despite his election record Childers was confident 
in his own ability and his appeal to his constituents. Childers now in his fifties, was 
still a relatively young man and was excited by the challenge of future political 
undertakings and changes. 
However, to develop his political career Childers needed to appeal to the 
Fianna Fáil leadership, especially Lemass. He continued to show political naivety and 
appeared not to have benefited from his previous experiences. This is clearly 
demonstrated in his letter to Lemass on 19 March 1959. Rather than exercise some 
degree of caution Childers had to ‘state some opinions about the present political 
situation in view of the changes that will be taking place in the course of the next 
twelve months’.151 Lemass soon to be Taoiseach was accustomed to receiving detailed 
memoranda from Childers. Lemass was a man of action and preferred to receive a one 
page memorandum direct and to the point rather than several pages of analysis and 
comparison. Childers’s own views would no doubt have been welcomed by Lemass 
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but he did not impress Lemass when he acknowledged that ‘I am only emphasising 
what obviously are your own views many times expressed’.152 Childers’s enthusiasm 
somehow blocked out the message Lemass had previously given him. Lemass wanted 
solutions not a revised presentation of problems no matter how well argued and 
presented. What he certainly did not want was a rehash of his own ideas.   
Childers’s term as Minister for Lands, Fisheries and Forestry can not be 
regarded as spectacularly successful. His undoubted successes in fisheries and forestry 
were overshadowed by his record in lands. Lands was the central and key aspect of 
his portfolio. This was somewhat of a crossroads in Childers’s political life. De Valera 
retired from active politics in 1959 and was succeeded as Taoiseach by Lemass. De 
Valera had taken Childers under his wing on his return to Ireland in 1931 and 
launched his political and ministerial career. Childers’s political future now lay in the 
hands of Lemass whose style of leadership was very different to that of de Valera. No 
doubt Childers wondered if he would retain his current portfolio or perhaps fulfil his 
ambition and be appointed Minister for Agriculture.   
                                                          
152
 Childers letter to Lemass, 19 Mar. 1959 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9954/76).  
  
  
114 
Chapter 4 
What price solvency? Minister for Transport and Power, 1959-69 
With de Valera’s retirement from politics in 1959 many felt that Fianna Fáil 
would not flourish without his presence. However, the new Taoiseach, Seán Lemass, 
provided the link with the past having followed de Valera into constitutional politics. 
As Minister for Industry and Commerce and Minister for Supplies during the years of 
the emergency he gained a reputation for ruthless efficiency. Lemass was one of the 
principal architects of Fianna Fáil’s constituency organisation and was responsible for 
the revival of the party after the defeat in 1948. With ‘an almost instinctive 
understanding of economic problems….the new Taoiseach was admirably equipped to 
preside over a period of rapid expansion’.1 The Irish economy grew ‘at an 
unprecedented rate during the 1960s’.2 Finance minister Jim Ryan forecast a rise in 
population and by December 1962 Lemass could tell the Dáil that in many industrial 
occupations there was a scarcity of workers. The contrast between de Valera and 
Lemass in conducting business is revealing. De Valera engaged everyone around the 
table whereas Lemass ‘was more direct in handling government meetings’.3 This was 
a period of immense change and Brian Girvin correctly states that Lemass 
transformed the state during his period as Taoiseach, a transformation that he had 
been planning since the post-war period. According to Girvin the important point 
about Lemass was that he was ‘willing to give the leadership that de Valera so 
patently did not’.4 The Lemass era lasted from June 1959 to November 1966; it was a 
period of profound change. The 1960s were, stated Cormac Ó Gráda ‘Ireland’s golden 
age’.5 However, this period was not golden for Childers personally and the 
development of his political career. 
While the Fianna Fáil party did not face a crisis with de Valera’s departure, 
Childers’s political career did not prosper under the new Taoiseach, Seán Lemass.  
The contrast in styles between the two men was illustrated in a letter from Childers to 
Lemass dated 21 October 1960. In the letter Childers suggested that statistics would 
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show that the opposition were incorrect in asserting that Fianna Fáil policy was 
forcing small farmers to emigrate and wondered if ‘you would like to make use of it 
rather than myself’.6 The reply from Lemass showed the different styles and 
approaches of both men. Lemass acknowledged Childers’s letter and continued: 
I do not think that there is much to be gained by entering into a statistical 
battle regarding its intensity. There is no question that it is much too high, 
and what the public will want will be evidence of determination to relieve 
the causes of it rather than the fluctuations in its incidence.7 
 
What the public wanted, indeed what was expected of politicians by the public, was 
not always apparent to Childers. He was divorced from grassroots politics and was not 
taken entirely seriously by some as a politician. As Garret Fitzgerald noted during his 
interview with the author, this was ‘especially true in the case of Lemass’.8 Not well 
equipped for politics, Childers’s hard work and integrity did not produce the effective 
outcome due to what Garret Fitzgerald has described as ‘his remoteness from 
politics’.9 Childers was an efficient administrator but longwinded; Lemass was one of 
de Valera’s ablest ministers who got things done and was very impatient. Yet Childers 
was popular with his constituents and was very aware of the power of 
communications and propaganda when he had responsibility for the broadcasting 
service. This apparent contradiction in Childers can only be explained by recognising 
that he knew the value of communications to his party but could not apply this to his 
own career. Leaving aside party and family considerations, Childers’s personal 
popularity with his constituents is somewhat difficult to explain. Childers’s work ethic 
and the many meetings he addressed made a positive impact with the electorate. He 
was different in many ways from his party colleagues and this also appealed to the 
electorate. Childers did not have the charisma of Jack Lynch or the mystique of de 
Valera but he did have a relationship with the electorate that survived even when 
Fianna Fáil as a party failed at the polls. 
Childers’s term as Minister for Lands had not been particularly successful and 
not surprisingly he did not secure the agriculture portfolio. Jack Lynch succeeded 
Lemass at the Department of Industry and Commerce and he quickly realised that the 
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department was responsible for far too many semi-state bodies. As a result Lemass 
formed a new Department of Transport and Power and appointed Childers as minister. 
This new department established on 27 July 1959 had responsibility for semi-state 
companies in the transport and power sectors. These companies included Coras 
Iompair Éireann, Aer Lingus, Electricity Supply Board and Bord na Móna. While 
there is no evidence to show Childers’s feelings towards his new portfolio he could 
not have been impressed with a body of work that was discarded by the Department of 
Industry and Commerce. Although this was an important portfolio Childers was 
effectively a voice for the semi-state companies. His portfolio was expanded with the 
transfer of responsibility for tourism from the Department of Industry and Commerce 
to Childers in October 1961 and his additional appointment as Minister for Posts and 
Telegraphs in 1966. The diversity of Childers’s portfolio is testament to his abilities 
as an administrator but it nevertheless was a mixed bag and could not be viewed as a 
progression of his political career. He was maturing into the political process and the 
experience he gained over his many portfolios would finally come together during his 
term as Minister for Health. 
This chapter focuses on the controls available and exercised by Childers over 
the semi-state companies as he had little or no input into the daily workings of the 
semi-state companies. However, with responsibility for transport Childers had to 
handle the very emotive subject of uneconomic rail closures and this is examined in 
some detail. His handling of this issue demonstrated that Childers used the available 
legislation to avoid questions and proposals from opposition deputies and the general 
public. This is not to say that he hid behind the legislation; in the case of the railway 
closures he genuinely felt that line closures was the correct solution. His stance in this 
instance is one which can be traced right through his political career. While Minister 
for Lands he ignored calls from farmers with small holdings to divide estates among 
them. The Land Commission did not interfere in well run estates. While this was Land 
Commission policy it could also be argued that Childers conveniently used this policy 
to avoid dealing with the grievances of small farm holders. However, from Childers’s 
point of view the issue was one of land utilisation and productivity; it did not matter 
who owned the land as long as it was worked to its maximum potential. In both 
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examples Childers was correct in principle but should have been aware of what the 
public expected of him. Once again Childers showed his lack of understanding and 
appreciation of the dynamics of grassroots politics. Childers was informed and aware 
of the issues but did not appreciate how emotive the issues were to the public.  
The transfer of responsibility for tourism in 1961 enthused Childers and his 
handling of this familiar sector will be reviewed in some detail. Childers renewed his 
interest in broadcasting with his appointment as Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in 
1966 for the second occasion. The ongoing development of the telephone system 
proved to be one of the highlights of his second term as Minister for Posts and 
Telegraphs. Outside of his direct ministerial responsibilities the most challenging 
issue for Childers during this period was his decision to leave Longford-Westmeath 
and move to Monaghan in 1961. This was a difficult decision for Childers and some 
of the issues surrounding his move to Monaghan are explored.  
As this was a new department Childers was questioned at some length in the 
Dáil as to his responsibilities and powers as Minister for Transport and Power. 
Deputies were aware that Dáil Éireann had no authority to probe into the 
administrative routines of semi-state companies. These companies now had a minister 
responsible for their actions and deputies queried Childers on the issue of his authority 
to examine the running of semi-state companies. Did he have this power and if so 
would deputies be able to question him and get answers to their queries? In presenting 
his first estimate in the Dáil, Childers was informed by deputy McQuillan, National 
Progressive Democrats, that he did not ‘propose to subscribe one penny towards your 
salary until I know what you are going to be paid to do’.10 This was not an 
unreasonable approach given that the Minister for Lands had ‘very little power. Are 
we now to appoint another Minister in charge of transport and power who will have as 
little responsibility?’.11 Although deputy McQuillan did not directly state that he was 
referring to Childers in his lands reference this was in fact the case. Childers did have 
responsibility and power while in Lands, his problems arose mainly due to the 
insufficient volume of land for distribution. His limiting factor was acreage not 
power. 
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In his reply to the Dáil Childers observed that it had been the ‘established 
tradition that the Minister does not interfere with the day-to-day working of state 
companies’.12 Childers assured deputies that if a situation arose where he felt it 
correct to inquire into the workings of any state company then he would do so. He 
believed that it was impossible to devise a set of rules which would define the 
relationship between a minister, members of the Dáil and a state company. He did 
however outline his powers and methods of control in dealing with state companies. 
He examined general policy, financial position and how the companies affected the 
economy as a whole. New policies were issued when required and discussions 
involving adequacy and efficiency of the services were ongoing. The Dáil had the 
opportunity to comment on pieces of legislation as they progressed through the 
system and ‘there is also the debate on the annual estimate on which a number of 
matters can be raised’.13 In answering questions on the lack of control of state 
companies Childers responded: 
The minister exercises very definite control through the appointment of 
members of the board….accounts of each of these companies are subject 
to scrutiny in my Department….there is very close contact between the 
minister, his department and the higher officers of the boards of these 
companies.14 
 
Childers regarded it as his duty ‘to see that in the overall plan of a company a 
reasonable balance of interests is maintained’.15 He was always firm on the issue of 
daily interference in the operations of state companies. The whole purpose of creating 
such a company would be lost ‘if the directors and operatives of the companies felt 
that from week to week they could be constantly interfered with’.16 Childers’s 
presentation of the yearly estimates in the Dáil followed the same pattern year after 
year. He outlined the workings and achievements of the state companies in great 
detail and responded to as many questions as he could without interfering or causing 
unnecessary difficulties for the management teams of the state companies. In reality 
Childers was but a voice for the semi-state companies who were controlled by their 
management teams. The number of semi-state companies and their diversity of 
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activities made it impossible for Childers, or any minister, to have any direct input 
into the daily operations of these companies. 
However as a matter of general policy Childers believed that all subsidies 
should be discontinued as quickly as possible and that the transport companies should 
pay their way. He set out his strategy for Irish transport early in 1960. The taxpayer 
should not be asked to subsidise ‘the running costs of any form of public transport 
because there is great amplitude of transport facilities’.17 This sentiment was no doubt 
genuinely felt by Childers, but it also strengthened his stance for the closure of the 
uneconomic railways. However his comment on state companies to the Dáil in July 
1961 raised an issue which supported the retention of uneconomic railways. Replying 
to a question from deputy McGilligan, Fine Gael, Childers declared that state 
companies ‘taken as a whole, are successful undertakings, and that the capital 
invested by the State can be fully justified from the economic and social standpoint’.18 
On the issue of investment in public transport deputy Treacy, Labour, commented that 
‘it is reasonable to suggest that a transport service of this kind in most other countries 
is not a paying proposition. It was taken over here because it was not a paying 
proposition….it was an essential public service which must be maintained’.19 
However, Childers ignored the social aspect when he steadfastly supported the closure 
of uneconomic railways despite arguments from communities and deputies on the 
grounds of social necessity. From his time working in Paris he would have been aware 
of the necessity to meet every requirement of the tourist and the development of the 
rail system would have been positive for tourism. The Transport Act of 1958 
empowered Coras Iompair Éireann (hereafter cited as CIE) to close uneconomic 
railways and Childers used it to support his position. From a purely economic point of 
view the process was justified but Childers ignored the social dimension and did not 
envisage the retention of the railways as an asset in building rural communities and 
aiding tourism.   
Speaking in Cork in October 1960 Childers stated that modernised railways 
were and would be for the foreseeable future an essential component of the transport 
system. He considered rail transport particularly suited to long distance travel but that 
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the railways needed to be tailored to conditions prevailing at that time. Childers was 
obviously not compiling his notes at this time on the future requirements of Irish 
transport. Focusing on the economics of rail operation he was determined not to 
persist ‘in running at a loss services by rail which can, with equal satisfaction, and 
indeed, perhaps, with greater convenience to the public, be operated with profit by 
road’.20 The theme of regional and local organisation was favoured by Childers and 
can be found throughout his ministerial portfolios. In keeping with this theme, 
Childers oversaw the process of decentralisation within CIE. A major reorganisation 
of the Board’s management was introduced during 1960-1 when ‘a policy of 
decentralisation was implemented whereby much of the direct responsibilities for the 
Board’s operations was delegated to 5 Area Managers located at Dublin, Cork, 
Limerick, Waterford and Galway’.21 The primary aim was to set up a relatively 
autonomous local management to improve customer service, increase sales and make 
most effective use of personnel and rolling stock.  
A keen outdoor person and having walked almost every hill in Ireland, it 
would not be unreasonable to expect Childers to champion the cause of rural Ireland. 
Instead, it appeared that in relation to the railway line closures he was concerned with 
the economics of the issue ignoring the present and future social results of his actions. 
In the past de Valera accused Childers of caring too much on the economics of 
farming and not enough on the farmer. CIE was free to close the uneconomic lines 
and Childers saw no use in local interests requesting postponement. In reply to 
questions in the Dáil on the closure of the Claremorris-Ballinrobe railway, Childers 
set out his position, which he stuck to rigidly: 
The Transport Act, 1958, empowers CIE to terminate any particular train 
service provided the Board is satisfied that its operation is uneconomic and 
that there is no prospect of its continued operation being economic within 
a reasonable period. This means, in effect, that the fate of any particular 
line or station must depend on whether sufficient public support is given to 
it to justify its retention. I should make it clear that under the Act I have no 
function in the matter.22 
 
In this statement Childers was correctly passing all responsibility over to CIE but it 
was uncharacteristic of him not to at least consider future prospects and expectations. 
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In previous portfolios Childers was accused of sheltering behind legislation, policies 
and committees to avoid confrontation. Childers removed the emotive issues from the 
situation and made his decision on the facts available to him. He was consistent in his 
approach; whether or not he was correct was another matter. Wherever CIE decided to 
close rail lines there was local opposition from all sections of the community. The 
closing of the West Cork Railways, for example, demonstrated the feeling of anger 
generated in communities. Childers as minister was often by-passed by the local 
community with letters posted directly to Sean Lemass. One such letter to Lemass 
accused him of killing off a whole community and pleaded with him not to ‘act Pilate 
in the death of our area’.23 Letters were also addressed to Áras an Uachtaráin 
requesting the president meet a delegation on the proposed closing of the rail lines. 
However, this was refused, as it was not a matter the president could comment upon.24  
Pressure was also brought to bear on Childers and Lemass by local people 
living abroad. In December of 1960 Edward McCarthy, a native of Bantry, living in 
the Sudan wrote to Lemass and included an article, which he forwarded to the 
Southern Star newspaper. In the article McCarthy made the case for leaving the rail 
lines open and downplays the total economic focus argued by Childers. McCarthy’s 
opening paragraph asks ‘if Mr Lemass’s little finger were one day crippled, would he 
cut it off because it was no longer of any use to him? Or would he not rather have it 
treated, at great expense even, in order to make it function again normally?’25.  
In the Dáil, Childers was questioned on the employment consequences of 
closing the West Cork railway. His answers produced all the necessary facts, but there 
was no mention of the social consequences of the closures. All those made redundant 
would receive redundancy compensation and CIE was discharging their 
responsibilities as directed in the Transport Acts. When questioned as to the suitability 
of the roads to take the additional traffic due to the rail closures, Childers response 
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was: ‘I have no direct responsibility for the roads’.26 This was the easy way out for 
Childers; the fact was that the roads were not designed to take the additional traffic 
generated as a result of rail closures. The concerns within the political system were 
echoed when Lemass wrote to Childers suggesting that he briefly intervene in the 
following week’s debate on CIE closures. He requested information that Childers was 
preparing for his own use and also wrote to the Minister for Lands, Forestry and 
Fisheries requesting information about activities of that department in the West Cork 
area.27 Childers supplied detailed notes and statistics for Lemass on the rail closure 
debate and in a letter to Lemass stressed that ‘not even the most unused rail line 
would close if petitions were accepted as a valid reason for maintaining the line 
open’.28 Childers’s statistics on the West Cork railway line included passenger 
numbers, tonnage carried by category and the stations connected with the closure. A 
point at the end of his notes stated that ‘we have received no undertaking from any 
agricultural society, industrial undertaking or merchant that we will be given new 
business if the line is left open’.29  
There was no possibility of generating new business in the future or 
supporting the development of local communities with Childers’s economic approach 
to the closing of railways. A feature of Childers’s political career was his desire for 
local development and involvement in issues. Childers believed strongly in a 
community doing all it could for its own area and interests. This theme of self-help 
coupled with state assistance was echoed by Childers when he was in charge of 
forestry and fisheries. Rail closures occurred because they had not received sufficient 
local support to maintain them in operation. This was true at a point in time, but 
Childers’s position contradicted his previous desire for a partnership approach in 
developing local projects. In relation to the closing of rail lines he failed those very 
communities with his narrow economic perspective.  
Childers had no difficulty in defending his position. The responsibility for 
deciding whether to close any particular railway was ‘vested solely in CIE’.30 The 
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1958 Transport Act had the full support of all parties when it was being enacted. 
Despite subsidies from the exchequer CIE was losing one million six hundred 
thousand pounds per year up to 1956.31 In 1956 the Beddy Committee was established 
to inquire into internal transport. The government generally accepted its report in 
1957 and its recommendations included a reduction in the mileage of rail lines from 
one thousand nine hundred and eighteen to eight hundred and fifty miles.32 The 
important issues in public transport were ‘not the closing of some hopelessly 
uneconomic branch lines but the imminent prospect of complete solvency’.33 The 
1958 Transport Act was based on the ‘general principle that there is no special merit 
in a rail service as such and that the objective is to establish the most efficient widely 
used type of public transport in each area’.34 Speaking at the Annual General Meeting 
of the Irish Tourist Association in 1961 Childers stated that tourists came to Ireland 
partly ‘because Ireland had a distinctive character free from oppressive density of 
traffic’.35 However, Childers’s actions did not support the continuance of low density 
of traffic. He failed to realise that communities would grow and that the road 
congestion would spread across the country.  
In a letter to the general secretary of Fianna Fáil Childers continued to argue 
for rail closures: ‘nowhere in Europe are railways being maintained that carry such a 
trifling amount of traffic’.36 By 1963 some 621 miles of rail line had been closed. 
Childers argued that there was no evidence that a growth in the national economy 
would necessarily bring a proportionate share of the additional traffic to the public 
transport system. However, the ‘huge increase in private car numbers and the large 
increase in the number of heavy private lorries’ did not appear to have registered with 
Childers as something that needed his foresight and thought.37  
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Childers’s support for the closing of uneconomic railways and his policy of 
non-interference in the selection process by CIE brought criticism from Dáil deputies. 
Deputy Casey, Labour, suggested ‘that there is no need for a Minister for Transport 
and Power’.38 Childers refused to meet deputations in his previous portfolio and also 
refused to meet a deputation concerning the closure of the West Cork railway line, 
referring them back to the board of CIE. Childers was correct in principle but his 
action can be interpreted as politically naive. Naïve in the sense of what the public 
expected from their public representatives. Another politician in Childers’s position 
would have seen the benefits in meeting such deputations, irrespective of its impact 
on the final outcome. Childers time and time again showed his complete rejection of 
the back-slapping approach to politics. In 1966 deputy Dunne, Labour, reminded 
Childers of the social aspect of CIE and that profit should not have been the primary 
consideration but ‘it has been the primary consideration of his whole approach to CIE. 
The question of whether a branch line should exist or be put out of existence 
depended entirely on whether it was making or losing money’.39   
In 1961 Childers forecast what Irish transport requirements were likely to be 
in 1970 and made some general assumptions. Among these were, the world would 
grow richer by 1970 and the desire to travel would grow. In the area of air services he 
predicted the development of a low cost short-haul aircraft which should lead to more 
economy in air travel. Due to the predicted increase in travel, additional hangars and a 
doubling of Dublin Airport terminal and apron would be required by 1970. Extensions 
to the conveyor system for baggage would be required and computers would control 
the complete ticket reservation system. On the economics of air transport, an 
important consideration was the relationship between the cost of travel and the 
income levels of potential travellers. Childers predicted the development of small 
airfields in the vicinity of larger provincial towns or in suitable production areas. 
These were for the future as the needs arose to meet export or tourist requirements. 40 
Although actual evidence has not been located by the author, there is the possibility 
that Childers foresaw, in 1961, a network of air travel as an alternative to rail. He also 
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assumed that Ireland’s economic status would advance rapidly and there would also 
be rapid internationalising of trade. He predicted that car traffic would double by 1970 
and the process of ‘double carriageways, where required, would be in process of 
development’.41 In Dublin City, the corporation ‘had a great opportunity to prevent 
the inevitable complete jam up of traffic, provided the members had courage and 
some imagination’.42 There were vastly more cars per mile of road in England than in 
Ireland but as Childers assumed, roads would improve and speed limits would go up. 
However Childers saw these developments as providing further competition 
for CIE, which was correct, but he failed to see the inevitable results of road 
expansion and improvement. He recognised that CIE would have to increase schedule 
speeds, require newer and better-designed coaches, improve the track for noise 
reduction and provide better service for passengers. Train and bus services would 
have to be better co-ordinated whereby commuters from the provinces would be able 
to purchase all-in tickets including rail fare, bus service and a ticket to a destination or 
event of their choosing. Childers specified possible events of interest to the public, 
which included football matches and attendance at the theatre. There would also be, 
he suggested, an enormous increase in train tours.43 Childers had a blue-print for a 
modern rail network but closed rail lines in advance of the introduction of these 
improvements and expansion plans.  
Childers was also considering a blue-print of a different kind during this 
period; he would soon have to decide where his future political career would lie. In 
the March 1957 general election Fianna Fáil took one of the three seats in Monaghan, 
which shares a border with three of the six northern counties. Fianna Fáil was anxious 
to take a second seat in Monaghan and Childers appeared to be the ideal candidate as 
someone of suitable standing and reputation. Childers was the only Protestant Fianna 
Fáil deputy in successive governments but rarely mentioned this fact and made 
nothing of it, but he was capable of attracting Protestant support from the north of the 
county and retaining the traditional Republican vote in the south. It was now crucial to 
Fianna Fáil that his Protestantism be publicised. Rumours of Childers’s transfer to 
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Monaghan circulated within the constituency of Longford-Westmeath resulting in a 
letter from Athlone Comhairle Ceanntair to Lemass, dated 7 March 1961, which 
outlined the concerns of the local Fianna Fáil organisation and supporters: 
Considerable concern is felt at such a prospect, not only by Fianna Fáil 
supporters, but by opposition supporters as well. 
Mr. Childers has served this constituency faithfully and loyally for the past 
twenty-two years, whether in or out of office. 
We sincerely hope that Head Quarters will not take any action that would 
result in his departure from here. 44 
 
 The post-script on the letter, signed by T. Fahy, reads ‘Dear Erskine, This is a copy of 
a letter I sent to Mr Lemass. I hope it meets with your approval’.45  
The saga of Childers’s transfer to Monaghan appeared to have its roots in a 
south Monaghan Comhairle Ceanntair meeting held on the 7 October 1960. The first 
item on the agenda was organisation and the chairman suggested that a split in the 
local organisation as a result of: 
the manoeuvres of the various factions in the past, that some action should 
be taken to insure a tightening of the organisation. He suggested that we 
should take advantage of a suggestion voiced by Eddie Woods of 
Broomfield some time ago and invite Mr Erskine Childers Minister of 
Transport and Power to be our nominated candidate from South Monaghan 
at the next County Convention.46 
 
The south Monaghan organisation understood, even at this early stage, that Childers 
was available and if he moved to Monaghan he would be capable of uniting the 
organisation. The meeting unanimously agreed to write to the Fianna Fáil head-office 
inquiring on Childers’s availability to accept an invitation to their next meeting and to 
be their nominee for selection as a candidate in the next Dáil Éireann election. This 
was a very delicate matter for Childers. He had successfully contested all general 
elections in Longford-Westmeath since 1938 and having received a copy of the 
Monaghan letter to Fianna Fáil head-office replied: ‘as I have absolutely no intimation 
at the moment that my leaving the Longford-Westmeath seat would either be 
welcomed or advantageous to the party….I will write to you as soon as possible about 
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the matter’.47 Childers had to be cautious and adopted a conservative approach. While 
officially neither accepting nor refusing the Monaghan offer he requested that they 
‘take it that I have made, as yet, no decision whatever to change my present position 
and I am sure you will understand my attitude in regard to this’.48 From this comment 
the south Monaghan organisation could at least take it that Childers was considering 
the idea of a move.  
He wrote to Senator Carter of Longford and outlined the request from 
Monaghan and that his response was that they ‘must take it that I have no intention of 
altering my present position at the moment’.49 However, among his closest colleagues 
and party leadership, Childers had seriously considered, perhaps even decided, on a 
transfer to Monaghan. He and Carter had decided to meet the Taoiseach prior to his 
letter of 14 October 1960. Childers had to act quickly as the public in general would 
soon be aware of the situation. Resolutions were passed by the south Monaghan 
Comhairle Ceanntair and Childers requested Lemass meet himself and Senator Carter 
‘in the first week of November, when we could get the benefit of your long 
experience in regard to these matters’.50 In a hand note dated 21 October 1960 marked 
‘URGENT’, Childers wrote: ‘particulars of the Monaghan and Cavan 1954, 1957 
elections i.e. the total vote, quota, candidates, transfers, surpluses and final result’.51 
This piece of evidence is a further indication of his intentions to transfer to Monaghan 
and his successful response for a meeting with Lemass is recorded by hand on a piece 
of paper, ‘Taoiseach, Thursday week, 3 Nov’.52 Following on from the meeting with 
Lemass, Childers wrote to the South Monaghan Comhairle Cheanntair on 10 
November 1960 outlining his current position: 
I feel honoured that such an invitation should have been extended to me…. 
you will understand my making very clear the conditions under which I 
would accept nomination….I would examine sympathetically a nearly 
unanimous invitation….My name cannot be put forward with others for 
balloting….and if all goes well the press must not be told I have accepted 
until I give the word myself. 53  
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Childers replied to the Athlone Comhairle Ceanntair letter to Lemass dated 7 March 
1961 in which he reinforced the connection he had with Longford-Westmeath: 
I have received your letter quoting the resolution that you have sent to the 
Taoiseach. I very much appreciate this, as thanks in the political world are 
few and far between.  
I, in my turn, am very grateful for the support I have received from the 
stalwart and long-standing members of the Fianna Fáil organisation in 
Athlone. I would be very loath to break the bonds that have been 
established through the years.54 
 
His choice of words left his options wide open; the writing was on the wall. Childers’s 
transfer to Monaghan was not without its share of controversy in Monaghan.55 
However, all problems were eventually sorted out and Childers was unanimously 
invited to become a candidate for the Fianna Fáil party in the Monaghan-Louth 
constituency. In a letter to Senator John Brennan of Monaghan, Childers expressed 
the honour he had received and that he would: ‘now make the final decision, after 
consultation with the officers of the Westmeath-Longford organisation.56 On 4 July 
1961 Childers wrote to the South Monaghan Comhairle Ceanntair and accepted ‘with 
pride and pleasure the invitation you extended to me to stand for Monaghan at the 
General Election’.57  
 The question to be answered is – why did Childers decide to leave Longford-
Westmeath for Monaghan? Childers never lived in the midlands and perhaps saw the 
constituency as too remote from the centre of power. On the other hand, he made no 
secret of the fact that he wanted the agriculture portfolio and would therefore enhance 
his chances representing a rural constituency. In 1948, 1951, 1954 and 1957 the 
constituency of Longford-Westmeath was a five seat constituency. With the 
constituency revised to a four seat constituency for the 1961 general election, this 
obviously caused Childers concern. Childers was never elected on the first count in 
Longford-Westmeath.   
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A further consideration is highlighted by Childers in his letter to Frank Carter, 
Fianna Fáil senator, Longford-Westmeath, dated 24 June 1961. Childers asked Carter 
to attend the North-East Longford Comhairle Ceanntair meeting and read a letter at 
the meeting. In this letter Childers stated that:  
two candidates interested in the Longford/Athlone area cannot stand with 
any hope of both being elected. There is a vacancy in Monaghan for a 
candidate….under these circumstances I wish to leave the 
Longford/Athlone area to the candidate whose qualifications will be 
considered satisfactory to the Convention. I have no doubt that Frank 
Carter will be the person chosen.58 
 
In a short note to Carter accompanying the above letter, Childers stated that ‘there is 
an implication in it that if I remained the choice between you and me would go to a 
vote. I don’t know how to deal with this – if at all’.59 Carter’s response to Childers 
indicated that in such a situation he would stand aside, ‘loyalty would demand a 
solution in the shape of seniority, apart altogether from personal considerations’.60 
Childers had great respect for Carter and kept him fully updated on events concerning 
his move to Monaghan. Childers’s priority was of course to secure his own political 
future but he no doubt genuinely considered the dilemma he faced if he remained in 
Longford-Westmeath. In reply to a letter from a constituent in Longford, Childers 
again stated the situation concerning the nomination of candidates: 
Either I or Frank Carter would stand down. I know he would, if I offered 
to accept nomination. I think he is entitled to election. 
There is a vacancy in Monaghan. 
So there is the story. 
Please keep this letter to yourself.61 
 
Despite the many contradictions and instances of his ignoring the electorate during his 
political career, Childers nevertheless continued to appeal to the electorate. There are 
many reasons for Childers’s success and a letter from constituent Pat Carthy of Co. 
Longford to Childers alludes to some of those reasons:  
I repeat now as I have often done before – that Longford was not worthy 
of you as you were too upright and straight. The first morning that I met 
you in 1938 I seen honour in your face. It was bred in you both by father 
and mother.62 
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Childers was once more successful in a general election, this time in 
Monaghan. Fianna Fáil lost eight seats in the 1961 general election, but they remained 
in power with the support of Independent candidates. As usual Childers contributed to 
the national debate on issues of public and national interest. The late 1950s saw the 
publication of T.K. Whitaker’s economic plan, and many of issues raised within it 
were echoed and supported by Childers. Along with Lemass he realised that in the 
modern world there could be no ‘reliance on protection or isolationism’.63 He 
understood the need for foreign investment, the use of marketing organisations and 
the latest scientific techniques in industry. Childers remarked on Ireland’s progress 
since independence and the challenge ahead: 
the truth must be accepted that independence presented more challenges to 
be met than benefits to be enjoyed. Independence provided opportunities 
for progress, but the wishful thinking it encouraged had to be swept aside. 
There lay the challenge to any young virile nation.64 
 
Irish industry proved unable to sustain growth and break into export markets. Childers 
encouraged a much closer working relationship between employers and employees 
with incentive bonus schemes becoming more widespread.65 Irish industry would 
have to rationalise industrial production and co-ordinate marketing as was now 
common in British and European commerce. Design and packaging were vital for 
which ‘a thousand per cent advance in policy was a pre-requisite to success’.66 Gary 
Murphy states that against this background Lemass decided to incorporate the trade 
unions, business interests and farmer groups into the economic policy-making 
process. He had to do this, according to Murphy, if his attempt to move Ireland from 
‘economic nationalism to European union was going to be successful’.67 Ireland had 
applied for membership of the Common Market, and the Fianna Fáil slogan was “A 
better day’s work by everyone”, to ensure that Ireland could avail of the many 
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opportunities in the new Europe.68 This was a far cry from the Childers of the mid-
twenties who did not want to see Ireland industrialised and competing with the nations 
of the industrialised world. However, this was the Lemass era. Protectionism was 
gone, foreign investment was encouraged and the markets of Europe beckoned. 
Ireland had moved away from de Valera’s vision for the country.  
Following the 1961 general election Lemass retained his cabinet with the 
welcome news for Childers that responsibility for tourism was transferring from the 
Department of Industry and Commerce to Transport and Power in October 1961.69  
To develop the tourist industry Childers had to compete for a share of government 
funding. In this process he experienced a mixture of success and setbacks. The tourist 
industry soon became familiar with the words ‘when I was a travel agent in Paris’, in 
relating to a point he was making in a speech or lecture.70 Addressing the Annual 
Convention of the Association of British Travel Agents, held in Dublin on 15 October 
1962, Childers prefaced his address by saying: 
As a retired manager of a European travel agency in Paris, where I worked 
from 1928 to 1931, I welcome you, not only as minister in charge of 
tourism but as an ex-colleague of yours knowing all the satisfaction, the 
headaches and the really difficult problems of a service where your job is 
to sell future happiness.71 
 
His experience of the travel industry had been an excellent introduction to 
politics. Both care for the future needs of people, although in politics Childers 
suggested in a different and more complex environment. Childers related to tourism in 
a special way. Despite the general improvement in the tourist industry, improvement 
in living standards and the total bedroom accommodation in the Republic had shown 
no significant change in ten years. The number of rooms with bath had increased by 
only a few hundred during this period. Childers advised the Irish Tourist Association 
on 22 October 1959 that: ‘the provision of baths or showers was no longer required 
for only the rich; it was indispensable for almost every grade of American traveller 
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and the demand was rapidly growing elsewhere’.72 Childers urged far greater effort 
and progress in the future. The real potential of the United States market could only 
be achieved by investing in advertising and forming closer relationships with travel 
agents. Bedroom population was crucial for continued tourist expansion but a massive 
improvement in standards was necessary. Childers opened the new offices of Irish 
International Airlines in New York in December 1960. Entering the transatlantic air 
service was a bold step for a small country like Ireland but the opening of new offices 
in New York was a measure of the company’s success. This success had proved that 
Ireland could present two worlds to the tourist; the unspoiled countryside and 
hospitality of the Irish, alongside the most up-to-date management techniques and the 
desire to work hard while retaining an old-world atmosphere. Childers made reference 
to his administrative training with an American business in Europe and declared that 
he could always look at Ireland objectively. He would not be content until the 
‘Republic was as perfect as possible – a model to the whole world’.73 Given what 
happened to his father this was a remarkable statement from Childers.  
A review of the tourism structure revealed that too much emphasis was placed 
on Dublin. Childers had previously demonstrated his keenness to decentralise and 
give more control to regional and local enterprises. In keeping with this theme, eight 
Regional Tourism Organisations were established in 1962.74 These were limited 
companies funded by Bord Fáilte and led to the establishment of tourist offices 
providing information for visitors; the local tourism drive could now be co-ordinated. 
There were however delays in the operation of the regional organisations. 
Membership was open to local authorities and to local development associations 
concerned with the tourist industry. Bord Fáilte invited suitable persons to act as 
caretaker directors until the general meetings of the regional organisations could be 
held. When questioned in the Dáil regarding how the caretaker directors were 
selected, Childers replied that Bord Fáilte: ‘selected representatives from each area 
whom they thought would be most suitable’.75 Those selected represented the 
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professional, industrial and local authority sections and Childers was requested to 
explain why the trade union movement was ignored. His response was that ‘the 
people who were interested in and concerned with tourism were invited to take part’.76 
The opposition parties in the Dáil reminded Childers that ‘the trade union people have 
a greater interest in the tourist industry than many who are represented. The trade 
union people are employed in the industry’.77 Childers acknowledged that there were 
complaints with some of the regional organisations but he felt that ‘it would be best to 
wait until the final organisation was established in which everybody interested in the 
area would be able to elect representatives’.78 The set-up of the regional organisations 
attracted criticisms but the general opinion favoured Bord Fáilte getting on with the 
job.  
Childers had a particular interest in youth hostel associations and was 
associated with An Óige almost since its foundation. Youth hostelling developed a 
love of the countryside and Childers was a strong believer in the value of foreign 
travel as a means of broadening the mind. Young hostel associations provided people 
with an opportunity of travelling to foreign countries and without this movement 
many would not have had this experience. Many who visited Ireland would return 
again in the future with their friends and families. Childers was well aware that the 
tenants of the hostels were the potential hotel clients of the future.79 
Many of those who stayed in youth hostels and tourists in general, visited 
Muckross House in County Kerry and its future as a tourist location was decided 
while Childers had responsibility for tourism. In a note to the secretary of his 
department he suggested three options for the house and estate. The first, and his 
personal preference, was that it be developed as an Irish heritage museum. The second 
suggestion was its conversion and use as a V.I.P. house, and his third choice was a 
botanical centre. Over the years a number of other proposals had been made 
concerning its use. These included a youth hostel, a country residence for the 
President and a dairying instruction centre.80 Having read a memorandum on the 
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possible uses of Muckross House, Childers concluded that: ‘this building should be a 
more direct attraction to tourists of all kinds and I can think of no better way of using 
it than for the purposes of establishing a museum of the Irish heritage’.81  Lemass had 
received an approach concerning the use of Muckross House and Childers wrote to 
him outlining his views for the house. He suggested that Ireland needed a location to 
present its image and proposed the establishment of a museum. The museum was to 
illustrate Ireland’s missionary work from the fourth to the eight century and to 
demonstrate Irish heritage from the sixteenth century to the present day. The gardens 
were already open to visitors and the house, suggested Childers: ‘would be an ideal 
location for such a museum being situated in a national park in our most renowned 
tourist area’.82  
However, the government was considering the house as a centre for 
administrative studies under the Institute of Public Administration and as additional 
hotel accommodation in Killarney. Childers had a visit from the son of the donor of 
the properties who ‘expressed his disappointment with the proposed use of the house 
for Administrative Studies. He [son of the donor] has since written to me confirming 
his views and has expressed his preference for the idea of a Heritage Museum’.83 In 
his letter to Lemass, Childers also emphasised the views of the local tourist 
organisation that Muckross House should be used as a tourist amenity. Despite the 
fact that Childers had the backing of the donor family and local tourism interests his 
proposal appeared to have been ignored by Lemass. In a letter to the Minister for 
Finance he stated that ‘it is a curious fact that the Taoiseach never seems to accept any 
suggestions from me about ways of advertising the country, but I, nevertheless, am 
going to persevere’.84 This presents us with a further indication of the relationship that 
existed between Lemass and Childers. Their styles of working were different and their 
past had nothing in common other than the fact, which in itself was a lot, that Childers 
father and Lemass fought on the anti-treaty side in the Civil War.   
Childers did persevere in his efforts which also included the establishment of 
popular museums and the preservation of national monuments. Numerous letters to 
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the Departments of the Taoiseach, Finance and Education finally led to a response 
from the Department of Finance stating that a new branch in the Office of Public 
Works, The National Parks and Monuments Branch, had been established.85 One of 
the objectives of the new branch was to develop better information and interpretative 
services for the benefit of those visiting parks and monuments. As to the specific issue 
of provincial museums, the Department of Finance found Childers’s suggestion: ‘very 
attractive and I have no doubt but that they would add considerably to the presentation 
of our National Monuments….You will have been pleased therefore to hear that the 
Minister for Finance has authorised An Taisce to undertake a survey, to be paid for by 
the State, of provincial museums, great gardens and historic houses’.86 
To develop such tourist amenities and allow Bord Fáilte achieve its targets set 
for tourism under the Second Economic Programme, scheduled to run from 1964 to 
1970, Childers had to convince his colleagues, especially those in the Department of 
Finance and its minister deputy James Ryan, of the necessity to maintain sufficient 
funding of Bord Fáilte. Childers was aware of the controls and restrictions imposed by 
the Department of Finance when he had responsibility for the broadcasting service. 
Advertising, promotion, market research, improved sales techniques, higher capacity 
aircraft were all vital to the success of the tourist industry. The North American 
market was especially positive to Ireland following President Kennedy’s visit to 
Ireland and Lemass’s visit to Washington. Bord Fáilte emphasised the opportunity 
available to exploit the American market, which may not return or would be costly to 
create in the future. In a letter to deputy Ryan, Childers stated that: ‘I am personally 
convinced more than ever that now is the time for significant investment in tourism if 
we are to achieve the sort of progress which I believe to be possible’.87 
Ryan explained to Childers that due to demands for other services, which he 
had already brought to the attention of the government, he could not make available 
the amount requested by Bord Fáilte for the year 1964-5. Ryan’s proposed solution 
was not agreeable to Childers and a stalemate situation developed. Childers wrote to 
Ryan and stated that if he remained adamant: ‘I will have no alternative but to take the 
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matter to arbitration by the government. I appreciate your difficulties and am sorry if I 
appear to be uncooperative. I am sending a copy of this correspondence to the 
Taoiseach’.88 In a post-script to the letter Childers assumed that Ryan had read Bord 
Fáilte’s memo on the practical effectiveness of their promotional work. The volume of 
contacts with travel agents and details of package tours increased greatly and was vital 
to their campaign. In trying to persuade Ryan he concluded ‘if every other country is 
stepping up promotion, we must!’89  
 Childers’s letter to Lemass detailed the proposed cut to Bord Fáilte’s grant 
request for the year 1964-5 and the reasons why this should not be done. The 
circumstances were now right for a major effort in the defined markets and ‘I feel it 
would be disastrous if we were not to take full advantage of these circumstances’.90 
Lemass acknowledged Childers’s letter and accompanying documents relating to 
Bord Fáilte’s grant for 1964-5. While agreeing that Childers had a very considerable 
case for a higher allocation Lemass did not think that is was: 
within the realm of financial possibility in the circumstances of this year. I 
think you should, before the government meeting, consider what 
modification of your proposals would still permit of a useful increase in 
the Board’s promotional work. The proposals of the Minister for Finance 
seem to me to be reasonable, and I shall be greatly surprised if the 
Government do not share this view.91 
 
Lemass decided in favour of his Minister of Finance despite the compelling 
arguments made by Childers. The Minister for Finance had demands from all 
government departments to contend with, Childers’s only priority was to secure the 
maximum funding for his own department. While the finance minister had to balance 
overall spending and commanded a strong voice in government, this issue is again 
indicative of the working relationship that existed between Lemass and Childers. 
Childers would learn from this episode and take a different approach on the next 
occasion.  
 Having argued his position within government for the maximum funding for 
his departments, Childers then distanced himself from the operations of his 
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departments. Childers would not interfere in land allocation decisions, he refused to 
meet deputations in relation to rail closures and in keeping with his policy, he refused 
to meet a deputation from County Leitrim in relation to tourist development. While 
Childers was correct in explaining that the Tourist Traffic Acts entrusted tourist 
development to Bord Fáilte, his understanding of the relationship between the public 
and their elected representatives in Ireland can once again be questioned. Childers was 
not interested in wasting time discussing issues for the sake of discussions. He should 
have played the political game but did not. He was concerned with practical 
consequences, a pragmatist.  
Childers was very interested in forging links between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland. Bord Fáilte was of the opinion that there were a number of areas 
where they and the Northern Ireland Tourist Board could cooperate in a practical way. 
He did not support partition and suggested that if the island were one there would be 
new ideas and energies that would benefit the whole island. A common promotional 
campaign highlighting the island’s potential would surely encourage investment. The 
results of this type of promotion would inevitably lead to an increase of tourists from 
Europe and America.92 With similar economic problems and facing all the problems 
of a small nation: ‘there was an overwhelming case for the presentation of one all-
Ireland image to the European Economic Community’.93 Childers believed that as the 
years went by the world would become more integrated and internationalised. He 
emphasised that the promotion of Ireland through unification was not intended to 
isolate Great Britain: 
Let it be stated again that a United Ireland would have a far more genuine 
solidly based friendship with the English people, a better mutual 
understanding of differences in attitude and of mutual problems and a far 
more effective economic and social relationship.94 
 
Childers stated that entry into the European Economic Community would lead to 
eventual re-unification of Ireland provided that outdated prejudices were abandoned. 
Childers and Lemass did have something they could agree on, an end to partition. 
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For now Childers had to be less ambitious and face the practical realities of 
life and politics as they existed then. Bord Fáilte suggested the production of a single 
travel brochure covering the whole of Ireland with the advantage of marketing Ireland 
as a destination rather than two separate sections. Tours and familiarisation sessions 
for travel agents should cover the whole of Ireland and the same should apply to 
publicists and marketing agencies. Research information could be exchanged and the 
offices of both tourist bodies could answer queries and provide information on the 
whole island. The possibilities for joint promotion of Irish holidays in the British 
market were also listed for consideration.95 However, political questions would arise 
such as the border and the ‘desirability of identifying our interests too closely with 
those of Britain’.96 Relations between Bord Fáilte and the Northern Ireland Tourist 
Board were fairly friendly while relations with the British Tourist Authority were very 
good. It appeared from the memo that some members of the Northern Ireland Tourist 
Board feared that ‘any joint publicity might be the occasion of showing an undivided 
Ireland’.97  
The Director-General of Bord Fáilte, Dr T.J. O’Driscoll, agreed with the Irish 
Association for Cultural, Economic and Social Relations in selecting tourism as an 
activity with possibilities for co-operation between the two parts of Ireland.98 
Newspaper reports of a possible joint promotion campaign between Bord Fáilte and 
the British Tourist Authority resulted in Lemass writing to Childers. Lemass 
suggested ‘that you should keep yourself very fully informed of any such 
development, which could have political implications, and which might not in my 
view be very advantageous in our tourist promotion effort’.99 Lemass requested 
Childers, at his convenience, to let him know what was intended. At last Childers was 
engaged in an activity that got the attention of Lemass.  
Childers informed Lemass that the proposed co-operation envisaged by Bord 
Fáilte with the British Tourist Authority while probably ‘desirable from a purely 
commercial point of view, might possibly involve too close an identification of our 
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interests with those of the British’.100 Childers had taken on the Minister for Finance 
and lost, he did not want to give Lemass any further reasons to doubt his capabilities 
and sense of judgement. To reassure Lemass on the separate identity issue Childers 
stated that: 
There would be absolutely no question of the use of the description 
“British Isles”….there are no concrete proposals under consideration at 
present but I have arranged for Bord Fáilte to keep me fully informed of 
the position and I shall write to you again in the event of further 
developments or of any concrete proposals.101 
 
There was however reason for Childers to question the judgement of Bord 
Fáilte after they planned a visit for young Northern Ireland soldiers to Achill Island. 
The British Army was forced to cancel the proposed visit by seventy young soldiers 
following reports of anti-British slogans daubed on roads and bridges on the island. 
The Achill Tourist Association planned a welcome for the soldiers and they regretted 
what had happened.102 Lemass wrote to Childers and stated that the circumstances 
surrounding the proposed visit by the soldiers ‘must be regarded as a bad blow to the 
whole tourist promotion effort’.103 He was aware that Bord Fáilte organised the visit 
without consulting the government and it revealed a serious lack of judgement on 
their behalf. Bord Fáilte should have envisaged what happened in Achill as a 
possibility. Lemass suggested that Childers ‘should consult with Bord Fáilte, and 
advise them that, whenever arrangements contemplated by them appear likely to 
involve political consideration, they should consult with you in advance’.104 In his 
reply to Lemass, Childers informed him that he had already decided to take the action, 
which Lemass suggested.105 These were not good times for Childers. Even though 
Childers was not directly responsible for the proposed visit, it was his department and 
his direct responsibility. At best it must have cast doubts in Lemass’s mind as to the 
controls and communications Childers had in place with Bord Fáilte. But Lemass did 
not intervene himself and showed confidence in Childers to remedy the situation.  
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Childers’s position on partition and his desire to develop relationships with 
Northern Ireland no doubt caught the attention of Lemass; on this occasion they were 
both singing from the same hymn-sheet. According to Michael Kennedy: ‘Lemass had 
been expecting that a meeting with [Terence] O’Neill would eventually come 
about’.106 Lemass had shown an interest in developing good relations with Northern 
Ireland since coming to power in 1932. In 1959 Lemass continued to press for cross-
border co-operation. He was prepared to ‘explore any promising prospect of 
developing useful co-operation for the sake of the practical benefits it may yield to the 
ordinary people in the North and the South’.107 This did not change his stance on 
partition; it was still his government’s desire to see the Irish people and country 
reunited. In March 1963 Terence O’Neill became Prime Minister of Northern Ireland 
and the process commenced which resulted in the meeting of Lemass and O’Neill at 
Stormont on 14 January 1965. The meeting had no pre-arranged agenda, it was 
exploratory, but it had occurred. The issues discussed included the promotion of 
tourism, trade liberalisation and the exchange of information across a wide area of 
common concerns. This was one of the most sensational events since the 
establishment of the border and led to further meetings and co-operation at ministerial 
level.108 Childers must have been elated at these developments. At last, talks and co-
operation between North and South; through his work in tourism he did his bit to help 
the process along.  
Childers learned some hard political lessons after his attempts to secure Bord 
Fáilte funding for the year 1964-5. On the next occasion he did not take on the 
Minister for Finance but rather reminded Lemass of ‘the taxation from tourist 
spending – over £5m. from each additional £10m. of tourist expenditure’.109 Funding 
was becoming more difficult to secure as banks concentrated on projects of a 
productive nature that would increase exports. Childers argued that tourism generated 
considerable tax revenues, was an export industry and provided significant 
employment. His solution to fund development was ‘to establish a Hotel Credit 
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Agency, either on the lines of the Industrial Credit Company or the Agricultural 
Credit Corporation or to give Bord Fáilte borrowing powers and to provide them with 
a line of credit to advance to hotels’.110 In his reply Lemass stated that ‘our problem, 
at this time, is to allocate wisely the scarce resources which are available’.111 This 
would involve a curtailment of investment in worthwhile developments, including 
tourism. 
 Worse was to come for Childers as Lemass suggested that he was not 
convinced as to the further need of government grants in bringing about an expansion 
of tourist accommodation. A time had to come when ‘a momentum of growth will 
have been set up which should enable these grants to be withdrawn’112 Lemass 
suggested that it was not impossible that the same rate of growth, or close to it, could 
be maintained without grants. As to Childers’s suggestion of a Hotel Credit Agency, 
Lemass was not at all convinced that the government should take responsibility for the 
hotel industry’s credit requirements. Lemass concluded: ‘I will need a great deal of 
convincing of the desirability of this course, apart altogether from the Minister for 
Finance’s difficulty in regard to it’.113 Childers agreed with Lemass that it was 
possible to build a new hotel and operate it economically without the benefit of grants. 
These circumstances could be found in Dublin and a few other places where there was 
an extended tourist season and adequate off-season business. However, the objective 
of the tourist industry was according to Childers: 
to secure the provision of accommodation in or near scenic areas not only 
because the tourist expects to find accommodation there, especially with 
the growth of motoring tourism, but also because tourist traffic passing 
through an area is of no benefit to the people of the area unless 
accommodation is available to induce the visitors to stay.114 
 
He continued to impress upon Lemass ‘the urgently needed investment requirements 
for this industry, whose contribution to exports has now become paramount’.115 
Childers was now speaking the language Lemass understood and wanted to hear. 
Additional grants led to improvements in accommodation, resorts and recreation 
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facilities. Farmhouse accommodation was heavily promoted and grants were made 
available for additional development of this sector.116  
Throughout his career Childers encouraged local community involvement in 
projects that benefited the area. He repeated this theme with his plea in relation to 
greater regional involvement in tourism. He was not prepared to continue funding 
activities that should be sponsored locally. Shannon Airport was the natural landing 
place for tourists who wished to see the West of Ireland but there was need for greater 
regional publicity and ‘the people would simply have to dip their hands in their 
pockets for this purpose’.117 Childers advocated a Promotion Officer to deal with 
tourism in every county. Hotel managers should collaborate with each other and 
appoint agents to travel to the United States and Great Britain and promote the 
concept of hotel chains. Coach tours from Shannon should be increased and every 
locality should create its own image to attract tourists. The tourist potential of Clare 
was just barely exploited but he could not be expected to do more than provide basic 
publicity material.118   
 Childers had shown a keen interest in the development of fisheries in his 
previous portfolio and his contribution to this area of tourism can be judged from the 
increased number of fishing visitors. In 1957 12,000 fishing visitors came to Ireland 
and contributed £285,000 to tourist revenues.119 By 1962 this figure had increased to 
58,000 visitors spending £1,346,000.120 Development plans for all types of fishing 
resulted in 117,400 anglers visiting Ireland in 1968 spending £4,134,000.121 In general 
great progress was made in the tourist area during Childers’s term as minister. 
Speaking at the Annual General Meeting of the Irish Tourist Association in October 
1961, Childers stated that standards in accommodation, recreation and transport had 
all improved, but were still short of what they should be. He stated that ‘success in the 
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tourist industry and eulogies by tourists should stimulate greater effort and not cloak 
deficiencies’.122  
 Despite his considerable efforts deficiencies in the system still persisted in 
1969 as evidenced in a letter from an American tourist to the then Taoiseach, Jack 
Lynch. The conditions experienced by the tourist led her to describe Ireland as truly 
backward compared for example to Scotland. Beggars on the streets of Dublin and 
Athlone and the visible conditions of young children ‘made me sick. Do you not take 
care of the poor people in Ireland? the way other countries do’.123  The Grand Hotel in 
Moate, County Westmeath got a special mention in the letter to Lynch. Having stayed 
there for four days and nights the tourist paints a very bleak picture of the hotel and 
the town. The rear of the hotel was full of debris and very dirty. No hot water in the 
hotel and no water at all for two days, no soap, dirty towels used by other tenants and: 
‘a back breaking bed, held together with ropes and the food was positively 
sickening’.124 The tourist concluded: ‘the Irish are a backward, stupid, dirty and lazy 
lot of people. As for the village of Moate, well it’s a pitiful place to live’125. Outside 
of the larger cities the tourist experienced only dirt and starving dogs and cats. Having 
found her uncle she was dismayed by his living conditions. His house was filthy, no 
furniture, no wash basins or sinks and he ‘badly in need of a bath’126. The restaurant 
in Moate, the Bon Bon, was also dirty and the tourist wondered why the government 
did not check out the facilities in towns for tourists. Why was there no Department of 
Health and why were new houses being built in Moate with no bathrooms or running 
water? According to the angry tourist, given these conditions, it was easy to 
understand why so many young people were leaving Ireland.127   
By 1965 Lemass was considering retirement and when he finally did so in 
November 1966 there was no one obvious successor. However, Bruce Arnold 
suggested that Jack Lynch was favoured by both Lemass and de Valera as leadership 
material.128 Fianna Fáil faced a leadership election but Childers was not among those 
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in the reckoning. Childers was somewhat of a loner and was not one to socialise in the 
Leinster House bar. He appeared distant to the younger deputies but always gave of 
his knowledge and commanded respect. T.K. Whitaker suggests that ‘because of his 
English education, accent and mannerisms I feel he was never quite accepted as “one 
of us”, though his patriotism would never have been in doubt’.129 Childers was one of 
the fifty-two deputies who voted for Jack Lynch as leader and the government had a 
new Taoiseach on 10 November 1966. Lynch was the first Taoiseach to have no direct 
involvement in the civil war and therefore a new era commenced in Irish politics. 
More important personally for Childers was the fact that Lynch’s style of 
management was similar to that of de Valera. Lynch was not considered as a 
candidate from the beginning but emerged victorious over George Colley with 
Charles Haughey having withdrawn from contention. Lynch presided over a 
government in which many members considered themselves candidates for his 
position. In time of crisis Lynch would come to depend on the support of Childers. 
For now, Childers was made Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in addition to his other 
responsibilities in a cabinet re-shuffle. He was now one of the most senior members of 
government and had two departments to control. 
 Childers had previously held the portfolio of Minister for Posts and Telegraphs 
during 1951-4. Having responsibility once again for the broadcasting service Childers 
looked at the general position of the service and drafted a report on Radio Éireann 
(hereafter cited as RE). His eighteen-point summary of the radio service suggested 
that a large number of listeners tune into other services and although RE provided a 
good service, it was ‘not meeting needs of majority’.130 The service operated from 
inadequate premises and costs were excessive. In Dáil Éireann Childers outlined 
Radio Telefís Éireann’s (hereafter cited as RTE) plans for the acquisition of a new site 
for its broadcasting service. Negotiations were taking place for the purchase of eight 
acres at Donnybrook and part of the property would be used ‘for a radio centre which 
is a much overdue need’.131 Young people in particular were listening to foreign radio 
and he suggested that RE follow the example of pirate stations, which were popular. 
                                                          
129
 Letter from T.K. Whitaker to the author, 13 Dec. 2005. 
130
 Childers report on the radio service, 4 Aug. 1967 (N.A.I., Dept. of Posts and Telegraphs, MS 
2001/78/81). 
131
 Dáil Éireann debates, vol.230, 26 Oct. 1967. 
 
  
  
145 
Childers was not supporting the actual presence of pirate stations but rather 
suggesting an analysis of programming schedules used by pirates. At this time pirate 
radio ships were broadcasting of the English and Dutch coasts and several member 
states of the Council of Europe had introduced legislation to combat such ships. 
Childers questioned the level of local interest programmes and suggested the 
establishment of local radio stations.132  
Childers also updated himself on the current position of RTE and predictably 
prepared a memorandum for the government. The financial position of RTE had 
deteriorated in recent years due to increased expenditure on both television and radio 
without a corresponding increase of incomes. In his memorandum to the government 
dated 11 December 1967, Childers outlined the financial requests of RTE. Among the 
requests was the proposal that the combined radio and television licence be increased 
from five pounds to six pounds and five shillings from 1 April 1968. This was refused 
by Childers but he did agree with RTE for exchequer advances towards its capital 
programme. The Minister for Finance considered that RTE should arrange its capital 
expenditure so as to be able to fund it from its own resources. His view was 
influenced by the inability of the exchequer to fully meet the capital requirements for 
productive development and social projects such as housing, education and health. 
Resources had to be allocated on schemes that encouraged economic growth. The 
Minister for Finance recommended that action be taken to prevent large deficits 
occurring and to maximise incomes from licence fees and advertising. Childers’s 
response was that: 
it will simply not be practicable for the Authority to continue to finance its 
capital programme for the next few years entirely from its own resources 
unless a substantial increase is authorised in the licence fees.133 
 
His argument on the licence fee issue was not clear as he said that he did ‘not consider 
that an increase in the licence fees would be justified at present’ and that he was not 
convinced that RTE’s ‘capital programme should be carried out as quickly as 
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planned’.134 The confusion in this memorandum was highlighted in a note from the 
Taoiseach’s department: 
His argument against the increase of the licence fees is not clear or 
forceful. Finally the material on the capital programme is spread all over 
the memorandum & spiced with details about cost control techniques, 
comparisons with other countries etc which do not greatly help, detailed as 
they are, in determining a solution.135 
 
The note recommended sending back the memorandum for revision, however, the 
Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, while acknowledging that ‘the memo is quiet diffuse I think 
we might circulate for next Tuesday, 19 Dec. 1967’.136 Childers’s memoranda were 
longwinded and included considerable amounts of data supporting the problem but 
this very often clouded the issues at hand and a search for a solution.  
If Childers was uncertain on the issue of licence fee increases for RTE there 
was no such uncertainty when it came to granting free licences to old age pensioners. 
He refused a request from deputy Luke Belton, Fine Gael, to extend the provision of 
free radio and television licences to old age pensioners. His department referred to the 
provision of free radio licenses to blind persons who satisfied certain well-defined 
conditions. The provision of this concession was to facilitate such persons, who 
because of their disability, ‘generally appreciate radio far more than listeners who 
have their sight’.137 The question of extending the concession to television licenses 
and to a broader category of people was considered from time to time but was always 
rejected because it would be difficult to define categories of people who would 
qualify. Any extension of the concession ‘would involve a substantial loss in 
broadcasting licence revenue’ and although the department had a good deal of 
sympathy for the old age pensioners whose means were limited ‘it was not possible to 
relieve them of the need to pay the ordinary broadcasting licence fees’.138 Belton’s 
reply suggested that Childers no longer had a requirement to determine the 
circumstances of applicants as ‘Mr Haughey has agreed to give free electricity to old 
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age pensioners’.139 Further pressure on Childers came from the Society of St. Vincent 
de Paul who wrote to Childers in December 1967. They earnestly requested that 
Childers: ‘consider sympathetically the proposal to issue television licences free to old 
age pensioners’.140 They were particularly concerned with those old age pensioners 
living alone and the free television licences would ‘bring untold pleasure into many 
drab and lonely lives’.141 Childers gave careful consideration to the free television 
licences request and highlighted the existing concessions of travel and electricity. 
These concessions went ‘far towards easing the lot of old age pensioners’ and 
Childers regretted that he was ‘unable to agree to your Society’s representations’.142 
The Society were apparently not prepared to drop the issue and a further letter from 
them once again emphasised those living alone and the fact that they were already 
receiving travel and electricity concessions. They were prepared to purchase the 
television sets and continue to pay for the licences although this would be a drain on 
their limited funds. Childers was requested to consider the matter again as this would 
be ‘very much in keeping with the present State policy regarding the old, and for the 
State the cost would not really be excessive’.143 Determined to maintain his position 
Childers commended the Society for its excellent work but he was ‘unable to agree to 
any extension of the existing licence concession’.144 However, within a few weeks of 
Childers’s refusal, a letter from the Society was thanking him and the Minister for 
Finance for the proposal: ‘to give free TV and Radio licences to certain categories of 
old age pensioners’.145 The decision by deputy Haughey to grant free electricity to old 
age pensioners was more representative of the social needs of the time and showed a 
more realistic understanding of peoples’ needs.  
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A proposal by the Department of Health in 1968 initiated another loss of 
revenue situation for Childers. The department drafted a memorandum on the 
problems in public health which cigarettes posed and the steps to be undertaken to 
intensify the anti-smoking campaign. Among the items for discussion was cigarette 
advertising on television. They suggested to RT.E. to limit cigarette advertising on 
television until after 10 p.m. and to discourage participants in home produced 
programmes from smoking cigarettes.146 The Department of Health also proposed the 
showing of short film clips during children’s programmes to be screened free of 
charge by RTE. Their reply stated that the loss in revenue ‘could not be made good in 
any significant degree from other possible advertising sources’.147 Childers responded 
in his usual way and gathered all the facts pertinent to the issue. He requested his 
department to gather ‘in countries where tobacco product advertising is permitted in 
newspapers and periodicals but not on TV or Radio what has been the effect?’.148 It is 
difficult to say what impact his personal involvement had in RTE deciding ‘to 
discontinue the advertising of cigarettes on television’.149 The phased process was to 
be completed by 1971 and the loss of revenue was to be compensated by an 
application for an increase in licence fees. The Department of Health had shown that 
the discontinuance of cigarette advertising on television in Britain had no overall loss 
of revenue to the independent television companies. A more important point was the 
balance to be made between revenue and human suffering. This was not the end of the 
issue for Childers as his next portfolio was health.  
When discussing controversial matters in which government departments were 
concerned RTE had assured Childers that the relevant department would be afforded 
the opportunity of giving the official view before such programmes were broadcast. 
Childers required that three days’ notice be given to departments to enable them 
prepare their case. Programmes broadcast without obtaining relevant department 
views or which were not balanced brought swift and decisive action from Childers. In 
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December 1968 RTE broadcast a programme on Bantry Bay which had a direct effect 
on Childers’s own department. In his opinion this programme was not objective and 
contrary to his agreement, his department was not consulted in relation to the content 
of the programme. The programme focused on Bantry Bay and Gulf Oil but Childers 
was annoyed because it suggested: ‘that my department just accepted Gulf Oil’s 
proposition. The suggestion was made that my department was sleepy and did not 
drive a hard enough bargain’.150 Childers’s department was not given the opportunity 
to stress the long negotiations that had taken place with Gulf Oil to ensure a pollution 
free environment. On the financial side, the programme did not mention the rates and 
rent paid to Cork County Council. This was the first time an industrial enterprise was 
established in the Western area without the payment of 40-50% free grants. A very 
angry Childers concluded his letter by saying: 
I am extremely angry. I have been made a fool of by Justin Keating, one of 
your practising Communists who had a subtle sneering manner. The 
programme is brilliantly conceived to cast doubt and to deliver quiet 
innuendoes.151 
 
A further letter to RTE in March 1969 outlined Childers’s views on a 
programme that included a discussion on the mining industry. He suggested that the 
programme was prepared ‘on a biassed Socialist basis, completely contrary to the 
Broadcasting Act impartiality section’.152 The programme should have included 
discussions on topics such as the heavy speculative capital costs and the problems 
associated with marketing the products. Nothing was said in relation to new 
prospecting techniques that were far too expensive for Ireland to fund. This was a 
technical programme and the Department of Industry and Commerce should have 
been consulted on the above and other issues. The programme ‘was brilliantly 
designed to present a case that the government had been deceived, fooled, exploited to 
the limit’.153 Childers concluded by saying: ‘I cannot permit this kind of debate to 
continue. I will discuss it with the Board’.154  
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Childers was not anti-liberal and his record as minister with responsibility for 
broadcasting showed that he encouraged open and balanced debate. However, 
Childers ensured that the Fianna Fáil position was adequately covered. The state 
controlled television service often had according to Diarmaid Ferriter: ‘a difficult time 
in trying to establish and measure the extent of its true independence, given the ease 
with which political and social pressure could be brought to bear when it was deemed 
to have strayed beyond its brief’.155 Lemass expressed the view in 1966 that the state 
broadcaster should not be completely independent of government supervision in 
regards to its current affairs programmes.156 However, the Irish Times, suggestion in 
1969 that: ‘in his heart Mr. Childers would like to give the nation piped television 
from his Party’s H.Q.’ was a little harsh.157 This relatively new medium of 
communication was there to be exploited by all political parties. There was truth in 
the sentiment that politicians must ‘adjust their rather proprietorial attitude in regard 
to television….they set up this thing and they are entitled to the benefit of it’.158 The 
view that RTE would become: ‘an extension of the Government propaganda service 
where there would be no objectivity, no controversy, only the neutered views of the 
ruling cliqué’ was not likely to become a reality.159  Having responsibility for the 
broadcasting service in the 1950s Childers well understood the power of the 
communications media.  
Childers most significant contribution as Minister for Posts and Telegraphs 
was in the development of the national telephone service. He wanted to build on the 
experience he gained while Minister for Posts and Telegraphs during 1951-4 and 
continue with the improvements in the telephone service. The Swedish telephone 
system was considered one of the best in Europe and Childers, along with the chief 
engineer from the Department of Posts and Telegraphs went to Stockholm to examine 
the Swedish system.160 Following Childers’s visit to Sweden an agreement was signed 
between the Swedish telephone company, Ericsson, and the Department of Posts and 
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Telegraphs. This agreement, signed: ‘in 1972 for a five year duration involving an 
industrial package which included local employment in manufacturing’ was one of 
Childers’s outstanding success stories.161 On a national level, it led to the 
modernisation of Ireland’s telephone network, and on a local level it provided much 
needed employment when Ericsson opened a manufacturing facility in Athlone, 
County Westmeath, in 1974. Ericsson continues to be a key employer in Athlone with 
the emphasis on software development. 
Politically, the Department of Posts and Telegraphs was not regarded as one of 
the senior ministries. Yet it was one of the biggest public enterprises with the 
appearance of an unwillingness to face the need for change. The department did not 
react quickly enough to modernise and develop the telephone system to meet public 
demand. Households could be waiting a couple of years for a telephone. The 
department had not ‘attuned itself to the modern Ireland’.162 The Irish Times article of 
19 June 1965 described the outward signs of the department. Postal vans and pillar 
boxes were painted a depressing shade of green, telephone booths were relics from a 
bygone era, its uniforms were outdated and premises were often shabby. Changes 
were taking place but these seemed to be dictated by changes in technology and not 
‘by a bold and imaginative vision for the future’.163 The British Post Office was to 
become a public corporation in order to increase its efficiency. It would still be a 
government department with a minister at its head answerable to parliament for its 
day-to day operations.164 A consultant’s report was severely critical of the 
management structure of the telephone service. Childers once again confronted the 
control of the civil service over his department. Under the control of the civil service 
new innovations were not being considered and the management structure was too 
rigid. Childers suggested changing the telephone administration over to a state 
company management team.  Eager to implement the findings of the report, continue 
with the services of the consultant and conduct a thorough examination into the 
desirability of changing the telephone administration, Childers wrote to the then 
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Taoiseach, Jack Lynch.165 In his reply to Childers, Lynch agreed that some change 
was necessary and requested that Childers consult with the Minister for Finance 
before undertaking a full-scale examination.166 In February 1968 Childers wrote to the 
then Minister for Finance, Charles J. Haughey, enclosing a memorandum proposing 
the incorporation of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs as a state corporation. 
Childers wanted Haughey’s reaction to his proposal before he presented them to 
government. He had completed his examination of the department’s operations and 
informed Haughey that he had arrived at the: ‘inescapable conclusion that the Postal 
and Telecommunication services should be operated by a state company with the 
same statutory organisation and powers such as the E.S.B. and subject to specific 
ministerial control’.167  
To support his position Childers outlined the current position of the 
department. It employed 18,000 people, about half of the civil service, and many of its 
operations were commercial.168 These operations included a telecommunications 
service, letter and parcel transport service, a banking type service, a purchasing 
organisation for its own and other Departments of State and general supervision of the 
broadcasting service. Childers stressed that department officers ‘live in a paradoxical 
world of trying to operate a business while at the same time being tied to Civil Service 
procedure’.169 In his reply Haughey was anxious to establish: ‘whether a State-
sponsored body would provide a better service without imposing further charges on 
the Exchequer’.170 The provision of long-term capital for the development of the 
telephone service was of particular interest to Haughey. Subject to his difficulties in 
relating requirements to available resources he had considerable sympathy with 
Childers’s views. Haughey suggested to Childers that he explore the possibility of the 
‘segregation of the telecommunications service as a separate public enterprise’.171 He 
was not convinced that Childers’s proposals would not lead to additional charges on 
the Exchequer. Both acknowledged that the retention of the Post Office within the 
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civil service caused problems. The suggestion that the telephone service be a separate 
public enterprise brought a positive response from Childers. He wrote to the 
Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, to see if he was prepared to consider the principle of 
incorporation. If he was: ‘the question of whether the whole or part of the service can 
be incorporated can be examined’.172 Evidence of Childers’s maturity as a politician; 
negotiation and compromise had replaced a singled minded approach previously 
exhibited by Childers.    
The period 1959-69 was not one in which Childers progressed his political 
career. In general this period of Childers’s political career was disappointing but it 
was a time of continued political learning, and Childers showed definite signs of 
maturing politically. He did however have his successes during this period and 
towards the end of this period he held two ministries. His vision for co-operation 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic echoed that of Lemass. His eagerness and 
total commitment to his portfolios were admirable and there was no doubting 
Childers’s work ethic and administrative abilities. However, his lack of understanding 
of the Irish political system demonstrated in his portfolios to date did not argue 
favourably for his candidacy for the more senior government portfolios. Childers did 
learn from his political experiences and with Jack Lynch as Taoiseach and the 
radically changing position of the Catholic Church as a result of the Second Vatican 
Council, the political horizon looked more positive for Childers.  
The approaching June 1969 general election and the worsening situation in 
Northern Ireland were of concern to Childers. Apart altogether from his hatred of 
violence he was apprehensive of the effect on tourism. With Frank Aiken soon to 
retire to the backbenches, Childers would be the senior member of the Fianna Fáil 
government if he held his seat in Monaghan and Fianna Fáil won the June 1969 
general election.  
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Chapter 5 
Tánaiste and Minister for Health, 1969-73; forerunner of the modern 
presidency, 1973-4  
Jack Lynch led Fianna Fáil to victory in the general election of 18 June 1969 
winning seventy-five of the 144 Dáil seats. The scale of his victory had shown that he 
was not merely an interim party leader. His rivals had their ambitions thwarted but 
they were not going to take this set-back lightly. George Colley had decided to bide 
his time for the leadership, but three other contenders, Charles Haughey, Neil Blaney 
and Kevin Boland were waiting for the opportunity to challenge Lynch. When the 
crisis broke on 6 May 1970 Lynch had few colleagues he could trust. The moment 
had arrived for Childers not only to firmly back his party leader but to show his 
calmness and control under severe pressure. The early 1970s were troubled times for 
Lynch but he managed to survive. He not only survived as leader of Fianna Fáil but 
registered considerable success during this period. Among these were the 
establishment of special courts to deal with gunmen and the winning of the 
referendum in May 1972 in favour of Ireland’s entry into the European Economic 
Community. Childers support of Lynch and his part in maintaining calm during this 
crisis deserves more recognition than has been afforded to him. 
 Childers secured his own seat in Monaghan in the 1969 election and was 
about to undertake the most rewarding and challenging portfolio of his political 
career. Although never considered for the position of Taoiseach, his political maturity 
and experience was about to be rewarded by Jack Lynch. Article twenty eight, section 
six of Bunreacht na hÉireann states that: 
The Taoiseach shall nominate a member of the Government to be the Tánaiste. 
The Tánaiste shall act for all purposes in the place of the Taoiseach if the 
Taoiseach should die, or become permanently incapacitated, until a new 
Taoiseach shall have been appointed.1 
 
When the Dáil resumed in July 1969, Frank Aiken retired to the back benches and 
was replaced as Tánaiste by Childers, Lynch’s most senior colleague, on 2 July 1969. 
Childers remained as Tánaiste until he resigned from political life on 14 March 1973 
to contest the presidential election. Lynch made minimal changes to his government 
with Charles Haughey, Neil Blaney and Kevin Boland all returning to their portfolios. 
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Childers’s contribution to Irish political life was rewarded and he fulfilled the 
expectations and trust which Jack Lynch bestowed upon him. In the ensuing cabinet 
re-shuffle Childers was allocated the health portfolio, the ministry in which Childers 
most effectively demonstrated his talents as an administrator and manager. In an 
interview in early 1971 Childers admitted that he wanted ‘to be Minister for 
Agriculture. I wanted that ministry most of all. Nobody would think me suitable, 
though’.2 Although not realising this ambition Childers had never the less gained his 
first senior portfolio at the age of sixty-three. Health had been his first choice of study 
at Cambridge and it was as Minister for Health that he would gain the most personal 
satisfaction and general recognition of his accomplishments. One of his primary tasks 
in his new portfolio was the implementation of the 1970 health act which had its 
origins in a government white paper in 1966.3 This complex piece of legislation 
demonstrated Childers’s administrative and organisational abilities. Having the new 
structures in place Childers concentrated on the real work as Minister for Health; the 
opportunity to bring real and positive change to the lives of people and his areas of 
interest ranged from child care to the care and protection of the aged. 
 In July 1969 Childers confronted a health system with administrative routines 
based mainly on the county council system established in 1898 and visitations to local 
doctors were through the dispensary system created in 1852. This dispensary system 
was also responsible for the provision of medicines, often dispensed by the doctor. It 
was realised, stated John Devlin, that to take advantage of improvements in healthcare 
and new technology, it was necessary to introduce new administrative procedures ‘to 
maximise access to healthcare.’4 The 1970 Health Act gave Childers the authority to 
remove these antiquated systems. It is important to emphasise that Childers worked 
from a loose framework on how the new system would be structured. The 1966 
proposals on health were vague and this presented Childers with the opportunity to 
use his negotiation and administrative skills. The vagueness of the proposed new 
health structures can be appreciated by referring to one of the key elements of the new 
structures, the provision of health boards. It was envisaged that health boards be 
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created but the number of boards and the negotiations necessary to implement these 
boards rested with Childers. He was now in a position where administrative skills 
alone were not sufficient. He had to plan, lead, control and motivate. This was a real 
test for Childers and the opportunity to use the political skills he had amassed during 
his political career. 
On 15 July 1969 Childers proposed to the Dáil that ‘the Health Bill, 1969, 
which had reached Committee Stage prior to the dissolution of the Dáil on 22 May 
1969, be restored to the Order Paper’5 The Dáil passed the motion and Childers 
commenced his direct involvement with the health bill. The new health structure was 
based on the creation of eight health boards, three regional hospital boards in Cork, 
Dublin and Galway and a new body called Comhairle na nOspidéal. The dispensary 
system was abolished and replaced by the choice-of-doctor scheme. The provision of 
medicines was transferred from the dispensary and allocated to chemist outlets. 
Childers faced the enormous task of replacing structures and practices in operation 
from the foundation of the state. People and institutions were required to accept 
change and the uncertainty it brought with it. 
 Provision of health services was the responsibility of twenty-seven local 
authorities and this role passed to the eight new health boards each responsible for a 
group of counties. Childers planned on having the health boards in place by October 
1970 and that they would be in a position to take over the responsibility of the health 
services on 1 April 1971.6 All hospitals owned by the local authorities transferred to 
the health boards but this left the problem of the voluntary hospitals whose ownership 
was not affected by the introduction of the health bill. There was also the problem of 
cooperation between hospitals outside the control of individual health boards.  
There were mixed feelings about the establishment of the health boards and 
Childers emphasised the unique features, which he believed, would assist in their 
success. The membership of the boards comprised public representatives, medical and 
other professional people whose daily lives ‘were spent in the provision of health 
services in one form or another’.7 With responsibility from April 1971 for the 
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administration of the health services, each board would have control and 
responsibility for the provision of all health services in its area. When the decision 
was taken to change the system of administration, arguments were made for leaving 
the administration of services outside of hospitals in the hands of local authorities. 
This was rejected and Childers suggested that: 
all of the services were inter-dependent on one another, and there could 
not be proper planning or resource allocation in a situation where one body 
was not responsible for taking an overall look at the total health care needs 
of an area.8  
 
Most commentators were in agreement with Childers’s desire to rationalise the 
number of local health authorities. However, while agreeing with the general 
membership of the health boards, former Labour party deputy Barry Desmond, has 
suggested that Childers gave too much power to the various bodies that comprised the 
health boards.9 Childers expected the various professional groups that comprised the 
membership of the health boards to work towards the provision of better health 
services and not indulge self-interests.10 Childers was a man of principle and would 
have expected the health boards to take an objective view on all policy discussions. It 
can also be argued that the provision of eight health-boards was excessive given the 
size and population of the country. Childers could have amended the proposed 
structure and looked at the overall health service from the point of view of the entire 
country. This would have led to enormous cost savings in personnel and general 
administration but would not have facilitated Childers’s view of the future 
development of health care. His plan was for the development of community health 
teams under the control of the health boards. Childers encouraged local community 
efforts in relation to all aspects of social and economic life and the new health and 
welfare systems ‘would be welded into one and shaped to meet the needs of the local 
community’.11 Local development was a theme that constantly emerged throughout 
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Childers political career. The health board structure provided the opportunities for 
moving health care into the communities.    
Local authorities were apprehensive of the proposed developments. They no 
longer controlled the provision of health services and were anxious as to the effects on 
their counties. Childers held conferences to answers their questions and update them 
on issues of interest. Childers’s former constituency of Longford-Westmeath shared 
the same concerns and uncertainties experienced by other county officials. Westmeath 
County Council was invited to send six representatives, together with the County 
Manager to a conference with Childers on the new health bill proposals. Westmeath 
was grouped with Longford, Laois and Offaly to form the new Midland Health Board. 
The retention of hospital facilities was of concern to Westmeath County Council and 
it was decided that Westmeath and Longford should work closely together to secure 
the best hospitalisation in their counties. Laois and Offaly County Councils had a 
similar co-operation pact. The concerns were not only experienced at county level and 
the debate quickly emerged as to which towns would benefit from the new health 
structures. In Westmeath there was the perception among councillors that Athlone 
was a town of factories and Mullingar was a town of hospitals. Childers faced difficult 
decisions on a national and local level in determining where hospitals were to be 
situated. The Buchanan Report, published in 1968, had recommended Athlone as the 
major growth area for the Midlands and with the expected transfer of the Department 
of Education to Athlone; local councillors could expect a positive outcome for 
Athlone when details of the new health structures were announced.12  
One of the major questions to be answered in the Midland Health Board area 
was the intended location of the Regional Hospital. Regional Hospitals would be 
located at central locations and when pressed on this issue by the various interested 
parties in the Midlands, Childers acknowledged that there were: ‘plenty of headaches 
involved in making a decision and in trying to satisfy everybody’.13 In Offaly the 
council recognised that the issue of the Regional Hospital would be the most 
important item to be considered for a long time to come. Offaly councillors were not 
only considering the Regional Hospital but also suitable locations for the Regional 
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Board should it be sited in Tullamore.14 In Athlone, councillors were confident that 
the Regional Hospital would be located there, while representatives in Tullamore 
were reminding Childers that the Fitzgerald Report had recommended their area for 
the Regional Hospital.15 The Fitzgerald Report was produced in 1967 by a council 
made up entirely of hospital consultants and was part of the re-appraisal of the health 
services undertaken in the 1960s. A letter from Childers to Laois-Offaly TDs dated 19 
November 1969 stated that no final decision had been made on the location of a new 
Regional Hospital for the Midlands. Childers promised that: ‘before any final decision 
is taken as to the future of the Midland hospital services, I will be in touch with the 
local health authorities involved’.16 The complex and demanding decisions required of 
Childers in relation to the Midland Health Board was representative of concerns and 
challenges faced by him across all the health board areas. Through inclusive 
negotiations Childers managed the uncertainty and fears faced by concerned 
organisations. However, he was determined to implement hospital changes and no 
amount of local pressures would deter him as he had shown in previous portfolios. 
Childers had made unpopular decisions in the past and he continued to make objective 
decisions based on the evidence and facts available to him. Addressing the National 
Health Council (cited hereafter as the NHC) in November 1969, Childers stated that 
no amount of local pressure would deter him from making firm decisions regarding 
the concentration of acute surgical services in large well-equipped hospitals. This 
would, stated Childers, lead to a reduction in deaths and a reduction in the numbers of 
people who suffered disability as a result of acute illness. The reorganisation of 
hospital services was also necessitated by the need to improve facilities for the 
training of graduates and nurses. Referring to an English survey Childers told the 
NHC that ‘deaths from coronary thrombosis were markedly lower when patients were 
treated in a teaching hospital as compared with an ordinary hospital’.17   
To overcome the difficulties the health boards would have in relation to 
voluntary hospitals and other issues the health bill proposed the formation of three 
regional hospital boards. Their function was the regional development and general 
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organisation ‘of hospital services in an efficient and satisfactory manner in the 
hospitals administered by health boards and other bodies in its functional area which 
are engaged in the provision of services under the Act’.18 At a national level 
Comhairle na nOspidéal was established to control the allocation of medical personnel 
to the hospitals, both health board hospitals and voluntary hospitals. It regulated 
consultant appointments and the development of specialties in the hospitals providing 
services under the health act. Childers regarded this body as: ‘highly important, both 
for the quality of the services and for ensuring the best use of resources, that there 
should be control on the creation of new specialties in hospitals and the appointment 
of new consultants’.19  
 In the dismantling of the old structures the most fundamental issue to Childers 
was the abolition of the dispensary system and its replacement by the choice-of-doctor 
scheme. To Childers this was ‘the most important change in the services’.20   He was 
determined that: ‘nothing would stand in the way of achieving what in effect would be 
the final point of departure from 19th century concepts of public medicine’.21 The 
choice of doctor scheme for medical card holders removed the social discrimination 
which existed under the dispensary system.  
Having successfully negotiated the structure of the health system for the 
following thirty odd years, Childers continued his desire for efficiency in the 
department of health. Throughout his political career Childers constantly sought 
efficiency in all portfolios he held. He endorsed the acute surgical hospital services in 
large well-equipped hospitals and set up a special unit in the Department of Health to 
improve hospital efficiency. Childers recognised the need for a complete overhaul of 
hospital administration in order to reduce cost and to increase productivity of all 
medical staff. While determined to implement changes and new procedures Childers 
knew that he had to convince the existing organisations of the need for change and he 
would include them in the decision-making process by requesting their input and 
advice. This inclusive approach was shown by Childers in his dealings with An Bord 
Altranais in relation to improved efficiency in the nursing area. His hospital efficiency 
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unit would include work study in relation to nurse-patient ratios and would lead to a 
more efficient method of operation for nurses and a happier working environment.22  
Addressing the NHC he outlined the proposed new administration of the 
health services. The NHC had themselves given much thought to the area of health 
administration and Childers emphasised that their contributions helped mould several 
provisions of the new health bill.23 Childers used his experience and people skills in 
conveying the future position of the NHC itself. With the proposed new 
administration of the health services the position of the NHC came under review. He 
conceded that the new health arrangements would not affect the need to have a 
widely-based authoritative advisory body such as the NHC, but in future its 
membership would be drawn from the health boards and other new administrative 
bodies. This was not to say that the NHC would become a consultative body of the 
new health boards but that half its members would come from the health boards. The 
council’s function was to advise the minister on health issues referred to them by the 
minister. Childers suggested that the new membership would provide a good mixture 
of the medical professions and those engaged in practical administration of the health 
services.24 He suggested to the NHC that they might consider whether it would be 
advantageous to them in their discussions if they had more close and direct contact 
with his department. He wondered if it would be of help to the NHC if senior officers 
of his department were to attend their meetings. Childers suggested that senior 
officers who had specialist knowledge of a particular subject share their expertise with 
the NHC. These officers would not be attending as members of the NHC and it would 
be for the NHC, and not Childers, to decide if the suggestion would be accepted, ‘he 
was throwing it out for their consideration’.25 The NHC accepted Childers’s 
suggestions and testimony to the cooperation between the department of health and 
the NHC is found in the 1972 annual report of the NHC. They concluded their report 
by expressing their sincere appreciation to ‘the many Departmental officials who 
                                                          
22
 Childers speech to An Bord Altranais, 25 Mar. 1970 (N.A.I., GIS-Ministers’ Speeches 1969-70, MS 
GIS 1/68). 
23
 Childers speech to the National Health Council, 7 Nov. 1969 (N.A.I., GIS-Ministers’ Speeches 1969-
70, MS GIS 1/68).  
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
  
  
162 
contributed so much to the Council’s discussions during the past two years’.26 The 
approach adopted by Childers was typical of his negotiating stance during this period. 
Gone were the days when he was singled minded in his approach and not prepared to 
compromise or negotiate his position. He had learned from his previous experiences 
and now skilfully led the medical organisations through a very delicate process.  
Childers’s philosophy on health can be summarised in his assertion that ‘we 
have an obligation to ensure the health services should be of the best standard 
attainable and should be readily available to those whose needs are greatest’.27 To 
deliver health services Childers recognised the vital role of the nursing profession. He 
was eager that those nurses who had a particular understanding of the problems of 
children work in this area of the health service. Childers called for a greater emphasis 
on the value to the community of the public health nurse. He became more involved 
with nursing developments and supported An Bord Altranais in every way open to 
him to achieve their aims and goals. He saw it as vital to have sufficient numbers of 
highly qualified nurses and to have post-graduate nursing training to meet future 
demands of the health services. To provide training in a wide range of nursing skills 
Childers recommended the amalgamation of training schools thus providing training 
schools of at least three hundred beds. The Fitzgerald Report also recommended the 
establishment of hospitals of not less than three hundred beds in order to provide 
student nurses with the range of skills and techniques required.28    
While the introduction of new systems and a continued drive for efficiency 
were important ingredients of the new health structures, it was the care of people that 
was of paramount importance to Childers. Three areas of interest are considered to 
demonstrate Childers contribution to health development during his reign as minister.  
One of Childers’s areas of special interest was the development of child care 
services and he instigated a planned programme of child health care covering the 
years 1970-4. Child care was of interest to Dáil deputies particularly those in the 
medical profession. In December 1969 deputy Browne, Labour, questioned Childers 
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on the eligibility of children for free treatment under the school medical services. 
Deputy Tunney, Fianna Fáil, asked Childers if he was prepared: ‘to extend school 
medical inspections to all children under the age of fourteen’.29 In relation to child 
care, Childers’s priority lay in ‘pre-school service for all children and the existing 
school service in national schools’.30 Addressing the Dáil during his presentation of 
the health department spending estimates for 1970-1 he told deputies that: ‘pre-school 
children will receive at least three or four detailed examinations….school children 
will have more detailed and selective school health examinations’.31 Child welfare 
and school health services had been a feature of the public health system for many 
years. Young children were examined in clinics and the school service generally 
provided three medical examinations for national school children during the term of 
their school life. However, deficiencies were identified within child health services 
and Childers set about remedying the situation. Pre-school examinations were 
confined to urban areas and this limited its impact as it ‘reached slightly less than half 
of the total number of pre-school children’.32 The effectiveness of the school 
examination system was hindered by the fact ‘that the examination of large numbers 
of healthy children was an obstacle to the fuller examination of children needing 
particular care and attention’.33 Childers proposed to introduce his new child care 
service ‘gradually over a period of 4 years’.34 The ever maturing politician within 
Childers realised that his programme needed time and he was aware of the many 
demands on the finance minister. His ultimate objective was to: 
provide a comprehensive medical examination for children at the ages of 6 
months, 12 months and 2 years….comprehensive medical examinations 
for children over 6 years….pre-school developmental paediatric 
examinations in rural areas….as soon as practicable.35 
 
Part of this programme was the introduction of developmental screening for 
babies of six months old. It was not intended for children who were obviously ill and 
being treated by the family doctor. This service was to reassure parents that their 
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children were perfectly healthy or to identify medical problems at the earliest stage. 
The new service was a preventative one and extended to include one and two year old 
children. His aim ‘was a modern child health service stretching from the cradle to the 
teenage stage and laying the foundation for a healthy and well adjusted adult life’.36 
Childers’s plan envisaged an integrated system whereby all relevant records 
concerning the health of a child were brought together.     
At the other end of the health spectrum were the aged and Childers was not 
satisfied with their care. He believed that a social service community care programme 
was ‘the most important single programme of health policy yet to be developed over 
the whole country’.37 This was not to say that essential and effective institutional 
services were not required. Replying to deputy Browne’s suggestion that the ‘concept 
of the county home should be abandoned’, Childers agreed that the traditional concept 
of indiscriminate admissions and general poor standards of accommodation should be 
abandoned.38 However, this did not mean that ‘homes in which satisfactory standards 
of accommodation and facilities for the proper care of patients have been 
provided….need to be abandoned’.39 This was a reasonable position for Childers to 
adopt, but he emphasised that the primary aim of services for the aged would be ‘to 
assist persons to continue to live in the community for as long as possible with the aid 
of supportive services’.40 The new health boards would give high priority to 
developing services for the aged. Childers believed that community care was more 
beneficial than institutional care. His personal conviction was that: ‘voluntary home 
help service, which is in essence merely an extension of normal good neighbourly 
relations, is far more desirable than the recruitment of home help staff by the Health 
Board’.41 Childers urged health authorities to encourage voluntary bodies to accept 
‘greater responsibility for the care of the aged in the community’.42 Throughout his 
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political career Childers championed the cause of self-sufficiency and the need for 
communities to take ownership of local projects. He included provision in legislation 
for the provision of a comprehensive home help service for the aged in their homes. 
This service envisaged a local woman carrying out household duties which would 
enable the aged person to continue living at home and away from institutions. There 
were many issues in relation to county homes that Childers could not provide 
satisfactory answers to. Deputy Browne pressed Childers hard on accommodation 
facilities in county homes for married couples and, where it arose, their children. 
Childers response was that county homes were ‘designed on the basis of segregated 
accommodation…accommodation for married couples was not provided’.43 This 
practice was, according to deputy Browne ‘scandalous….forcibly divorcing married 
aged couples’.44 Childers’s response was that progress was being made at a pace 
which the economy could afford. In reply to Childers deputy Coogan, Fine Gael, 
stated: ‘those whom God has joined, let no man put asunder’.45  
 The county homes issue was just one of the many problems faced by Childers 
in relation to the care of the aged. He continued to show his political maturity and 
understanding of the demands placed upon a limited source of funding. In relation to 
the care of the aged Childers told deputies that: ‘our resources are not unlimited and 
that even among priority projects, the competition for a share of funds available is 
intense...we have to be flexible….however….to aim for the ideal’.46 Childers was still 
an idealist but had learned from his previous experiences. 
The area of mental illness occupied a considerable part of Childers’s time as 
health minister. His targets included a reduction in the number of long-stay patients 
and ‘that patients admitted to our psychiatric hospitals receive intensive care so that 
they may be returned to the community as quickly as possible’.47 While appreciating 
that great improvements had taken place and that district mental hospitals had greatly 
‘changed from places of custody to places of treatment’, much more needed to be 
done.48 Additional medical staff needed to be recruited and properly utilised. To 
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advance a proper psychiatric service additional nursing staff were required. On the 
physical environment in which many patients were maintained, Childers was shocked 
and questioned why standards were accepted ‘which would not be tolerated anywhere 
else’.49 He was concerned with the number of patients in psychiatric hospitals, as 
numbers were exceptionally high by international standards. The percentage of 
voluntary admissions to psychiatric hospitals was, according to Diarmaid Ferriter, 
low, with the World Health Organisation highlighting in 1963 Ireland’s extraordinary 
mental health statistics.50 
In creating the health and regional boards Childers endorsed the use of bigger 
hospitals with a wide range of facilities and expertise. The Fitzgerald Report had 
recommended larger hospitals ‘on the grounds of safety, medical and nursing training 
and economics’.51 Not so in relation to mental health facilities. He did not support the 
expansion of the mental institutions and reduced the capital financing for such 
projects. The report of an inquiry into mental illness published in 1966 recommended 
that large psychiatric hospitals gradually be replaced with psychiatric units attached to 
general hospitals.52 Childers instructed his department to divert the main capital 
expenditure to ‘short-stay psychiatric units in general hospitals or to out-patient 
clinics’.53 He advised that all current expenditure be allocated to community services 
and ‘the quick development of psychiatric social worker service. A new effort to be 
made to attract psychiatric social workers’.54 Mental health was to receive additional 
aid for lectures ‘to the public on young age group mental illness’.55 Awareness, 
prevention and again, community involvement, underpinned Childers’s approach to 
mental health. In common with all areas of health, the issues in relation to mental 
illness would be tackled, according to Childers, in a ‘steady programme of 
improvement over a period’.56   
                                                          
49
 Childers speech to a conference of managers and chief psychiatrists in St. Brendan’s Hospital, 
Dublin, 27 May 1970 (N.A.I., GIS-Ministers’ Speeches May 1970-May 1971, MS GIS 1/69).  
50
 Diarmaid Ferriter, The transformation of Ireland 1900-2000 (London, 2005), p.592. 
51
 Patricia Brown and Geoffrey Chadwick, ‘Management and the health professional’ in Joseph Robins 
(ed.), Reflections on health (Dublin, 1997), p.195. 
52
 Padraig O’Morain, The health of a nation, the Irish healthcare system 1957-2007 (Dublin, 2007), 
p.9. 
53
 Childers memo. to his dept., 7 Jan. 1972 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9947/19). 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Dáil Éireann debates, vol.246, 5 May 1970.  
  
  
167 
While in the department of lands Childers frequently commented on issues 
relating to agriculture. This was not always greeted with applause by his fellow 
ministers but it showed that he was thinking outside the boundaries of his own 
department and the possible effects each department had on the other. When he came 
across unsatisfactory procedures or events he highlighted these in order to make 
improvements. Childers viewed health not only in terms of structures and procedures 
within his department but also on conditions and issues outside the immediate ambit 
of his department which affected health. The issues he put forward for consideration 
included the effects of urban life compared to that of rural living. The anonymity of 
life in urban areas due to the migration to new housing areas and the reduction of 
social and moral controls by the clergy as compared with rural areas contributed to 
‘the evils of metropolis life’.57 Mental and physical illness could be reduced in 
incidence by the development of community associations ‘devoted to the 
encouragement of adult education, cultural activity, hobbies, etc.’.58 Childers was also 
concerned with the young age at which people were admitted to mental hospitals and 
suggested that this must be associated in part with difficulties at home and the failure 
‘of society to help those who are bad communicators. The unsure people’.59 He 
emphasised the lack of community associations to deal with the problem of ‘nothing 
to do in the evenings’.60 He advocated the necessity to develop community centres on 
an equal level with housing developments.   
Bad housing and under-privileged conditions contributed towards stress and 
associated problems. Childers suggested that a very big question arose in the area of 
marriage guidance counselling. In a very direct comment he said that: ‘I am 
absolutely convinced that many marriages break down and mental stress occurs 
because of the inability of a wife to look after her house and because she has never 
been taught to cook properly for the modern age. Domestic science for both girls and, 
possibly, boys enters into the picture’.61 To put Childers’s views into context, it is 
worth remembering that 1970 was the year that Ireland’s Catholic bishops agreed to 
                                                          
57
 Childers memo. to his dept., 4 Feb. 1970 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9947/5). 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid. 
  
  
168 
lift the church ban which prevented its members from attending Trinity College, 
Dublin. The beginning of the 1970s saw Ireland: 
 Well and truly caught up in the stepped-up tempo of social change….a 
will to challenge what was called ‘the establishment’.…student sit-ins, 
contraceptive trains….campaigns for.…equal pay, contraception and 
divorce. The women’s liberation movement began to be a formidable 
presence in Irish life, not so much in its particular organisational forms 
and activities, but more in the whole atmosphere of questioning traditional 
sex roles that gave rise to it.62 
 
Was Childers out of touch with developments in the 1970s or was he attributing blame 
to the social changes that were contributing, in his opinion, to problems such as 
marriage break downs and mental health issues? New conditions in the 1970s 
presented, according to Childers, new challenges. Growing affluence, a belief that 
wealth brings solutions to personal and moral problems and the introduction of the 
forty hour week thus creating leisure stress problems contributed to the new 
challenges. This era also experienced mass communication of violence and unrest 
from the whole world and the ‘clamour of anti-establishment protest’.63 Childers’s 
solution was to develop ‘health education on a far greater scale’.64 He concluded his 
memorandum by seeking his officials’ advice and by emphasising that he ‘was not 
going to leave this problem unexamined’.65  
Childers considered the statistics on the death rate per one hundred as the 
‘most valid evidence of health service efficiency’ and life expectancy statistics as the 
‘most valid of all’.66 To Childers ‘health must be viewed in context of all aspects of 
living’.67   His desire to identify the range of problems that affected health but were 
outside the control of his department demonstrated his understanding of public health. 
Having learned from previous experiences that his ideal solution may not be 
politically possible he stated that: ‘if we cannot invade the fields covered by other 
departments, we can at least encourage community associations’.68   
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Childers demonstrated an understanding of health issues in the broadest sense. 
However, he was accused of ignoring the health issues in relation to smoking. In the 
Dáil Childers was questioned on the possibility of introducing legislation to ensure the 
discontinuance of cigarette advertising on television and in the press. The RTE 
deadline for ceasing cigarette advertising was 1 April 1971 but Childers did not feel 
‘justified in seeking to compel the discontinuance of press advertising’.69 He was 
going to avoid compulsion and rely on cigarette manufacturers to comply ‘with a code 
of standards for advertising which limits considerably the effectiveness of such 
advertising’.70 When pressed on the dangers of smoking and the increase in the 
number of people dying from lung cancer Childers argued the point of voluntary 
restraint, having regard to the fact ‘that the incidence of lung cancer depends to a 
considerable degree on the number of cigarettes consumed over a given period’.71 The 
number of deaths from cancer of the bronchus, trachea and lung in 1966 was 777.72 
By 1968 the number had increased to 908.73 In light of this trend and other medical 
conditions arising from cigarette smoking Childers was urged to reconsider his 
attitude. His reply to the Dáil was that:  
this matter will always be kept under review but as in connection with the 
fatalities and deaths that occur from a number of other causes an element 
of voluntary restraint must come into the picture.74  
 
The response to this statement from deputy Noel Browne, now of Labour, was 
‘Rubbish’.75 His position on cigarette advertising conflicted with opposition opinion 
and the medical statistics during these years. Statistics for 1970 for the corresponding 
illness showed total deaths of 957 and this figure increased to 1004 in 1971.76 When 
pressed by deputy Browne if he intended to stop all cigarette advertising Childers 
replied: ‘On the question of banning advertising of cigarettes entirely, I must say that I 
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am disinclined to use any element of compulsion whatsoever’.77 Childers preached 
personal and community responsibility, people helping themselves and their 
communities. During his term in the department of lands Childers stated that people 
were too dependent on their public representatives. His initial position on smoking 
was in keeping with this view. While he led campaigns directed at young people in 
relation to the hazards of smoking, he was not a pioneer in the drive to abolish 
cigarette advertising from the media in general. 
The introduction of any new system brings its own problems and challenges 
and Childers’s new health structure was no different. During 1969 the then finance 
minister, Charles Haughey, urged his fellow ministers, including Childers, to look for 
areas where expenditure could be reduced or deferred. Health costs were increasing 
and in September 1970 the then Minister for Finance George Colley reminded 
Childers of his department’s proposed scheme to introduce a health contribution 
scheme for the middle income group. The NHC also accepted that it was reasonable to 
expect those who could contribute towards the cost of health care to do so. By 
September 1970 the cost of health services were continuing to rise ‘without reckoning 
the cost of new services such as choice of doctor and supply of drugs through 
pharmacies’.78 Replying to a question from deputy Cooney, Fine Gael, in the Dáil 
concerning the cost of general practitioner services in the Midland Health Board, 
Childers stated that ‘while it has been possible to make estimates of the cost of the 
new scheme on a broad national basis it would….be difficult….to estimate the cost 
implications in a particular part of the country’.79  By 1973 there were concerns in 
government regarding abuses within the choice-of-doctor scheme with an Taoiseach, 
Jack Lynch, urging Childers that action was required to avoid the situation getting out 
of control. The expenditure on medicines provided under the general medical services 
revealed a continuing upward trend during the period 1966-7 to 1970-1. The cost of 
the service was £1,281,200 in 1966-7 and this had risen each year until it reached 
£3,056,100 for the year 1970-1.80 Medical services were increasing in cost and 
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Childers set about restoring confidence within government on the expenditure within 
the general medical services. On 10 January 1973 Childers prepared a memorandum 
for government on the choice-of-doctor scheme. In it he gave some historical 
information detailing events up to the introduction of the scheme including how 
doctors were to be compensated for using the new scheme. During an address to the 
Irish Medical Association in July 1966, an officer of the department of health stated: 
I am not suggesting that doctors are more likely than others to take 
advantage of circumstances where their earnings can be varied more or 
less at their will but doctors, not much less than other mortals, are 
bedevilled with the effects of original sin.81 
 
Within the memorandum Childers prepared a table showing the estimated earnings of 
doctors from the scheme. While the vast majority were expected to earn less than 
6,000 pounds some doctors’ earnings were expected to be in the range of 12,000 to 
15,000 pounds. Childers concluded that if a doctor was full time dedicated to the 
service then: ‘a gross income ranging up to about £10,000 in a year might, in the 
Minister’s view, be quite reasonable and not out of accord with earnings from fees 
from public funds by some other professions’.82 Doctors with relatively small incomes 
could also be abusing the system as they ‘may be claiming excessive amounts in 
relation to the numbers on their lists’.83 Childers detailed the investigation procedures 
where abuse was suspected and suggested that ‘for most of the doctors participating in 
the scheme, there does not seem to be evidence of abuse’.84 Where the number of 
visits by patients to their doctors was high Childers proposed, in co-operation with the 
medical profession, to launch a publicity campaign to educate the public on the use of 
the service. Childers also urged programmes of education for participating doctors in 
the scheme in relation to visiting and prescribing patterns. As a long-term project 
there would be constant monitoring of the system ‘with a view to making 
improvements’.85 In considering the scheme one essential factor that had to be kept in 
mind was, according to Childers, ‘the cost of keeping and treating a patient in 
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hospital’.86 In many cases this was ‘exceeding £10 a day….more than a general 
practitioner, even with a high visiting rate, would receive for the average patient in a 
year.87 Childers argued that the expenditure on the choice-of-doctor scheme had 
reduced the numbers going to hospital for in-patient and out-patient care. The new 
scheme gave the doctor the incentive to keep patients at home, the old dispensary 
system encouraged hospitalisation. Apart altogether from the positive financial 
benefits of the new system it also went some way towards Childers’s aim of keeping 
people away from institutions and treating them in their own communities. Local and 
community care was paramount in Childers’s health policies. However, the benefits 
derived from the new system did not in any way justify abuses and Childers was 
‘determined….to eliminate abuses as far as possible’.88  
While his direct priorities and responsibilities lay in the health portfolio, 
Childers’s position as Tánaiste exposed him to issues he would not otherwise have 
encountered. In October 1969 Lynch wrote to Childers for his views on a department 
of defence review of Ireland’s emergency preparations and the effect of a war on 
Ireland. Lynch requested Childers’s ‘observations on the subject prior to any 
necessary submission to the government’.89 In his reply, Childers stated that ‘I do not 
believe we can be neutral, even if we believed in a neutrality policy’.90 In the event of 
a world war involving Britain, Ireland could not remain neutral because of partition. 
De Valera had used the partition issue as one of his arguments for remaining neutral 
during the Second World War. He also suggested that measures to counter nuclear 
bombing or fall-out were beyond Ireland’s capacities and that the army ‘in my view, 
can only be used for internal security’.91  
 The early 1970s was a testing time for Lynch and his government on many 
fronts and he could count on the absolute support of Childers. Ireland’s negotiations 
for entry into the European Economic Community, the situation in Northern Ireland 
and the arms crisis, led to ‘grave responsibilities placed upon the government’ during 
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this period.92 This was, stated Childers, a time for unity within Fianna Fáil on all 
major issues. The government required support in relation to ‘national security and the 
maintenance of law and order’.93 Childers pleaded the case for the ‘absolute and 
imperative need to support the Taoiseach and in so doing to accept government policy 
in regard to reunification and the general policy regarding the present Northern 
situation’.94 Childers appeared on Ulster Television along with the then Northern 
Ireland Minister of Development, Mr Faulkner, and discussed the setting up of a 
North-South study group. He called for a peaceful settlement ‘of the old historical 
quarrel, a peaceful coming together and greater understanding’.95 Childers could 
never contemplate violence as a solution to any problem. In relation to Northern 
Ireland he suggested that the religious hatred ‘had been fermented for political 
reasons’.96 He remembered that his father shook hands with the firing squad shortly 
before his execution and spoke to him of ‘this horror of the war of brothers’.97 
Childers never forgot those words and he realised that the strife in Northern Ireland 
was ‘a thousand times more deadly than the events of 1922 in the South’.98 
 The fact that Childers was a Protestant may lead one to speculate that he had a 
part to play in discussions between the British and Irish governments in the 1970s and 
earlier. However there is no evidence in the archives to suggest that Childers had any 
part to play in events in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s. His background, 
ability to communicate and his desire for reconciliation would suggest that he would 
have been actively involved in discussions between the two governments. T.K. 
Whitaker recalled that Childers: 
Englishness and Protestantism would have given him access to moderate 
Unionists, while, possibly, raising suspicions amongst more extreme 
elements on both sides! He was not, to my knowledge, given any specific 
responsibility in the NI context.99 
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Whitaker’s suggestion of suspicions of Childers by some was echoed by Michael 
Cunningham.100 Cunningham argued that Childers message over the years 1969-73 
was always the same: 
Protestants were good and Republicans were bad. He appeared to hate 
things Irish and republican. On one occasion a man who later became a 
Cabinet Minister in Dublin said of Childers: ‘He knows no Irish but speaks 
fluent French and English like a native’.101 
 
Furthermore, Childers appointment as Tánaiste in 1969 was significant, according to 
Cunningham, because he had ‘close ties with the British, being married to a former 
member of the British Embassy staff’.102  According to Cunningham, Childers showed 
his true colours following bloody Sunday when he spoke of the murders in Derry and 
commented: ‘”I regret the OVERKILL of Catholics’”.103 The historical record 
demonstrates that Cunningham’s portrayal of Childers is not accurate. It is true that 
Childers never had any time for extreme republicanism and that he steadfastly held the 
view that violence was never justified in resolving differences. It is also true that 
despite pressure from his mother, Childers refused to learn Irish. He would not, stated 
Young, pretend to be something he was not. Childers had every reason to hate things 
Irish, given what happened to his father but the fact of the matter is that he dedicated 
his working life to the Irish state. Cunningham’s views are worth mentioning as they 
demonstrate the suspicions that some harboured towards Childers to which T.K. 
Whitaker referred.  
Was Childers really so utterly insensitive and undiplomatic? On bloody 
Sunday, 30 January 1972 paratroopers killed thirteen men following a march in Derry, 
a fourteenth victim died later.104 During the Dáil debate on 4 February 1972 on the 
Northern Ireland situation, Childers commented on the ‘appalling events which took 
place in Derry, the murder of thirteen Derry men’.105 He praised the civil rights 
movement for its ability to mount ‘massive protest against discrimination and against 
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deprivation of fifty years….to highlight the abuses of power on the part of the 
Northern government….to do this without any intent to physical violence and without 
espousing the cause of those who sought gun violence was remarkable’.106 The civil 
rights movement had, according to Childers, resisted sectarian action and had 
‘condemned the bombing of Unionist premises in the same way as they have 
condemned the acts of the British Army in their overkill attitude and in their 
brutality’.107 Childers commended the civil rights movement for its resistance to 
violence, sometimes at moments of anxiety and pressure largely ‘as a result of the 
tactics of the British Army and the British government’.108 The British government 
stated Childers had been, ‘indulging in self-deception’.109 Civil rights had to be 
implemented in a way that would end ‘the complete domination of one group in the 
community by the local majority in the community’.110 Then in 1970-1 the IRA began 
to enter the scene and they were not, according to Childers, approved by the civil 
rights movement, or by Dáil Éireann. The result of the IRA presence led to, stated 
Childers, ‘extreme pressure by the Stormont administration for overkill and over-
reaction by the British troops’.111 The British government could not succeed, 
according to Childers ‘by over-kill and over-reaction….the British army have been 
doing their best in the past year to build up the strength of the IRA’.112 In relation to 
the IRA, Childers stated that ‘they may condemn internment….condemn the over-kill 
attitude of the British army’ but none of them could ‘justify the intervention of the 
IRA’.113 Childers understood the explosive feeling concerning the ‘appalling situation 
in Derry’ but realised that their must be reconciliation. However, this would not 
happen ‘unless Unionists and Catholics start a dialogue and communicate with each 
other’.114 
Childers should not have used the word ‘overkill’ if for no other reason that it 
left him open to the type of misinterpretation indulged by Michael Cunningham. 
Given that it should not have been used, Childers cannot reasonably be accused of 
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‘close and friendly association with the forces of occupation and hatred of those who 
wanted rid of them’.115 The implication by Cunningham that Childers would not have 
regretted some killing of Catholics in Derry can best be answered by reference to 
Childers’s actions during his thirty-five years in public life. 
Childers continued to voice his opinions on the Northern Ireland situation. 
Addressing the Dublin University Business and Economic Society at Trinity College, 
Dublin, on 16 February 1971, Childers stated that the bitterness and ferocity of the 
violence in Northern Ireland would only postpone reunification. Violence only made 
the understanding between the two communities more difficult to bring about. He 
suggested that all sides in the conflict should, as civilised peoples, demonstrate the 
capacity to settle disagreements by peaceful means. Childers urged neither side to 
claim victory as this would never achieve the best result, there was ‘room for all Irish 
traditions in a united Ireland and an opportunity of creating the kind of society we 
could all be proud of’.116   
On 6 May 1970 the arms crisis became public when Taoiseach Jack Lynch 
dismissed two Fianna Fáil ministers, Neil Blaney and Charles Haughey for allegedly 
using government funds to import arms for the Irish Republican Army. This 
involvement in arms was an expression of concern within the more republican 
personnel of Fianna Fáil over the development of the conflict in Northern Ireland. It is 
important to give a brief account of the impact the Northern Ireland civil rights 
movement had on the politics of the entire country. By August 1969 the situation had 
become, according to Justin O’Brien, ‘uncontrollable….the conditions had been 
created for an Irish Government to have a profound influence….provided an 
opportunity to complete the unfinished business of the Irish revolution’.117 Following 
serious sectarian violence in Derry in August 1969, Jack Lynch made a television 
broadcast and stated that the government could not stand by and see people injured or 
even worse. However, as stated by O’Brien, ‘it was one thing to be the moral 
guardians of the nation’s ideology, quite another to take on the British army’.118 
Ensuing events led to the prosecution of Charles Haughey, among others. On 23 
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October 1970 Haughey was acquitted along with others and he ‘demanded the 
resignation of the Taoiseach’.119 The arms trial was ultimately, according to O’Brien, 
not centred on the legitimacy or otherwise of providing arms for Northern nationalists 
but rather on a ‘power play for the soul of Fianna Fáil’.120  
The Taoiseach now required the backing of the Fianna Fáil party and Childers 
as Tánaiste. Childers’s revulsion of violence naturally led him to oppose those who 
would attempt to illegally import arms for use in the conflict in Northern Ireland and 
thereby incite ‘civil war and nothing else’.121 This was a situation that demanded a 
cool head and a sense of calm. Childers’s exposure to events and circumstances 
experienced before his return to Ireland in 1931 helped to mould his personality and 
personal attributes. His education and independent lifestyle from an early age meant 
that Childers was not attracted to the many political groups and factions within Dáil 
Éireann. He was well positioned to defend his party leader and made no small 
contribution to the survival of the government. Childers was, according to former 
Taoiseach and Fine Gael leader, Garret Fitzgerald, ‘of considerable assistance to Jack 
Lynch, particularly during the arms crisis’.122 Childers ably demonstrated the qualities 
that the situation demanded. His reputation was that of a capable administrator and 
efficient minister rather than that of a leader. A special edition of the current affairs 
programme Seven Days was broadcast by RTE in May 1970 to discuss the departure 
of the ministers. Childers appeared on the programme and his handling of probing 
direct questions led to a sense of calm. He reassured people that everything was under 
control and that the government was working normally. The Irish Independent 
reported his television appearance as follows: 
Mr. Erskine Childers was a steadying influence at a time when rumour 
was rife and hard information was as scarce as ice cream in hell. In a 
statesmanlike performance he managed to preserve the coolness of a 
master mariner who knows every trick of the weather. Strange that with 
his unflappable manner and fluent speech he has not been seen more 
frequently as a spokesman for his party on T.V. 123  
 
                                                          
119
 Justin O’Brien, The arms trial (Dublin, 2000), p.x. 
120
 Ibid., p.x. 
121
 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 258, 4 Feb. 1972.    
122
 Garret Fitzgerald interview with the author,  20 Dec. 2007. 
123
 Irish Independent report on Childers television performance, 13 May 1970 (T.C.D., Childers papers, 
MS 9977/635). 
  
  
178 
During his career in politics Childers worked hard to understand and contribute 
positively to the many portfolios he held. He worked diligently and sought to apply his 
administrative abilities to his department. However, Childers never sought the 
limelight or the public glory for the work he undertook. Now forced into a very 
difficult situation he responded with the maturity and leadership qualities of a party 
leader. He had finally arrived on the Irish political scene some thirty odd years after 
entering public political life. 
Eager to preserve the unity of the party, Childers made his position quiet clear 
on the importation of arms into Northern Ireland: 
Nobody in the Fianna Fáil Party who wishes to remain a member of the 
Fianna Fáil Party can directly or indirectly, privately or publicly or 
otherwise, engage in the importation of arms into the North, go into the 
North and inspire activity or the use of arms by any of the groups there. 
Anybody in Fianna Fáil who does that can no longer remain a member of 
Fianna Fáil.124 
 
Replying to a motion of confidence in the government on 14 May 1970, Childers 
reminded deputies of the history of Fianna Fáil and their competence in dealing with 
difficult situations for many years. He stressed the spirit of unity in Fianna Fáil and 
drew deputies’ attention to the fact that Fianna Fáil dealt successfully with illegal 
armed organisations during the Second World War and during the period 1956-62. 
Childers emphasised the stability of Fianna Fáil government since 1932 while 
admitting the shock of recent events. However, in reply to deputy Cruise O’Brien, 
Labour, Childers denied any suggestion of defections or a collapse in Fianna Fáil and 
stated that ‘deputy O’Brien is going to be grievously disappointed’.125 Childers 
dismissed the idea of an alternative coalition government. There was, stated Childers, 
no agreement in place between Fine Gael and Labour and that coalition government 
would not be ‘advisable for this country.…at this time with all the difficulties that are 
faced in the north and….the prospect of our negotiating to join the European 
Economic Community’.126  
 Childers broadened the debate and urged deputies to realise that people north 
and south have to live together. He emphasised that whether people in the north were 
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Unionists or Nationalists ‘they are not English’.127 While recognising that all political 
parties failed to consider a long-term policy on relations with Unionists, he referred to 
the co-operation he achieved with the tourist authorities in the north when he was 
minister. Childers called for the voices of the moderate people in the north to be heard. 
He wished that they spoke more openly and they would be encouraged to do so ‘if we 
all agree in this House that armed intervention on our part can only result in these 
voices becoming more silent, more afraid, more suspicious’.128  
 Rallying Fianna Fáil TDs, Childers stated that he knew ‘of no political party 
among the 20 most civilised democracies where there has been so much remarkable 
unity as there has been within the Fianna Fáil Party’.129 There were occasions of 
differing opinions on issues by members but Childers stressed that the main point 
about Fianna Fáil ‘is that we remain together and those members….who feel that some 
particular aspect of policy is not entirely in accordance with their wishes, accept the 
majority decision and honour it’.130  
 Childers was always a Lynch supporter and both Blaney and Haughey had 
leadership ambitions. He was inoffensive, decent and honest and now found himself 
‘the no. 1 Hate Figure of the Blaney camp followers’.131 This may well have started 
with Garret Fitzgerald’s double edged compliment to Childers during the Dáil debate 
on 9 May 1970: 
I want at this point to refer to one man sitting on the opposite benches-the 
Tánaiste. Neil Blaney’s father was sentenced to death, but Erskine 
Childers father was executed in the most tragic circumstances. Never by 
word or deed has this man shown the slightest resentment of those who 
sent his father to his death. If Neil Blaney were such a man as Erskine 
Childers, there would be no danger to the peace of this country.132 
 
 Whether Garret Fitzgerald’s comments did or did not contribute to Childers’s 
difficulties within Fianna Fáil is not important. Childers’s own comments and the 
stance he adopted clearly defined his position. The arms crisis represented ‘the greatest 
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threat to the stability of the state in a generation and arguably since its foundation’, 
and Childers played a significant role in the survival of Jack Lynch’s government.133  
Seán Sherwin, current national organiser of Fianna Fáil recalled, during an 
interview with the author, one particular incident during the arms crisis. Sherwin 
represented the constituency of Dublin Southwest at that time and recounted the 
occasion when he and other Fianna Fáil deputies were in the parliamentary rooms of 
Dáil Éireann. Childers entered the room and declared that ‘those accused [Blaney and 
Haughey] were guilty and the evidence is there to prove it’.134 Childers statement was 
made prior to any trial and according to Sherwin was ‘injudicious in the extreme’.135 
Sherwin was not sure whether Childers took it upon himself to convey such a message 
or was acting on the Taoiseach’s instructions.    
It is ironic that upheaval within Fianna Fáil led to the defining moment in 
Childers’s political career. Childers continued to speak out in the cause of peace. His 
television appearances outnumbered those of the Taoiseach and his prominence was 
acknowledged when Newsweek magazine named him Minister of the Year in 1970.136 
In the first quarter of 1972 Childers was the leading Fianna Fáil speaker in the Dáil. 
According to Childers daughter, Nessa Childers, the Taoiseach ‘owed much to the 
loyalty and support he received’ from her father.137 However, Childers was ‘frustrated 
at Lynch’s decision to re-instate Charles Haughey within Fianna Fáil’.138 He 
completely rejected Haughey after his re-instatement.  
Childers’s opinions of Haughey were formulated long before the arms crisis, 
as far back as the 1950s. During an interview with the author, Garret Fitzgerald 
recalled a conversation with Childers’s wife, Rita, during the 1950s which highlights 
Childers’s awareness of the political corruption that was to emerge in the following 
decades. While out to dinner on one occasion, Childers remarked to Rita that those 
men dining there with Charles Haughey ‘would be corrupted’.139 Childers’s rejection 
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of Haughey continued into his presidential campaign when according to Garret 
Fitzgerald, Childers refused to enter Dublin north during the campaign ‘lest he have to 
meet Haughey’.140 
The Irish electorate voted in favour of European Economic Community 
membership in May 1972 and there was speculation that Childers might be Ireland’s 
first Commissioner in Brussels. Childers was, according to Young, approached by 
European officials to this end. However Jack Lynch was not willing, stated Young, ‘to 
lose his right-hand man’.141 Dr Patrick Hillery was appointed Commissioner in 
September 1972.142 Childers missed the chance of going to Brussels as Irish 
Commissioner and being eleven years older than Jack Lynch he would not become 
Taoiseach. De Valera was due to retire as President in 1973 and although Childers 
name was mentioned as a possible candidate, the same applied to several others. 
Childers enjoyed the health portfolio and was not anxious to allow his name to go 
forward for the presidency.  
On 5 February 1973 the Nineteenth Dáil was dissolved and a general election 
date of 28 February announced. Childers prepared to contest his Monaghan seat for 
the fourth time and was elected on the first count, his first and only time in his long 
political career. However, the result nationally brought about the first change of 
government in Ireland for sixteen years and Childers was out of a job overnight. How 
ironic and utterly cruel this was for Childers. Having found his true vocation in 
politics and in complete control of his portfolio, Childers was now in opposition. His 
performance in health and his contribution during the arms crisis to party and country 
had been rewarded by the electorate. Fianna Fáil won sixty-nine Dáil seats in the 1973 
general election, a reduction of six seats on the 1969 result.143 Fine Gael and Labour 
entered into an electoral pact and contested the election as an alternative coalition 
government. Before leaving the Department of Health, Childers prepared a letter and 
memoranda on the workings of the department for the incoming minister. The new 
Minister for Health was Brendan Corish and he responded to Childers as follows: 
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It is only now that I have had an opportunity of reading your letter of 14th 
instant and associated memoranda on the work of the department. It was 
most kind of you to go to the trouble of compiling these informative notes 
and I am sure that they will be of assistance to me over the coming few 
weeks. 144 
 
Childers was appointed opposition spokesman for health. In a letter to the incoming 
minister, once again demonstrating that he was a man of principles first and foremost, 
he stated that ‘if I am made shadow Minister for Health my criticism will be always 
constructive’.145  
Childers had gained his first senior portfolio when he was appointed Minister 
for Health in July 1969.  He was determined to make a positive contribution to the 
health of the nation and changed the fundamental structures on which the health 
system had been built. In doing so he used all his negotiating and administrative 
abilities to successfully navigate the passing of the health bill through the Oireachtas 
and successfully concluded the numerous negotiations with the medical professions 
and other relevant parties. Testimony to his efforts is provided by Patricia Brown who 
has stated that the 1970s was ‘an era of partnership between the Department of 
Health, the medical profession and the voluntary hospitals’.146 Jerry O’Dwyer has 
suggested that the 1970 Health Act will be remembered primarily for ‘the introduction 
of the choice of doctor scheme and the establishment of the health boards’.147 Further 
affirmation of Childers achievements during this period is provided by Padraig 
O’Morain who contends that the 1970 Health Act ‘demonstrated a virtual alliance of 
interest between the doctors, the Minister for Health and the Department’.148 Childers 
recalled that during his term in health he had learned ‘more about human nature in a 
year than I could learn in twenty years in any other occupation’.149   
During his political career Childers made many speeches on economic issues 
and was always convincing in supporting government policy. Childers wanted to be a 
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doctor and his first choice of study at university was medicine. However, he 
subsequently changed to history to gain a better understanding of the issues within 
Ireland and between Ireland and England. As health minister, Childers was in charge 
of a social portfolio and this is where his true vocation and abilities lay. He was a 
calming influence in government during the crisis of the early 1970s and showed that 
he was more than an efficient administrator. His work had a considerable impact on 
the development of a modern national health service in Ireland. According to Martin 
Mansergh ‘the development of the health service under….Erskine Childers should be 
mentioned as among Fianna Fáil’s achievements’.150 The changes to the health system 
under Childers’s term were significant and the structures he put in place during the 
early 1970s survived until recent years. The general recognition of his achievements 
in health is testimony in itself. The period of 1969-73 represented the culmination of 
experience and dedication amassed by Childers during his political career.   
Childers longed to return to the department of health but it was not to be. He 
had an important decision to make, remain in opposition or leave politics and contest 
the presidential election. How would Childers, with his appetite for work and his 
constant striving to enhance the portfolio assigned to him, make the transition to 
President of Ireland? Still full of energy and wanting the daily complexities of the 
Department of Health, the role of president, with its controls and limited sphere of 
activity was a role that came too soon for Childers.  
Before the result of the 1973 general election Childers published a statement 
disclaiming any intention to accept an invitation to contest the presidential election. 
He longed to continue as Minister for Health ‘to ensure that new policies were 
progressed….and above all to the development of community services’.151 However, 
he accepted the Fianna Fáil invitation to stand for the presidential office and spent 
many days considering the role and position of the president. Outside of the clearly 
defined constitutional obligations and duties, Childers viewed the office as 
‘representative of the people and when elected….must act for the whole people’.152 
Throughout his political career Childers emphasised the need for community self-help 
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and taking ownership of local issues. As president he would continue to encourage 
this spirit of community development and involvement.  
The office of President of Ireland was established under the 1937 Constitution 
of Ireland, in operation from 29 December 1937. Articles twelve to fourteen detail the 
powers and duties of the president. The office holder performs important ceremonial 
duties such as the appointment of the Taoiseach nominated by Dáil Éireann and other 
members of the government nominated by the Taoiseach. The president is a non-
executive head of state and does not participate in the day-to-day running of the 
government. The office holder may not be a member of either House of the 
Oireachtas. There are discretionary powers the president may use in specific 
circumstances. Among these is the power to refer a bill passed by the Oireachtas to 
the Supreme Court to verify its constitutionally. The president must however consult 
the Council of State before any such referral but need not be bound by its advice. 
However, the power of the president in relation to the dissolution of the Dáil does not 
require any consultation. The Taoiseach can request the president to dissolve Dáil 
Éireann but: 
The President may in his absolute discretion refuse to dissolve Dáil 
Éireann on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support 
of a majority in Dáil Éireann.153 
 
No president has ever exercised this power. The office of president is generally 
defined and controlled. Travel outside the country during the president’s term of office 
is only allowed with the consent of the government and communications on matters of 
national or public importance must also have the approval of the government.154  
Since the inauguration of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland the role of the 
president had, according to Childers, remained unchanged. He had consented to be a 
candidate on the understanding that if elected: ‘I will be able to expand the dimension 
and character of the Presidency’.155 The three previous holders of the office, Douglas 
Hyde, Séan T. Ó Ceallaigh and Eamon de Valera had their own style of presidency. 
Despite the control exercised by the Irish Constitution the style, not the substance of 
the office, was affected by personality and individual circumstances.  After his diverse 
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political career Childers believed that there should be a leader outside of the political 
field to give guidance ‘and reflect the most responsible aspirations of the people on 
matters where discussion and debate will not create division but encourage 
enlightened examination’.156 The president would not dictate solutions but should 
encourage reasoned discussions of new policies. In shaping the future of the country 
Childers proposed that the president seek the views of organisations and societies 
engaged in constructive policy shaping. The presidency should ‘espouse the cause of 
all voluntary community organisations, including the religious orders and 
organisations’.157 Childers emphasised that the president ‘could not often be a 
personal innovator, but he could reflect the most advanced and most patriotic views of 
those who elected him’.158 Childers’s view of the presidency was unique for his time 
but before he could attempt to stamp his impression on the office he had to win the 
presidential election. 
Childers decided on 5 April 1973 to accept the Fianna Fáil nomination to 
contest the Presidential election on 30 May 1973. His opposition was Mr T.F. 
O’Higgins who was defeated by de Valera in the 1966 election. There was a theory 
amongst political commentators that: ‘only one Fianna Fáil candidate for the 
Presidency could be expected to defeat Mr. Tom O’Higgins-and that was Mr. Lynch 
himself.’159 Lynch had stated that he would not contest the presidential election and 
he believed that Childers would make a very good president. However, according to 
his daughter, Nessa Childers: 
It was expected at the beginning of the campaign that my father would 
lose. Fianna Fáil expected him to lose. The reason being that they didn’t 
really see the possibility of somebody like my father winning the 
campaign.160 
 
 Childers in common with O’Higgins, was ‘in the tradition of dynastic politics which 
have characterised life in this State since 1922’.161 Both candidates experienced the 
turmoil and tragedy of the past but did not carry any bitterness into political life. 
O’Higgins was favourite to win the contest due to the general euphoria of the 
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coalition election success and also because of his remarkable fight against de Valera 
in 1966, and Childers was no de Valera. The air of optimism in the O’Higgins camp 
was expressed by Mrs. Terry O’Higgins when she stated that she was a ‘pessimist by 
nature but….looking forward to the victory celebration….I wouldn’t underestimate 
our opponent….they have agreed that their next move is to the Park’.162 When 
questioned for her views of a potential move to Áras an Uachtaráin Mrs Childers 
replied: ‘I haven’t really thought about it.…I would look forward to it – because I 
trust in my husband’.163 This was a new style of presidential contest both from the 
type of campaigns undertaken by the candidates and the influence and contribution of 
their wives. Childers sense of aloofness was compensated for by the contribution of 
his wife. In his letter to the author, T.K. Whitaker suggested that: ‘his relations with 
the native Irish were greatly eased by his wife Rita’s friendly and buoyant personality. 
I suspect that she was a strong and constant source of guidance and support’.164  
Although Rita’s guidance and opinions were no doubt sought by Childers during his 
political career she did not generally attend political rallies or travel with Childers 
during political campaigns, but that changed during the presidential campaign.  
In keeping with his attention to detail during his political career Childers’s 
campaign tour adopted a similar approach. In what was then a unique feature, the 
presidential campaign party toured the country in a specially prepared coach, while 
the opposition relied on the traditional open top car. Facilities on board the coach 
included a low platform for speeches, a public address system, all the latest equipment 
found in a busy office, a music centre and an area to receive deputations. Actions to 
be undertaken by regional and local directors of elections were planned to coincide 
with Childers’s visit to a particular location. Guidelines and notes were prepared for 
those speaking for Childers. The general approach was that ‘speeches should be aimed 
at bringing out the merits of Erskine Childers rather than attacking his opponent’.165 
The headquarters tour coordinator was Brian Lenihan and the tour outline suggested a 
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start date of 1 May with a press conference at 11.30 and finishing on 29 May at a rally 
in Dublin.166  His whistle-stop tour of the country covered some 3000 miles.  
Demonstrating his desire to be innovative in the office of president, Childers 
stated in the Sunday Press, that ‘the role of the fourth President must surely change 
decisively from that of the first three holders of the office’.167 The president 
represented all people including those who opposed him and ‘he cannot just open new 
institutions….nor can he remain aloof and isolated from the people’.168 The office of 
president was not viewed by Childers as a reward for his political contribution, 
somewhere to retire gracefully while fulfilling the obligations of the office. His would 
be an active presidency, pushing the boundaries yet understanding the constraints of 
the office. Childers’s desire to interact meaningfully with the people was a sentiment 
which Childers would not have expressed or understood in his earlier political career. 
Getting on with the job was the principal aim of Childers and appealing to or 
interacting with people was more of a hindrance than a necessary function of political 
life. However, a more mature Childers emerged, particularly following his term as 
Minister for Health. In the health portfolio he realised that the curing of sickness and 
the care of the aged, while of vital importance, were not the: 
Ultimate priority in establishing health services….I learned that the 
preservation of mental and physical health in our community was the most 
critical task of our time and I proceeded to highlight the necessity for 
establishing community services to advocate the coming together of 
people in a parish or movement.169 
 
Provision of facilities for younger people with the development of civic 
centres and sports facilities would ‘finally create the character of our society in fifteen 
years from now’.170 If elected, Childers would endeavour to provide ‘the right 
Christian social climate for our young people’.171 Conscious of the fact that Fianna 
Fáil were in opposition, Childers made it clear that ‘there is much useful work to be 
done by the President where there is no area of controversy, so that the President 
would never involve himself by confrontation with the government, or the 
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Opposition’.172 Childers considered it appropriate to confront the government on the 
extent to which the president could speak publicly on national issues. Addressing 
Fianna Fáil election workers at a convention in Dublin, Childers stated that ‘he was 
considering a “think tank” so that perhaps short and long term planning could be 
extended in the interests of the younger generation’.173 This special group of advisors 
would be a voice for all organisations engaged in the development of the country’s 
young minds. Childers wanted to help the younger generation and encouraged people 
to think of the future of Ireland in the 1990s.  
The idea of the president surrounding himself with special advisers did not 
command any backing from the coalition parties. The president would get all the 
advice he wanted from the government, but according to Conor Cruise O’Brien he 
was ‘not there to frame national policy, or to behave as if he were framing it’.174 
O’Brien considered Childers concept of the president as ‘a Fianna Fáil government 
exile in the Park’.175 Why, according to O’Brien was Childers ‘so eager for 
confrontations with the government on whose advice he is bound, if elected, to act’.176 
Childers’s concept of the presidency was according to O’Brien ‘quite different from 
anything we have yet known and could lead to very dangerous developments very 
near to the brink of the Constitution’.177 Childers did not plan to act outside the 
parameters of the presidential functions and duties. He did however propose to 
generate debate within communities and organisations who were engaged in the social 
and cultural development of the country. Yes, Childers’s concept of the presidency 
was different. He advocated change, involvement, reaching out to voluntary 
organisations who contributed enormously to their communities. This was nothing 
new in Childers, he constantly promoted community self-help during his political 
career and saw in the presidency an outlet to further promote and reward such 
endeavours.  
  More than almost anything else he desired ‘to bring about reconciliation in 
the North….but it should be remembered that in relation to matters of immediate live 
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political interest, he could not participate without consulting the government’.178 In 
defining the role of the president as he envisaged it, Childers was not advocating a 
threat to the government or that he would be a Fianna Fáil government in Áras an 
Uachtaráin.  
 The outcome of the election was interpreted as a test of the popularity of the 
coalition government and both Fine Gael and the Labour Party emphasised the 
importance of getting the voters out to support Tom O’Higgins. The successful 
candidate would be above politics, but the presidential election was political. Dr 
Conor Cruise O’Brien stated that ‘the Presidency was a political contest and should be 
honestly seen and presented as such’.179 A letter to each Fine Gael branch secretary on 
the presidential election from the party chairman emphasised that ‘it is extremely 
important that we win the Presidential election and the best way of ensuring this is to 
canvass every voter thoroughly’.180 The coalition government were confident of 
winning the election but did have a draft statement prepared in the event of a Childers 
success. Even though the coalition government went out of their way to make this a 
political election they were prepared to ignore Fianna Fáil’s contribution in the event 
of a Childers victory. The draft statement prepared for the Taoiseach stated: 
Mr Childers will have the good wishes of the Government on entry into 
his high Office….Naturally we, in the National Coalition, were 
disappointed that the strenuous efforts of Mr Tom O’Higgins….were not 
crowned with the success for which we hoped.  
The result of this election, with its remarkably low poll, cannot be taken as 
indicative of how the country would vote if the issue before it was a choice 
of Government.181 
 
A hand-written note at the bottom of the statement conveys the threat posed by 
Childers. It stated that Childers’s success: ‘should be regarded as a victory for Mr 
Childers rather than for the F.F. party, of which Mr Childers is by no means a typical 
member’.182 Though political in nature, it never the less conveys the qualities of the 
man and the genuine appeal Childers had with the electorate. Even though O’Higgins 
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had only narrowly lost to de Valera in 1966 the coalition government were right in 
fearing the qualities that Childers personally possessed.  
 Mr. O’Higgins refusal to engage in open debates on television is testimony to 
the skills of Childers. His eloquent speech and his previous television performances 
were there for all to see. The fact that O’Higgins’s party was in government was one 
of the issues that made him favourite to win the election. It can also be argued that 
this also worked against him. The coalition government urged the electorate to show 
their support for government policies by voting for O’Higgins. However, the budget 
introduced by the coalition government imposed additional taxation on the electorate 
and this was highlighted by Fianna Fáil. It appeared throughout the campaign that the 
Labour party organisation did not have its heart entirely in the election. Fine Gael on 
the other hand perhaps overdid it. Although the overall tone by both sides was worthy 
of the campaign ‘there were several forays into semi-scurrility, which probably earned 
Erskine Childers a lot of votes’.183 The role of back-slapping politician which 
O’Higgins’ colleagues portrayed on him was not ‘natural to him’.184 O’Higgins was a 
more serious and reserved man than projected during his campaign. 
 Childers used the considerable experience he amassed over his lengthy 
political career during his presidential campaign. He had always exhorted farmers to 
modernise methods of farming and if elected he claimed that he would encourage all 
organisations with constructive ideas. He would do ‘everything in his power to 
highlight the need for expanding and developing the advisory services, and the co-
operative societies’.185 Forestry and the establishment of parks and trails were of 
particular interest to Childers. He proposed to open Áras an Uachtaráin on certain 
days and wondered whether part of the large presidential estate ‘might one day be 
used for a National Youth Centre where organisations concerned with the 
advancement of young people could have their headquarters and certain facilities’.186 
This would however need government support and consent. He would continue to 
encourage the arts and favoured the development of national agencies aiding cultural 
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activities. Throughout his campaign Childers addressed a wide range of issues. He 
was particularly interested in the social and community undertakings that came from 
the second Vatican council and urged the formation of parish councils to work with 
all denominations in the creation of community councils.  
 The 1973 presidential campaign was unique given the historical backgrounds 
of both candidates’ families. It is testament to the character of both candidates that 
these historic events were not raised by either during the campaign. This was nothing 
new for Childers; his political career was conducted in the same tone. However, as 
regards campaigns, Childers’s flamboyant tour bus was something new to the 
campaign trail and caused much comment and excitement. In an interview conducted 
on his bus during the campaign Childers stated that: 
I’ve had so many promises of support from independent people who never 
cease telephoning, never cease writing letters, people who come up and 
talk to me, that I think to a very considerable degree it is a question of 
personality. I maybe wrong about that, we’ll have to wait and see.187 
 
Speaking from his blue and gold coloured bus, Childers was sincere in his sentiments. 
His term in health had thrust him into the public limelight and he coped admirably. He 
was now much more comfortably greeting the electorate though he still had, on 
occasions, to be reminded to wave as he journeyed through the electorate. While 
Childers travelled in his eye catching bus, O’Higgins travelled in the traditional car, 
making use of the sun roof to wave to the crowds.188  
As the first results came through on 31 May 1973 it was clear that Childers’s 
opinion had been correct. Childers received fifty-two percent of the valid poll and was 
48,584 votes ahead of his opponent at the end of the count.189 It is significant that de 
Valera’s winning margin over O’Higgins in the 1966 presidential election was 10,568 
votes.190 The success had, according to Childers, left him ‘like a humble clerk who 
found himself in a palace after having a wand waved over him’.191 He also remarked 
that the result was announced on the anniversary of the final end of the civil war in 
1923. 
Following Childers’s success, Seán MacEntee wrote to him and congratulated him: 
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On a clean fight and an unchallengeable victory. How proud your gallant, 
noble father and your good mother would have been, could they have 
foreseen that one day their son would be President of Ireland and would 
have attained that high office by his own devoted service to their 
teachings.192  
 
Childers showed a particular welcome for this letter from a man who had: 
For so long served the National Movement and given dedicated service to 
this country. I need hardly tell you that any service I have been able to 
render to this country has been due to the wonderful education which I had 
from my father and mother, but I should say that the grounding which you 
gave me in administrative work….was absolutely vital to me and I am 
afraid I never thanked you for it.193  
 
Messages of congratulations to Childers poured in far home and abroad. An extract 
from the letter of the parish priest of Castletownbere, County Cork represented the 
thoughts and sympathies of many on Childers election as President of Ireland: 
It is a long cry back to a night during the civil war when I and some more 
young priests hoped & prayed for a reprieve for your honoured father. We 
were terribly disappointed but at long last the Irish nation has made some 
recompense to his memory & to his family….I am delighted too that the 
country has recognised your own patriotic & sterling work & has paid you 
this glorious tribute.194  
 
Throughout his political career Childers benefited from the well organised Fianna Fáil 
organisation and the presidential campaign was no different. In a letter to all 
constituencies, George Colley, National Director of Elections wrote ‘I would like to 
congratulate you on the magnificent work done….we lost the general election….in the 
Presidential election we have served notice to the Coalition that we are on the road 
back’.195  
 International coverage of Childers’s election was widespread with particular 
attention to the fact that he was a Protestant.196 The defeat for Mr O’Higgins was a 
shock for the government which had promoted his candidacy. The tide had turned for 
Childers with the religious factor playing an important role in his election success. No 
doubt he had a genuine appeal to the general electorate, but this electorate used the 
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chance to show militant Protestants in Northern Ireland that there was no religious 
discrimination in the Irish Republic; a view proclaimed by Childers during his 
political career. Whatever the circumstances, this was a remarkable victory for 
Childers. The Irish Times reflected that ‘many Catholics, uncommitted as to party did 
think it the fitting thing….to give the vote to the Protestant’.197 If this was sectarian 
discrimination, then it was of a kind that Northern Ireland could have done with. 
Childers’s personality and grace earned him personal votes that would not have gone 
to Fianna Fáil in a general election.  
 Childers’s presidential victory has also to be viewed in relation to his last 
political success. Throughout his political career Childers was successful at every 
general election he contested, but was never elected on the first count until his final 
election in Monaghan in 1973. On occasions he took the final seat without reaching 
the quota. However, Childers’s constant condemnation of violence and his stance on 
the arms crisis appeared to have finally connected with the electorate. It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that this connection was repeated country-wide in the 
presidential election.  
 With the usual pomp and splendour Childers was inaugurated as the fourth 
President of Ireland in Dublin Castle on 25 June 1973. After the ceremony Childers 
stated that: 
This has been for me a most moving ceremony, particularly in that June 25 
is my father’s birthday anniversary. I am humbly aware of the great 
honour conferred on me. I know I shall need the prayers of the people for 
God’s guidance in performing my duties and in making a meaningful 
contribution to harmony among Irish men and women.198 
 
Throughout his political career Childers never sought any tribute for the death of his 
father. It is ironic that Childers was inaugurated as President of Ireland on 25 June, his 
father’s birthday. If the country was to make retribution to Childers this was indeed a 
fitting occasion. 
 As president, Childers travelled the country to perform official openings of 
community and social centres, school extensions, garden shows and many other social 
and cultural events. He addressed many functions and societies and the preparations 
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for such visits were very detailed and methodical.199 A constant theme in his speeches 
was that of youth and the fostering of community consciousness. His first public 
function was the opening of the Leisureland sports and recreation complex at Salthill 
in County Galway. The future environment for young people was of particular interest 
to Childers and he stated that ‘the work of organisations involved in youth projects is 
as important as the work of government agencies and no one has ever contradicted my 
declamations on this vital subject’.200   
Addressing the annual dinner of Carlow Chamber of Commerce on 1 
November 1974 he said that ‘his principal objective for the next five and a half years 
was to encourage community consciousness in every parish’.201 Back in Monaghan to 
address the opening of community week Childers emphasised the duties of the lay 
community arising out of the second Vatican council and the importance of 
community councils. Addressing post-primary students in Mullingar, County 
Westmeath on 8 November 1974 he spoke on the problem of alcoholism in Ireland. 
Having provided statistics on teenage drinking he advised parents who consented to 
teenagers drinking to ‘teach them to drink moderately’.202 
 Rita Childers was an important asset during Childers political career but 
particularly during the presidential campaign and his term in office. After the 
presidential result, the Woman’s Way magazine published an interview with Rita 
conducted in Áras an Uachtaráin.203 The campaign made her feel welcome and 
everyone wanted to see the Childers’s wife. Rita was a person who reached out to 
people and was comfortable talking to people. The presidential campaign was her first 
campaign. Political campaigns were political but the presidential was according to 
Rita ‘very different. It’s a personality contest’.204 It is obvious from the interview that 
Rita was an enormous asset to Childers. Commenting on the fact that 54% of the 
electorate were women, Rita believed that ‘a great deal of his vote came from 
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women….during the campaign I was besieged everywhere by women telling me to 
look after him’.205  
 Childers concept of a ‘think tank’ never materialised. Cosgrave completely 
dismissed the concept and Childers told Garret FitzGerald that he had ‘no alternative 
but to resign’.206 FitzGerald convinced Childers not to resign but he felt that ‘Childers 
continued to chafe at the restrictions on his actions imposed by his role as non-
executive president’.207 Nevertheless, Childers set himself a demanding schedule 
during his presidency and his health suffered as a consequence. Garret FitzGerald 
stated that: ‘while he was always very correct in the way he accepted the advice 
tendered to him….his frustration was intense, and I believe almost certainly 
contributed to his sudden tragic death’.208 After a distinguished term in health and in 
total control of his department, Childers no doubt found the presidential constraints 
hard to adjust to. He was not helped in creating his vision for the presidency due to 
the fact that Cosgrave and those closest to him ‘were essentially conservative in their 
outlook’.209 Aware of the constraints of his office he was clearly ahead of his time in 
his vision for the presidency.     
 While addressing a function in the Royal College of Physicians, Kildare 
Street, Dublin on 16 November 1974 Childers became ill and died of a heart attack on 
the 17 November 1974. The Irish Independent commented on a ‘Nation bereft….the 
President of all the people….the man who brought the highest office in the land into 
the homes of its citizens’.210 Previous holders of the office had the time and 
opportunity to make their mark on the office. Douglas Hyde completed one full term 
of seven years and Seán T. Ó Ceallaigh and Eamon de Valera both completed two 
terms in office. Childers had only entered his seventeenth month as president. It was 
fitting that Childers last speech as president concerned health. He was addressing the 
issue of mental health, better use of leisure time to combat the stresses of modern life 
and the need for research by experts in that field. He emphasised the problem of job 
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boredom and the ‘ever-growing intake of the milder psychotropic drugs, 
tranquillisers, stimulants and sleeping pills’.211  
In the Dáil, Jack Lynch was among those who paid tribute to Childers: 
He made no secret that he got the greatest feeling of achievement from his 
time as Tánaiste and Minister for Health because….his work there was 
concerned with the whole behaviour of human beings. He remained an 
idealist to his last heartbeat….with charity towards all, and with malice 
towards none.212 
 
Tributes were also paid to Childers in Seanad Éireann. Among those who spoke 
was Senator Robinson, a future President of Ireland, who joined with colleagues 
‘in paying tribute to Erskine Childers. I think the words most frequently used in 
relation to the late President refer to his dedication and his capacity for hard work. 
His greatest achievement as President was to carve out a new role for the 
Presidency in Irish life’.213 Testament from a future president on the innovation 
Childers brought to the presidency even after such a very short time. 
At the memorial service for Childers in Saint Patrick’s Cathedral on 21 of 
November 1974 many of his qualities were alluded to: 
He had that first requisite of a public man: integrity. He could not be 
corrupted. He was sincere….totally committed to peace. It is surprising in 
one….whose family were so involved in our island story, that he made so 
few references to the past. It is the Ireland of the future that concerned him 
most of all. He was a patriot to his finger-tips….recognised that patriotism 
was not enough. After this service we shall bear him out of Dublin 
southwards….to the cemetery at Derralossary…near a field where Parnell 
once played cricket….among the sturdy people of Wicklow,  in the place 
he loved most in all the world.214 
 
Tributes and sympathy were paid by many distinguished people at home and abroad. 
However, it was the thousands of ordinary people who filed through Saint Patrick’s 
Hall in Dublin Castle and who lined the streets of Dublin that truly represented the 
feelings of the Irish people for Childers. More than 11,000 people filed through Saint 
Patrick’s Hall in Dublin Castle paying their last respects to Childers.215   
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In his campaign Childers had committed to use the office of the president to 
try and build a bridge across partition and lay the foundations for a new Ireland based 
on a policy of reconciliation. He believed that the presidency could play a more 
positive role and be a focal point of cultural and environmental issues. Childers was 
not able to fulfil the many goals he set himself as president and this no doubt led to a 
sense of frustration. During his very short time as president, Childers had, according 
to Garret Fitzgerald, to deal with ‘a very strong political figure in Cosgrave and 
Childers was not as tactful as his female successors’.216 Commenting on Childers and 
on his presidential objectives Whitaker remarked that: 
His broad sense of Presidential responsibilities, including social and 
political rapprochement, probably helped to give him a sense of fulfilment. 
He was an honourable man – an idealist with a strong personal 
commitment to the improvement of economic and social conditions in 
Ireland and he did what he could to discharge this commitment.217  
 
Childers was a protégé of de Valera’s, ‘holding high office, before eventually 
becoming president in 1973, an office which he developed, a forerunner of the 
modern presidency’.218  
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Conclusion 
 From his entry into political life in 1938 up to the retirement of Lemass, 
Erskine Hamilton Childers worked with those most prominent in the formation of the 
Fianna Fáil party and the Irish State. While Childers circumstances and family 
connections with those individuals aided his early political career he nevertheless had 
to work hard and be patient. Arguably in his early political career Childers could be 
considered a relic from the civil war era, a reminder of former comrades, and this 
perhaps may have blinded some to Childers’s true strengths. De Valera’s letter to 
Lemass of 15 January 1960 is significant in establishing Childers’s position in 
political circles during this period. In the letter, de Valera thanked Lemass for his visit 
to Áras an Uachtaráin and for the gifts he presented to him. This presentation was of 
particular value to de Valera ‘because they are the gifts of the grand comrades with 
whom I was privileged to work’.1 Childers’s father was one of those comrades and 
this prompted de Valera to take Childers under his wing. Terry de Valera recalled that 
his father, Eamon de Valera, seldom mentioned the civil war and when he did it was 
with great sorrow. When speaking of Robert Erskine Childers, de Valera ‘did so with 
particular sorrow and the deepest sense of loss’.2 Childers owed his political career, or 
at least the beginning of it, to the legacy of his father, Robert Erskine Childers. De 
Valera and Fianna Fáil ‘adopted’ Childers on his return to Ireland in 1931 and 
according to Barry Desmond he ‘would not have survived in Cabinet were it not for 
Dev….and his name’.3 During his teenage years Childers showed some of the anti-
British sentiment associated with his father but the matured Childers was at the 
opposite end of the political spectrum when compared to his father. Childers was of 
moderate political opinion and according to Barry Desmond ‘was in sympathy with 
the position of Ml [Michael] Collins, Treaty wise’.4 Other than rare instances Childers 
avoided public comment on the treaty or his father’s execution. Barry Desmond’s 
recollections of conversations with Childers reveal that Childers was bitter as a result 
of the execution of his father, ‘but decided to adhere to the wishes of his father at all 
times’.5 It is impossible to deduce what effect his silence had on his relationships with 
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 Terry de Valera, A memoir (Dublin, 2004), p.140. 
3
 Letter from Barry Desmond to the author, 17 Oct. 2007. 
4Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
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his party colleagues and his political progress. Following de Valera’s retirement 
Childers’s career stagnated until Lemass retired and was succeeded by Jack Lynch. 
This was the beginning of a new era in Irish politics. Jack Lynch was the first 
Taoiseach to have no direct involvement in the civil war and there is no denying that 
Childers’s political career was boosted by Lynch’s appointment as Taoiseach.  
 During his political career Childers was totally committed to his portfolios and 
set about understanding each one in great detail. His dedication and attention to detail 
marked Childers out as an efficient administrator, but he also showed leadership 
qualities when the occasion arose during the arms crisis. During the twenty-two years 
in which he held government posts, Childers had responsibility for post-war road 
development, tourism, the development of the state broadcasting system, and health 
services. It was as Minister for Health that he made his greatest contribution to the 
nation, his greatest legacy. Despite his many portfolios Childers never held the 
ministry he wanted most of all, that of agriculture. His success as a parliamentary 
secretary and government minister can be gauged from his record over his career.  
In local government he overhauled the local authority audit system, planned 
new road systems, initiated amenity schemes to improve urban areas and improved 
methods of administration. His first term as minister for Posts and Telegraphs, from 
1951-4, was significant for his contribution to the development of the broadcasting 
system. Childers recognised that control of the broadcasting service needed to be 
removed from the civil service. To this end he established a five member council to 
run the broadcasting service on a daily basis. His appointment of Maurice Gorham as 
Director of Radio Éireann was hugely significant, not alone because of his 
broadcasting experience, but also because it was the first such appointment made 
outside of the civil service. Childers could not be generally considered other than a 
conservative politician but his  liberal views on the introduction of new radio 
programming led to the Minister for Finance, Seán MacEntee, making the first series 
of political broadcasts from Radio Éireann in April 1954.  
During his term in lands, from 1957-9, Childers conducted studies into land 
allocations and a thorough examination of Land Commission policies. Although he 
promised change to Land Commission policies, no real changes emerged. Childers 
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desperately wanted to do something for those who were qualified to work the land but 
who had no land. Childers realised too late that there was not enough land available to 
satisfy the demands and was forced to reverse his promise. This setback rightly 
brought criticism of Childers but it should not be seen solely as failure on his part. 
The real failure would have been for Childers to have accepted the situation as he first 
perceived it and done nothing. He did however have more success in relation to 
forestry and fisheries. Childers loved the countryside and initiated plans for forest 
parks, increased forestry planting by the state and campaigned for private forest 
planting. In the fisheries section he increased grants for trawler purchase and 
developed courses for skippers and deck hands.  
As Minister for Transport and Power from 1959-69 he had little control over 
the daily workings of the semi-state companies. The transfer of responsibility for 
tourism in 1961 to Childers gave him the opportunity to work in an environment he 
understood and could contribute to. He campaigned for additional funding to develop 
tourism in general and promoted the island of Ireland as one tourist destination. This 
was significant in that it was one of the few occasions when he and Lemass were 
singing from the same hymn sheet.   
It was however as Minister for Health from 1969-73 that Childers made his 
greatest impact and contribution. The advances in the health services during his term 
were considerable and long lasting. Among the highlights were the establishment of 
the health boards, the introduction of the choice-of-doctor scheme and the promotion 
of community care for the aged. Throughout his political career Childers encouraged 
community development, self-help and local ownership of projects. This was a 
constant theme in all his ministerial portfolios and during his very short term as 
president. Childers also devoted much time to child care services and to the causes of 
mental illness. Diarmaid Ferriter stated that Childers was one of the ‘more capable 
ministers that Fianna Fáil had produced….he had vision….he did think in the long 
term about things….marked him out as being somewhat different’.6 Childers was 
somewhat of a visionary and considered the long term view but he can stand accused 
of being blinded solely by short-term economic considerations in dealing with the 
issue of uneconomic railways. He was aware of the necessity to upgrade the 
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transportation system and maximise its potential locally and benefit to tourism in 
general. The 1958 Transport Act gave Coras Iompair Éireann the authority to close 
uneconomic railways but Childers never once argued for their retention on the 
grounds of future potential. In relation to the closing of uneconomic railways, 
Childers’s spirit of community development and his vision for the future sadly 
abandoned him. 
Despite his efforts to do his best in his various ministries there is always a 
sense that Childers was never a politician at heart, that he never fully understood the 
Irish political system and the relationship in Irish politics that exists between 
politician and electorate. He did not play politics with the public but had a relationship 
and trust based on his sincerity and sense of honour. During most of Childers’s 
political career memories and emotions of the civil war were still fresh. The execution 
of his father ‘even in the extremity of the anti Treaty campaign, outrageous at that 
time’ coupled with his veil of silence on the issue cemented a relationship with the 
electorate.7 His early political success was of course down to the fact that Fianna Fáil 
was very well organised at local level. Childers name was also of considerable benefit 
during his career and de Valera ensured the political career of the son of his former 
colleague, whom he greatly admired. However despite all of this the electorate would 
not have returned Childers to Dáil Éireann election after election were it not for his 
own personal attributes. He came from a privileged background and education system. 
He was proud of his upbringing, yet his sense of modesty and humility endeared him 
to the Irish public. Paradoxically, the fact that he was different from most other 
politicians worked in his favour. His electoral success in the constituency of Athlone-
Longford and Longford-Westmeath from 1938 to 1961 is more remarkable given that 
he never lived in the constituency and he was a Protestant with an English upbringing. 
His goal was to serve and the people rewarded his efforts.  
 Childers’s attachment to Ireland and his exposure to Irish politics from an 
early age prompted his return to Ireland in 1931. From letters to his family and letters 
from individuals to Childers it is clear that he always wanted to return to Ireland and 
commence a political career. The influence of his parents, in particular his father, was 
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immense and this further strengthened his desire to return to Ireland and serve what he 
considered his country as best he could.  
 The dominance of the Catholic Church in Ireland right through Childers’s 
political career did have a negative effect on his career prospects at ministerial level. 
It is no coincidence that Childers received his first senior portfolio some four years 
after the Second Vatican Council. Childers did assert that Protestants were not 
discriminated against in southern Ireland but Childers’s case must be viewed at an 
entirely different level. When it came to the position of high ministerial office in the 
state Childers did feel that his Protestantism worked against him. The negative impact 
his Protestantism had at ministerial level was certainly not reflected at the polling 
stations throughout his political career or the presidential election; in fact it helped 
him in the presidential election. His desire for peace and reconciliation was constantly 
rewarded by his constituents and admired by his political colleagues.    
However, it must also be noted that the resignation of Lemass also occurred 
during this period. The varying work styles of Lemass and Childers meant that 
generally they could not work effectively together, their work on issues relating to 
Northern Ireland being a notable exception. While Childers was aware that Lemass 
paid little attention to his ideas, he never the less continued to do his best and his 
reward arrived when Jack Lynch became Taoiseach in 1966.   
The influence and prominence of many of Childers’s political colleagues must 
be considered when reviewing his political achievements. Leadership style was an 
important factor in communications with Childers. De Valera resolved to convince his 
colleagues through argument and discussion until they agreed with his position. 
Lemass was not as patient as de Valera and Lynch recognised the potential and 
loyalty in Childers, and made allowance for his elaborate memoranda to government. 
Childers repaid Lynch for his confidence in him with his contribution to the 
government through a very difficult period in the early 1970s. This was an occasion 
when Childers’s broader views on life, and his exposure to many cultures, helped him 
to remain outside the many factions within the Fianna Fáil party and assist Lynch in 
maintaining control within the government. Childers played a key role in Fianna Fáil 
seeing off the extreme elements within the party during this period. 
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             By nature Childers was somewhat of a loner and did not have many political 
friends. Boarding school and the degree to which his father was absent in his early life 
no doubt made Childers more independent but he still remained very close to his 
family. He would not be found socialising with fellow deputies after Dáil proceedings 
and this would certainly have contributed to the image of him as being distant. It was 
paradoxical, or perhaps an indication of a broader mind, that his father sent Childers to 
England for his education, while he himself was doing what he could to rid Ireland of 
English influence. Childers was aware that he was regarded as ‘an aloof sort of 
person’.8 Whereas people would address the Taoiseach as Jack, the Tánaiste was 
invariably addressed as Mr Childers. In contrasting both men, the vote pulling appeal of 
Lynch and his ability to identify with all sections of society is a gift which cannot be 
easily developed. Although Childers did not have this particular asset, he was respected 
for his principles and his work ethic. Childers said of himself ‘I have neither the 
charisma of Jack Lynch nor the mystique of de Valera’.9 Reflecting on his career 
Childers stated that: 
The Irish people will have to decide whether I’ve ever contributed 
anything in my own right at all. I’ve been very privileged by having such 
parents. I had the most marvellous education. I was brought up in a family 
in which belief in public service, in the service of others, was a kind of 
hallmark of their own whole existence. It’s been quite impossible for me 
to live up to what I believe would be my father’s and mother’s 
expectations. I’ve just done my best.10 
 
Testament to his modesty and humility and the enormous expectations placed on 
Childers by his parents. Childers lived his life fulfilling what he considered the 
expectations of his parents. The enormous influence of his father and the promises he 
made to his father prior to his execution dominated Childers’s political life. He stated 
‘for the whole of my political life I did do my utmost to carry out his promises in 
every way possible’.11 This burden placed on Childers meant silence on many issues 
of public interest and meant that he could not share his feelings on many issues that 
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 Irish Independent, 22 Feb. 1973 (T.C.D., Childers papers, MS 9977/681). 
9
 From speech at University of Limerick during presentation ceremony of Doctor of Laws to Jack 
Lynch (http://www.ul.ie/vpacad/HonDocs/Cit-Jack%20Lynch.htm) (16 May 2007). 
10
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caused him great hurt. His daughter Nessa Childers gave her thoughts on her father’s 
dilemma: 
What happens to somebody when all those other feelings they have, have 
to go underground. I have a lot of speculation about that and I have some 
problems about him being asked to do that. Death bed promises are 
dangerous things because they completely imprison somebody in a 
particular way of thinking and feeling.12 
  
 After dedicating most of his adult life to the service of the Irish people Childers found 
fulfilment and personal reward in the health ministry. He was so engrossed in the 
health portfolio that he initially refused to consider running for the presidency. 
Reflecting on his life during the presidential campaign in 1973, Childers stated that: 
The one great mistake I made in my life was asking the Taoiseach’s, Prime 
Ministers for economic ministries because when I became Minister for 
Health I realised I should have always sought social ministries. The 
ministry of health was the most rewarding experience of my whole life.13  
  
 His public life can be summed up in the words of Maurice Manning: 
In retrospect Erskine Childers will be seen as a man who made a very 
significant and individual contribution to our public life over the past 35 
years-as a dedicated public servant in the fullest sense of these words, as a 
politician whose integrity was always beyond question, as an open-minded 
and innovating administrator, as a reforming Minister, especially in Health 
and Posts and Telegraphs, as a Parliamentarian whose devotion to the 
institution of parliament was total, and as a President whose short period 
in office was characterised by qualities of dignity and nobility.14 
 
Whatever can be said about his contributions during his political career he 
always did his best. Childers did not achieve his ambitions for the presidency even 
allowing for his short term in office. It would have been possible, indeed almost 
expected, for Childers to develop his career outside of politics and indeed outside of 
Ireland. However, that option was never one that Childers seriously considered. 
Coupled with the fact that he devoted his life to public service in Ireland it is not too 
remarkable to say that he attached no blame to Ireland for the death of his father. It is 
a difficult task to sum up the contribution of a man who gave his life to public service. 
It is possible to accumulate the positives and the negatives and come to a reasonable 
conclusion. But that methodology is not appropriate or sufficient on this occasion. 
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What is really worthwhile and lasting is the fact that Erskine Hamilton Childers set 
out to repair whatever hurt and violence was caused to Ireland by the Childers name. 
He did this by extending the hand of friendship to all and living a life of peace and 
reconciliation. Having sown the seeds of the modern day presidency, he also 
contributed to the path of reconciliation on the island of Ireland. There is a danger of 
eulogising Childers but the historical record speaks for itself. Childers was not perfect 
but he does indeed deserve credit for dedicating his life to the service of the state.  
At a lunch with Jack Lynch not long before his death, Childers expressed his 
own ambitions for the after-life. He stated that: ‘when I die I must be able to meet my 
Father, who will ask me what I did for my country, Ireland. I want to be able to meet 
him face to face and to answer: I did my very, very best, Father’.15   
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